MURAWSKI REALTY LLC v. POWELL XYZ (2025)

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:

Papers Numbered

Notice of Motion and

Affidavits /Affirmations annexed 1 & 2

Cross-Motion and Affirmations 4, 5 & 6

Answering Affidavits/Affirmation 7 (Ex. A)

Memoranda of Law 3; 8, 9

Other

Upon the foregoing cited papers, and after oral arguments on April 9, 2025, and June 30, 2025, the Decision/Order on the respondent-undertenants' motion to compel discovery (Mot. Seq. #3) and the petitioner's cross-motion to identify the respondent-undertenants and amend the caption (Mot. Seq. #4) are decided as follows:

This is a commercial landlord-tenant matter involving the eviction of Respondent, Britton Powell d/b/a Another New York Skyline from the premises located at 557 Leonard Street, Second Floor, Brooklyn, NY 11222. At the outset of this proceeding, the undertenants, John Does 1-3 (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent-Undertenants,”) moved to intervene. That application was resolved by a so-ordered stipulation dated February 4, 2025.

MOTION SEQUENCE #3

Respondent-Undertenants now move this Court to compel discovery pursuant to the February 4, 2025 so-ordered stipulation. The Court notes that the Notice of Motion submitted by Respondent-Undertenants, is improperly captioned, identifying themselves as “Petitioner.” Respondent-Undertenants allege that although Petitioner, Murawski Realty, LLC, has produced the lease agreement between Petitioner and Respondent Powell, it has failed to provide “full and complete responses to the discovery request,” thereby hindering their ability to properly litigate this matter.

In opposition, Petitioner contends that the lease discussed and agreed upon during conference was provided to the parties. Petitioner further asserts that Respondent-Undertenants' additional demands required leave of court, which was not obtained; that the demands are improper in the context of a summary proceeding; and that Petitioner never consented to produce them. Petitioner avers that Respondent-Undertenants' request for bank records constitutes a fishing expedition that is intrusive and irrelevant to the issues at hand in this summary proceeding.

In their Reply, Respondent-Undertenants argue that Petitioner executed the stipulation, which provides for the discovery of “documents related to this case,” and that any prior discussions before executing the stipulation are irrelevant. They further contend that, based on text messages provided by Respondent Powell, Petitioner lacks credibility in asserting that no relevant documents exist. Respondent-Undertenants assert that the text messages reveal a relationship that does not reflect a “conventional commercial landlord and tenant” arrangement, but rather the appearance of a “partnership enterprise.” They maintain that discovery is warranted, as it may illuminate the nature of the use and occupancy of the premises and the issue of the Court's jurisdiction over them. Respondent-Undertenants conclude that Petitioner is acting in bad faith by refusing to provide discovery while simultaneously demanding disclosure of Respondent-Undertenants' identities and an accounting of the escrow funds held by their counsel.

Standard

CPLR § 3101(a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matters material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” CPLR § 3101(a). It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to supervise disclosure and set reasonable terms and conditions therefor, and absent an improvident exercise of that discretion, its determination will not be disturbed. Leibowitz v. Babad, 175 A.D.3d 639, 106 N.Y.S.3d 380 (2nd Dept. 2019).

Analysis

The analysis in New York University v. Farkas, 121 Misc.2d 643, 468 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Civ. Ct. 1983), is instructive on the standard for granting a motion for discovery in summary eviction proceedings. There, the Court explained that “[t]he invention of the summary proceeding was designed to provide the landlord with a simple, expeditious, and inexpensive means of regaining possession of his premises in cases where the tenant refused upon demand to pay rent, or where he wrongfully held over without permission after the expiration of the term.” The court concluded that “disclosure may assist the speedy disposition of a case when it has served the purpose of clarifying the issues for trial.” Id. at 648, 468 N.Y.S.2d 808.

Consistent with the summary nature of a special proceeding, CPLR § 408 generally disallows pretrial disclosure without leave of court. See, Practice Commentaries, NY C.P.L.R. 408 (McKinney)(2025). See also, Bramble v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 125 A.D.3d 856, 4 N.Y.S.3d 238 (2nd Dept. 2015)(“In a special proceeding, ․ disclosure is available only by leave of the court”); New York Univ. v. Farkas, supra. Notably, while there may be a presumption against discovery in summary proceedings, case law has established exceptions. However, the condition precedent to qualifying as an exception—namely, that leave of court is obtained—has not been met by Respondent-Undertenants herein.

To the extent Respondent-Undertenants argue a prior so-ordered stipulation called for disclosure of all “documents related to this case,” thereby obviating the need for leave of court to bring the present motion to compel, the Court finds that argument unavailing. Surely, counsel should have anticipated that reasonable minds can differ as to what constitutes “documents related to this case,” and that the stipulation was not a carte blanche to produce any conceivable document any party may request. This is precisely the sort of issue that leave of court is intended to resolve before a discovery motion is filed.

As Respondent-Undertenants failed to seek leave of court to bring their motion to compel discovery, the motion is denied, without prejudice.

MOTION SEQUENCE #4

Petitioner, in its Cross-Motion and Opposition, seeks to compel the disclosure of Respondent-Undertenants' identities, amend the caption to reflect the same, and obtain an accounting of the monies held in escrow by Respondent-Undertenants' counsel. Petitioner argues that their agreement to permit Respondent-Undertenants to intervene in the proceeding anonymously was temporary and based on the absence of privity between the parties. Petitioner further contends that a judgment of possession against John Does would nonetheless result in the recovery of the premises—the ultimate relief sought.

Petitioner asserts that because Respondent-Undertenants have actively participated in this litigation, including filing an Answer and asserting entitlement to rent-stabilized leases, they should no longer be permitted to proceed under the cloak of anonymity. Identifying the Respondent-Undertenants, according to Petitioner, would allow for amendment of the caption and proper prosecution of the case. Additionally, Petitioner argues it is entitled to an accounting of all monies that Respondent-Undertenants' counsel claims are held in his firm's escrow account on their behalf.

ANONYMITY ISSUE

Respondent-Undertenants oppose the relief sought in the cross-motion, seeking to compel disclosure of their identities. They argue that disclosure is “unnecessary and harmful to their right to privacy.” According to Respondent-Undertenants, Petitioner's insistence on disclosure is both tactical and punitive. They maintain that the issue is one of discovery—not final resolution—and should be treated accordingly.

The parties were directed to submit a memorandum of law to further flesh out the anonymity issue. Petitioner argues that Respondent-Undertenants do not have a substantial privacy right sufficient to outweigh the constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. Petitioner emphasizes that by asserting residential occupancy rights, invoking the protections of the Rent Stabilization Code, and initiating a separate action to access the premises' electrical system, Respondent-Undertenants are active participants in this litigation and should not continue anonymously.

Petitioner contends that courts have analyzed anonymity under the factors articulated in Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2008), including: (1) whether litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and of personal nature; (2) whether identification poses risk of retaliatory harm to party seeking to proceed anonymously or even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) whether identification presents other harms and likely severity of those harms; (4) whether plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to possible harms of disclosure; (5) whether suit is challenging actions of government or that of private parties; (6) whether defendant is prejudiced by allowing plaintiff to press claims anonymously; (7) whether plaintiff's identity has thus far been kept confidential; (8) whether public's interest in litigation is furthered by requiring plaintiff to disclose his identity; (9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of issues presented or otherwise, there is atypically weak public interest in knowing litigants' identities; and (10) whether there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting confidentiality of plaintiff. Petitioner argues that, under these factors, generalized discomfort or litigation strategy is insufficient to justify anonymity, particularly where no specific harm has been demonstrated.

Respondent-Undertenants, however, contend that anonymity should be preserved to prevent harm from being publicly named in connection with a potentially unlawful eviction proceeding. They assert that anonymity is a good faith attempt to avoid prejudice while the Court addresses core jurisdictional issues. Disclosure, they argue, could damage their future rental prospects, imply acquiescence, and prejudice defenses related to service and due process.

Further, they argue that under the Sealed Plaintiff factors, the potential for reputational harm, housing blacklisting, rental denial, or retaliatory litigation justifies continued anonymity. Respondent-Undertenants also argue that Petitioner suffers no prejudice and that the public interest in disclosure is minimal, given the private nature of the dispute. Finally, they assert that jurisdictional issues must be resolved before disclosure to protect their due process rights and preserve potential statutory protections arising from a residential tenancy.

Standard

[W]hen balancing the plaintiff's claimed right to privacy against the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings, the scale tips in favor of disclosure. Doe v. Kidd, 19 Misc.3d 782, 860 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 2008); see also, Anonymous v. Lerner, 124 A.D.3d 487, 998 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1st Dept. 2015)(citations omitted)(The determination of whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed anonymously requires the court to “use its discretion in balancing plaintiff's privacy interest against the presumption in favor of open trials and against any potential prejudice to defendant”). Anonymity is warranted only where there exists “a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” Id., citing, Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

A party seeking anonymity is required to provide evidence to corroborate the allegations in support of the request. GCVAWCG-Doe v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of New York, 69 Misc.3d 648, 132 N.Y.S.3d 557 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020), citing, Doe v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 66 Misc.3d 444, 115 N.Y.S.3d 853 (Nassau Cty. Sup. Ct. 2019). Only in the most unique and compelling of cases should the court shield the identity of a party from all other parties. GCVAWCG-Doe v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of New York, supra. “To do otherwise jeopardizes the opposing party's right to due process” Id., citing, Doe v. MacFarland, 66 Misc.3d 604, 117 N.Y.S.3d 476 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 2019).

Analysis

Upon careful review, the Court finds that Respondent-Undertenants have not identified a substantial privacy right sufficient to overcome the presumption of openness of judicial proceedings. This case does not involve trade secrets, national security, “trial by newspaper,” imminent physical threats, or other core exceptions to transparency. While the Court is sympathetic to concerns of reputational harm, such harm is not sufficient, on its own, to override the longstanding legal principles governing public access to judicial proceedings.

Moreover, Respondent-Undertenants have failed to provide evidence corroborating their claims of harm. The possibility of being “blacklisted” by future landlords is a risk faced by virtually every respondent in a summary proceeding—residential or commercial. Permitting anonymity under such generalized concerns would cause the integrity of our judicial system to be undermined by secrecy and selective transparency. Furthermore, it is noted that the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 prohibits landlords from using a tenants' eviction history in a discriminatory manner.

Even if Petitioner is not materially prejudiced by nondisclosure, as Respondent-Undertenants argues, that consideration carries less weight here. What is paramount is the public's right to know.

Lastly, while Respondent-Undertenants' papers express an intent to preserve issues for appellate review, notably absent from the record are motions to dismiss based on lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. It is therefore improper to resist disclosure on jurisdictional grounds that have not been properly raised before the Court.

Privacy concerns, while legitimate, do not automatically justify anonymity. The public's right to monitor the workings of the judiciary remains paramount. It ensures accountability, guards against injustice, and preserves confidence in the legal system. Based on the foregoing, this court concludes that the suppression of Respondent-Undertenants' identity in the pleadings is unwarranted.

Accordingly, the part of Petitioner's motion seeking to compel disclosure is granted and its motion to amend the caption is also granted.

ACCOUNTING ISSUE

As part of its cross-motion, Petitioner argues that it is entitled to an accounting of the monies held in escrow by Counsel for Respondent-Undertenants. Respondent-Undertenants have allegedly deposited their monthly use and occupancy payments into their counsel's firm's escrow account, pending either the outcome of this matter or a Court Order.

In opposition, Respondent-Undertenants contend that the request for an accounting is premature and misleading. They further assert that liability has not yet been determined and that Petitioner has failed to properly apply for such relief, warranting denial of the application.

Analysis

The Court believes that Petitioner's request for an accounting may constitute a demand for injunctive relief. Specifically, Petitioner seeks a directive compelling disclosure of funds held in escrow prior to any adjudication of liability. The Court believes such relief likely exceeds the jurisdictional authority of this Court, particularly given that the matter was commenced as a holdover proceeding seeking possession only, and Petitioner has not cited any precedent establishing the Civil Court's authority to direct an accounting in this context. See, Chung v. Kim, 170 A.D.2d 232, 565 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1st Dept. 1991) (“Equitable relief sought ․ including injunction against sale of business, constructive trust on partnership monies, inspection of books, and accounting, was not within jurisdiction of [C]ivil [C]ourt ․”) (emphasis added); see also, Topaz Realty Corp. v. Morales, 9 Misc 3d 27, 801 N.Y.S.2d 479 (App. Term, 2nd Dept. 2005) (“․ [A]n order directing landlord's attorney to release funds being held in escrow was equitable and injunctive in nature and, thus, not within the limited equitable and injunctive powers of the Civil Court”); Priel ex rel. Priel v. Linarello, 7 Misc.3d 64, 794 N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. Term, 2005), aff'd sub nom. Priel v. Linarello, 44 A.D.3d 835, 843 N.Y.S.2d 436 (2007) (“The New York City Civil Court has limited equitable jurisdiction, and within those limitations it lacks jurisdiction over partnership accountings”).

Although the Court does not suggest that it will never have jurisdiction in matters seeking accountings in the context of commercial landlord-tenant cases, it is veering on the side of caution in this instance. Nothing in this decision shall be construed to preclude the parties from raising the issue of an accounting by further order of the court or once liability has been determined, should the procedural and jurisdictional posture be properly supported at that time.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's application for an accounting is denied without prejudice.

Accordingly, it is hereby

Ordered, that Respondent-Undertenants' motion to compel discovery (Mot. Seq. #3) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED, that Petitioner's motion (Mot. Seq. #4), seeking to compel disclosure, to amend the caption, and for an accounting, is granted in part and denied in part, as stated herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that counsel for Respondent-Undertenants is directed to refile its Memorandum of Law under Motion Sequence #4, and not as Motion Sequence #5 as currently labeled (see NYSCEF Do. 37); and it is further

Ordered, that counsel for Petitioner shall submit a proposed order to amend the caption to the Court via email to: ki-civil-803@nycourts.gov, copying all parties, on or before the close of business on August 8, 2025.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Lola Waterman, J.