Naadiyah Mustaffa, Plaintiff, v. Experian, Defendant. (2026)

The following papers were read on this motion:

PAPERS: NUMBERED

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 1

Answering Affidavits 2

Reply Affidavits 3

Upon the foregoing papers, Defendant moves pursuant to CPLR Section 3211(a)(3) and CPLR Section 3211(a)(7) seeking to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff has opposed the motion, and a reply affirmation was provided. Upon review and consideration of all papers submitted, the Defendant's motion is hereby GRANTED for the following reasons:

Plaintiff's action arises from a dispute over allegedly inaccurate information on her credit report with respect to five of Plaintiff's accounts. The Defendant, Experian, is a consumer credit reporting agency. Prior to commencing this action, Plaintiff sent three dispute letters to the Defendant, to which Defendant responded requesting further information and providing instructions and details on Experian's dispute investigation process. (See, Complaint ¶ 8-13). On July 16, 2025, Plaintiff subsequently filed a summons and complaint alleging that the Defendant violated various provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). Specifically, the complaint alleges that the defendant violated 15 USC Section 1681i(a), which provides that a consumer reporting agency such as Defendant shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information. (See, Complaint ¶ 20, 22). Plaintiff also alleges the defendant also violated 15 USC Section 1681e(b), which requires Defendant to establish procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy of information concerning the individual about whom the report relates and to further remove any information which is inaccurate. (See, Complaint ¶ 21, 23-24). Further, the complaint alleges that, based on the Defendant's violations, the Plaintiff has suffered: actual damages, including but not limited to; loss of credit, damage to reputation, embarrassment, humiliation and other mental, physical and emotional distress. (See, Complaint ¶ 23,31).

Defendant Experian filed the instant motion seeking dismissal of the Complaint on three grounds: (1) that Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) for failure to allege an injury in fact; (2) that Plaintiff's claims fail to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) because her conclusory damages allegations failed to sufficiently allege that Experian furnished factually inaccurate or materially misleading information; and (3) that Plaintiff's claims fail to state a cause of action pursuant to 3211(a)(7) because her FCRA claims are preempted by the FCRA, 15 USC § 1681 et seq. The Defendant convincingly argues that this instant matter is identical to a similar matter decided by this Court in Munir v. Experian. Index no: CV-031190/24 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County), wherein the complaint was dismissed for failure to allege a concrete injury, and that this Court should therefore similarly dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.

In opposition, Plaintiff repeats the same conclusory allegations and argues that this matter is distinguishable from Munir, in that allegedly detailed information about the disputed accounts were provided and that these specific accounts were sufficient to confer her capacity to sue under New York law and that her claims are not pre-empted by the FCRA.

Under 3211(a)(3), a party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against them on the ground that the party asserting the cause of action lacks standing to sue. It is well settled that "standing is a threshold determination that a person should be allowed access to the courts to adjudicate the merits of a particular dispute" (Frankel v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 193 AD3d 689, 690 [2d Dept 2021], citing Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 769 [1991]). "Where a CPLR Section 3211(a)(3) motion is based upon an alleged lack of standing, the burden is on the moving defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiff's lack of standing as a matter of law." (Sizova v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 217 AD3d 1007, 1007-1008 [2d Dept 2023]). Here, the Court finds that the Defendant has met its prima facie burden.

While the Plaintiff contends that the New York standing requirement is more flexible than the federal Article III in that New York applies a two-part test to determine standing, the parties appear to agree in that the test requires that: (1) the plaintiff must establish an injury-in-fact; and (2) the asserted injury must be within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the statute allegedly violated. (See Matter of Ass'n for a Better Long Is., Inc. v. New York State Dept of Envt'l Conservation, 23 NY3d 1, 6 [2014]).

Herein, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to establish in the complaint any injury in fact resulting from the alleged inaccurate information. The complaint fails to allege any current or past hardship beyond the alleged statutory violation itself. Bare conclusory allegations without any factual specificity are insufficient to allege any cause of action. (See Pinkesz v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 AD3d 886. 227 MUS3d 127 [2d Dept., 2025]). Thus, the Court holds that the Plaintiff has failed to allege that she suffered any concrete injury. As to the second prong, the Court also finds that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that the alleged injury was within the zone of interest to be protected by the statute.

Consequently, the complaint fails to assert any legitimate claims and the motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby GRANTED.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: March 12, 2026

Queens, New York

HON. FANIA JEAN, J.C.C

Fania Jean, J.