KIMBALL AUSTIN SACHS v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition seeks to prohibit respondent Judge Jessica Peterson from adjudicating petitioner's motion to set aside his judgment of conviction and withdraw his guilty plea. Petitioner has also filed an emergency motion to stay the October 5, 2026, hearing on his motion.¹

Mandamus is properly requested to compel the district court to perform a legally required act or to correct a manifest abuse of discretion. NRS 34.160; Walker v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 678, 680, 476 P.3d 1194, 1196-97 (2020). Prohibition may issue when a district court exceeds its jurisdiction. NRS 34.320. Whether a petition seeking such relief will be considered by this court, however, is purely discretionary, Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851-52 (1991), and it is the petitioner's burden to demonstrate that writ review is warranted, Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).

Having considered the petition and supporting documents, we are not persuaded that our extraordinary intervention is warranted. Petitioner asserts that due process requires adjudication of his motion by a different judge because the motion accuses Judge Peterson of coercion, and thus her impartiality could be reasonably questioned, per NCJC 2.11(A). He further explains that he has submitted a referral to the Nevada Attorney General Public Integrity Office for investigation of his allegations of perjury and other misconduct against Judge Peterson. This is insufficient to meet the standards for issuing mandamus or prohibition.

This court will not consider writ petitions that raise factual issues in the first instance. Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). Here, while petitioner apparently submitted notices to the chief judge, chief justice, and Judge Peterson seeking reassignment, he has not shown that he followed the proper procedures by moving to disqualify Judge Peterson, and he has not provided for this court's review any order denying such a motion. Moreover, while a judge may have an obligation under NCJC 2.11 to recuse herself when warranted even absent a motion, petitioner sets forth the asserted grounds for Judge Peterson's “self-disqualification” within the motion to set aside itself, and Judge Peterson has not yet ruled on petitioner's motion or otherwise refused to address the recusal concerns noted therein. Recusal is not automatic in this situation. As noted by a New York court, “[t]he mere allegation of court coercion should not in and of itself disqualify a Judge/Justice from deciding a motion. If a mere allegation of court misconduct were enough, then litigants could, by making such claims, disqualify a Judge/Justice whom the litigant does not like.” People v. Lewis, 630 N.Y.S.2d 605, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1995); see also In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the filing of a complaint or suit against a judge does not automatically require recusal). Accordingly, the recusal issue has not been resolved below, and we thus decline to consider it at this time. We further note that, if necessary, petitioner may raise the recusal issue in any appeal from an adverse determination on his motion. See Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 841. We decline to intervene and

ORDER the petition DENIED.²

Stiglich, J.

Cadish, J.

Lee, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As the October 5 hearing has been rescheduled to November 16, we decline to give this matter emergency treatment under NRAP 21(a)(6). See NRAP 27(e) (governing the standards for emergency relief).

2.   In light of this order, petitioner's motion for stay is denied as moot, as is any relief requested in his October 19, 2026, notice.