RICHARD CLIFFORD MCINTYRE v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of possession of less than 14 grams of a controlled substance. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Kathleen M. Drakulich, Judge.

Appellant Richard McIntyre pleaded guilty to first- or second-time possession of less than 14 grams of methamphetamine under NRS 453.336(2)(a). The district court deferred judgment as required by statute and set forth specific conditions for McIntyre under NRS 176.211. These conditions included to refrain from using or possessing drugs and to be supervised by the Division of Parole and Probation. During the deferral period, the Division assessed McIntyre a technical violation for testing positive for controlled substances, and the parties stipulated to a 30-day limited remand to custody. Several months later, McIntyre received another technical violation for possessing drug paraphernalia and failing to report his attendance at Narcotics Anonymous meetings to the Division. The district court revoked its deferral of judgment, adjudicated McIntyre guilty under NRS 453.336(2)(a), and sentenced him to 19 to 48 months.

McIntyre argues the district court abused its discretion by revoking his deferral of judgment without exhausting graduated sanctions. We review for an abuse of discretion. See Sheridan v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 567 P.3d 345, 347 (2025).

According to McIntyre, because a term of the deferred judgment was to report to the Division, the process for revoking his deferred status for technical violations should have been the same as those outlined for revoking probation under NRS 176A.510(7) and NRS 176A.630(2)(d). Those provisions require the exhaustion of graduated sanctions before probation may be revoked for a technical violation.

When the district court defers judgment pursuant to NRS 176.211, the court may set forth specific conditions for the defendant. NRS 176.211(2). Those conditions may include placement on probation and imposition of any conditions which may normally be imposed on a probationer. NRS 176.211(2)(f). If the defendant complies with the conditions for a prescribed time period, the district court must dismiss the charges without adjudicating guilt. NRS 176.211(5). However, if the defendant violates a term or condition during the deferral period, the district court may revoke the deferral of judgment. NRS 176.211(4). NRS 176.211(4) makes no distinction between technical and non-technical violations and imposes no requirement to use graduated sanctions before the deferral may be revoked. By the plain language of NRS 176.211(4), the district court may revoke a deferral of judgment for any violation. Although McIntyre was subject to similar conditions as a probationer, the conditions were imposed under NRS 176.211 rather than the probation statutes in NRS Chapter 176A. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking McIntyre's deferred status without exhausting graduated sanctions.

We are also unpersuaded by McIntyre's argument that NRS 176.211 must be read in conjunction with the probation statutes. Although NRS 176.211(2) refers to probation statutes in explaining what conditions the district court may impose on a deferral of judgment, it refers only to the statutes covering general conditions of probation, not the statutes addressing technical violations. See NRS 176.211(2) (referencing NRS 176A.400 and NRS 176A.500, but not NRS 176A.610).

Nonetheless, as the State concedes, reversal is warranted. Upon revoking McIntyre's deferred status, the district court was required by statute to allow McIntyre an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea because the deferred judgment was implemented for a violation of NRS 453.336(2)(a). NRS 176.211(4)(b) (stating that when judgment is deferred for a violation of NRS 453.336(2)(a), the court must allow the defendant to withdraw their plea if the court terminates the deferral). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

Cadish, J.