BRYAN LEE HALL v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge.

A jury found appellant Bryan Lee Hall guilty of first-degree murder and robbery and sentenced Hall to death for the murder. This court affirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal. See Hall v. State (Hall I), No. 62663, 2015 WL 6447296 (Nev. Oct. 22, 2015) (Order of Affirmance). Hall filed a timely postconviction habeas petition, which, among other claims, alleged that trial and appellate counsel should have challenged the admission of Hall's California juvenile records during the penalty phase of trial. On appeal from an order denying that petition, we affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective-assistance claim related to the admission of Hall's juvenile records. Hall v. State (Hall II), No. 81994, 2022 WL 17543910, at *1-2 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2022) (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding). After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court again denied the petition. This appeal followed.

Hall argues that the district court erred in concluding that trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of the California juvenile records on either of two different theories: as violating the Fifth Amendment and as violating California law. We disagree and affirm.

To prove ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, a petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113-14 (1996) (applying the Strickland test to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). First, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, the petitioner must show resulting prejudice such that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Id. Both components of the inquiry must be shown. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. The petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). On appeal, we give deference to the district court's factual findings—if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous—but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

Hall did not demonstrate ineffective assistance based on a violation of the Fifth Amendment

Hall asserts that counsel should have challenged the use of psychological evaluations in the California juvenile records on Fifth Amendment grounds. Because the evaluations were court-ordered, Hall contends counsel should have challenged the records under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). Hall has not demonstrated deficient performance for two reasons.

First, both trial and appellate counsel challenged the admission of the psychological records under Redmen v. State, 108 Nev. 227, 234, 828 P.2d 395, 400 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Alford v. State, 111 Nev. 1409, 906 P.2d 714 (1995). In Redmen, we explained that “psychiatric evidence purporting to predict the future dangerousness of a defendant is highly unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible at death penalty sentencing hearings.” Id. We conclude trial counsel made a reasonable objection to the use of the psychological records at trial based on Redmen. See Johnson v. State, 133 Nev. 571, 576, 402 P.3d 1266, 1273-74 (2017) (“[A]n attorney is not constitutionally deficient simply because another attorney would have taken a different approach.”). Because trial counsel preserved that alleged error, appellate counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the use of the psychological records on the same basis. See Hall I, 2015 WL 6447296, at *4; see also Anderson v. United States, 393 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The question ․ is not whether counsel's choice to omit the argument on appeal was an intelligent or effective decision, but rather whether [the] decision was an unreasonable one which only an incompetent attorney would adopt.” (citation modified)).

Second, Hall has not shown that counsel omitted a clearly meritorious challenge. Hall relies on multiple cases recognizing that statements made during court-ordered psychological evaluations cannot be used against defendants at trial. E.g., Estelle, 451 U.S. 454; Brown v. State, 113 Nev. 275, 290, 934 P.2d 235, 245 (1997). In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a psychiatrist's testimony stemming from the defendant's competency evaluation for trial was improperly used later during the defendant's penalty hearing because it violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 451 U.S. at 463. In Brown, this court relied on Estelle to determine the district court abuses its discretion by basing the defendant's sentence on information obtained from a court-ordered competency examination conducted before trial. 113 Nev. at 288-90, 934 P.2d at 243-45.

Unlike Estelle and Brown, the psychological evaluation at issue here was conducted in an unrelated matter, many years before Hall was tried in the instant case. Thus, the evaluation was not being used to incriminate Hall for crimes already committed when the evaluation was conducted. See United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439. 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (“In general, the privilege against self-incrimination only prohibits compelled testimony that might incriminate a witness for crimes he had already committed, or was in the process of committing, at the time the testimony was given.”). Given this key distinction, Hall failed to demonstrate trial or appellate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006) (“Trial counsel need not lodge futile objections to avoid ineffective assistance of counsel claims.”); Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1114 (recognizing that appellate counsel is not ineffective for declining to raise meritless issues).

Hall did not demonstrate ineffective assistance based on a violation of California law

Hall further asserts that trial and appellate counsel should have challenged the introduction of the juvenile records based on California law. Relying on Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827, Hall asserts the Nevada prosecutors were authorized to inspect the juvenile records but had to obtain a California juvenile court order to introduce the records at the penalty phase in the Nevada case. We conclude Hall did not demonstrate deficient performance because he did not show trial or appellate counsel would have been successful in excluding the California juvenile records using this approach.¹

This court has repeatedly observed that juvenile records are relevant in the penalty phase of a capital trial. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1354, 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006) (concluding defendant's “juvenile record was relevant to his character, revealing a pattern of escalating violent criminal behavior”); Thomas v. State, 138 Nev. 359, 372, 510 P.3d 754, 769 (2022) (rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to challenge the admission of juvenile records given the holding in Johnson). And Hall presents no authority that requires Nevada courts to apply Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827 in assessing the admissibility of juvenile records in a capital penalty hearing. Cf. In re Det. of Marshall, 90 P.3d 1081, 1087 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (observing “no authority” for the proposition that “the prosecutor could obtain ․ [California] juvenile dependency records legally but that it could not provide them to its chosen expert witness”); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 138 (2024) (explaining that “[t]he local law of the forum determines the admissibility of evidence’’).

Even assuming California law applied to the evidentiary issue, Hall has not demonstrated trial counsel could have successfully excluded the records at trial. Hall asserts Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827 prohibits Nevada prosecutors from disseminating juvenile records to unauthorized persons, including jurors, without a California juvenile court order. See People v. Thurston, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 603 (Ct. App. 2016) (noting that a person in receipt of juvenile records may not disclose information contained therein to an unauthorized person without court approval). As a result, Hall contends trial counsel acted objectively unreasonably by omitting an objection under California law. We conclude this argument lacks merit.

California precedent suggests an evidentiary objection based on Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827 would not have resulted in a different outcome. For example, the California Court of Appeal determined that the erroneous dissemination of juvenile records without the required juvenile court order during an adult offender's resentencing was harmless. See Thurston, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 610 (“No legitimate rationale supports appellant's effort to avoid the consequence of his juvenile adjudication by exploiting the fortuity of the procedural missteps that occurred here.”). The Thurston court noted “[t]he privacy rights implicated were not those of a child, but of an adult decades past the age of majority,” attenuating the policy interest in preserving the confidentiality of the underlying information. Id. at 607. Consequently, the court found it “all but impossible to imagine that [the juvenile] court would not have released the records in question” had it been asked to do so. Id. at 606.

We see no meaningful distinction here. The California authorities released Hall's juvenile records upon request to the Nevada prosecutors. Even assuming the Nevada trial court required the prosecution to petition for a California juvenile court order, there is little doubt the petition would have been granted. Cf. Marshall, 90 P.3d at 1087 (“It would make no sense [for California] to provide these [juvenile records] to the prosecutor and then forbid him from using them at trial.”).

Similarly, Hall has not shown that appellate counsel performed deficiently given that a successful challenge to the evidence was unlikely. See Burnside v. State, 131 Nev. 371, 402-03, 352 P.3d 627, 649 (2015) (finding no plain error in the admission of allegedly improperly obtained juvenile records). Thus, Hall has not demonstrated it was objectively unreasonable for counsel to not challenge the juvenile records under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827.

In sum, we conclude Hall failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel based on their failure to challenge the admission of the California juvenile records pursuant to the Fifth Amendment or California law. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in denying this claim.² We therefore

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Herndon, C.J.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

Cadish, J.

Lee, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the district court erred in determining trial counsel performed deficiently, we conclude the district court properly denied the claim on the prejudice prong. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (“If a judgment or order of a trial court reaches the right result, although it is based on an incorrect ground, the judgment or order will be affirmed on appeal.”).

2.   To the extent Hall argues the district court erred in applying the Strickland standard and the State did not demonstrate harmless error, we conclude the contentions are without merit.