MARIAH FRITCHIE CESAR TOBAR AND TRUE REAL ESTATE LLC NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY v. VICTORIA TOOLE (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a motion to set aside default. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Scott N. Freeman, Judge.

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing the challenged district court order is not a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). She asserts that although the district court clerk entered a default against appellants, the district court has not yet determined the nature and amount of relief to which respondent is entitled and entered default judgment. Further, respondent seeks an award of the attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to this appeal, contending this appeal is plainly jurisdictionally defective and frivolous, and brought or maintained without reasonable ground or solely for delay.

Appellants oppose the motion, arguing the district court entered case terminating discovery sanctions and struck their answer in its entirety, which led the district court clerk to enter default against them. They assert the foregoing actions are tantamount to a final judgment, even if not labeled as such. Finally, appellants state that they unequivocally oppose respondent's request for attorney fees and costs, contending they set forth reasonable argument and caselaw for their appeal.

“[A] final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs.” Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000). A default, unlike a default judgment, does not fully resolve any claims. See Looper v. Looper, 277 S.E.2d 78, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (“[t]he entry of default by the clerk is not a final judgment and is not appealable” because “[i]t is an interlocutory act looking toward the subsequent entry of a final judgment by default”); Lee v. Sage Creek Refining Co., Inc., 876 P.2d 997, 998 (Wyo. 1994) (“entry of default is not a final disposition of the controversy” as “[i]t is simply a clerical act performed by the clerk of court which determines liability but not relief”); see also Est. of Lomastro v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 124 Nev. 1060, 1068, 195 P.3d 339, 345 (2008) (recognizing the distinction between a default and a default judgment).

An order denying a motion to set aside a default is likewise not a final judgment. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rowan, 107 Nev. 362, 363, 812 P.2d 350, 350 (1991). Accordingly, the challenged order is not appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Appellants have thus failed to meet their burden to show that this court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Moran v. Bonneville Square Assocs., 117 Nev. 525, 527, 25 P.3d 898, 899 (2001) (“[T]he burden rests squarely upon the shoulders of a party seeking to invoke our jurisdiction to establish, to our satisfaction, that this court does in fact have jurisdiction.”). Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted and this appeal is dismissed. Respondent's request for attorney fees and costs, however, is denied. NRAP 38.

It is so ORDERED.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.