IN RE: THE POWER-OF-ATTORNEY OF: IDA RUBIN (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from district court orders entered in relation to a petition to construe power of attorney, and for declaratory and supplemental relief. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Gloria Sturman, Judge.

When review of the docketing statement and other documents before this court revealed a potential jurisdictional defect, this court ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant suggested in the docketing statement that the district court's October 6, 2025, order granting respondent's motion for summary judgment was a final judgment appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1). But it appeared several of the claims asserted in appellant's petition remained pending in the district court such that the order was not a final appealable judgment. See Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (defining a final judgment for purposes of NRAP 3A(b)(1) as “one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs”).

In response, appellant maintains that the October 6, 2025, order is an appealable final judgment. She contends the order granted relief regarding the only litigated issue—competency of the principal. The other requests for relief in the petition, appellant suggests, were rendered moot or implicitly resolved when the district court “confirmed the agent's authority.” We agree with respondent that the order does not resolve all issues raised in the petition.

Respondent's petition asked the court to take several actions. The October 6 order cannot reasonably be construed as resolving all of the requests therein, including those to (1) determine if a third-party had utilized the 2008 or 2018 power of attorney documents, and if so, compel that third-party to provide an accounting regarding financial and/or healthcare decisions, and (2) appoint respondent as durable and healthcare power of attorney if the court determined that the agent was failing to act as attorney-in fact. And appellant does not point to any other district court order resolving these issues. It thus appears they remain pending in the district court.

Appellant suggests that the October 6 order resolved all issues because the order granted respondent's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. But respondent sought summary judgment only on some of the requests in the petition—specifically, for determinations regarding the principal's current capacity and the validity of the 2018 power of attorney documents. The motion did not request judgment on the other requests for relief. Appellant also points out that the district court vacated every trial date and the October 6 order bears a notation that the case is statistically closed. Neither the vacating of a trial date nor a statistical closure resolves any issue raised in the petition; such actions thus do not create finality. See generally Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 301 P.3d 850 (2013) (concluding that an order statistically closing a case but not resolving any claims is not a final judgment). Similarly, respondent's statements in another court with respect to finality for purposes of issue preclusion do not confer this court with jurisdiction.

Appellant further argues that jurisdiction is proper under NRS 155.190(1)(n), applicable via NRS 164.005(2), which authorizes appeals from orders “[m]aking any decision wherein the amount in controversy equals or exceeds, exclusive of costs, $10,000.” Appellant asserts the challenged October 6, 2025, order implicates an estate valued well in excess of $10,000. We agree with respondent that NRS 155.190(1)(n) does not authorize an appeal from the October 6 order. While the order may ultimately affect the distribution of estate assets exceeding $10,000, the order itself does not actually resolve a controversy regarding assets in excess of $10,000 in value. See Matter of 23 Partners Tr. I, Dated Feb. 1, 2017, No. 92322, 2026 WL 1618365 (Nev. June 3, 2026) (Order Dismissing Appeal) (rejecting an argument that an order was appealable under NRS 155.190(1)(n) where the order could eventually affect the distribution of assets exceeding $10,000, but did not directly resolve any controversy as to such assets).

This court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule.” Brown, 129 Nev. at 345, 301 P.3d at 851. Appellant does not demonstrate that any statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from the challenged orders. See Moran v. Bonneville Square Assocs., 117 Nev. 525, 527, 25 P.3d 898, 899 (2001) (“[T]he burden rests squarely upon the shoulders of a party seeking to invoke our jurisdiction to establish, to our satisfaction, that this court does in fact have jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.