IN RE: THE TRUST/ESTATE OF WALTER A. CRIPPS (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a pro se appeal from district court orders, entered in proceedings related to a trust, denying appellant's motions for summary judgment and sanctions. Fourth Judicial District Court, Elko County; Hon. Kriston N. Hill, Judge.

Respondent moves to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. He contends that NRAP 3A(b) does not authorize appeals from interlocutory orders denying motions for summary judgment or motions for sanctions. In opposition, appellant suggests the orders are appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(12), NRS 155.190(1)(n), NRS 164.033(6), and NRS 164.015.

NRAP 3A(b)(12) allows appeals provided for by statute. Appealability under NRAP 3A(b)(12) therefore depends upon the existence of a statute authorizing an appeal. None of the statutes cited by appellant authorize an appeal from the challenged orders.

NRS 155.190(1)(n), applicable to NRS Chapter 164 pursuant to NRS 164.005, allows an appeal from a district court order “[m]aking any decision wherein the amount in controversy equals or exceeds, exclusive of costs, $10,000.” While the total value of the trust assets may exceed $10,000, the challenged orders do not make any decision involving assets in excess of $10,000. The orders are thus not appealable under NRS 155.190(1)(n). See Matter of 23 Partners Tr. I, Dated Feb. 1, 2017, No. 92322, 2026 WL 1618365 (Nev. June 3, 2026) (Order Dismissing Appeal) (rejecting an argument that an order was appealable under NRS 155.190(1)(n) where the order could eventually affect the distribution of assets exceeding $10,000, but did not directly resolve any controversy as to such assets).

Neither are the orders appealable pursuant to NRS 164.033 or NRS 164.015(6). NRS 164.033(6) authorizes an aggrieved person to appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS 164.033. NRS 164.015(6) authorizes appeals from interlocutory district court orders resolving petitions concerning the internal affairs of nontestamentary trusts. It does not appear, and appellant does not assert, that the petition sought relief under NRS 164.033, or that the challenged orders were entered pursuant to that statute. Critically, neither of the challenged orders finally resolves appellant's petition. An appeal under either statute is improper until the petition is finally resolved. See Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks, 127 Nev. 896, 900, 266 P.3d 618, 620 (2011) (“Even for appealable interlocutory orders, [ ] we have consistently required that, for an appeal to be proper, the order must finally resolve the particular issue.”).

This court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule.” Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). Appellant does not demonstrate that any statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from the challenged orders. See Moran v. Bonneville Square Assocs., 117 Nev. 525, 527, 25 P.3d 898, 899 (2001) (“[T]he burden rests squarely upon the shoulders of a party seeking to invoke our jurisdiction to establish, to our satisfaction, that this court does in fact have jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, we grant respondent's motion and

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.¹

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   If aggrieved, appellant may file a new notice of appeal once the district court enters an appealable order.