JOHN REEKS v. GUSTAVO AGUILAR AND BLUEBERRY JEWELERS (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from an August 20, 2026, interlocutory order denying appellant's “Motion to Vacate Order (NRCP 60(b)(3); NRCP 60(d)(3)), Fraud Upon the Court, Case-Terminating Sanctions (NRCP 37(b)(2); NRCP 37(d); NRCP 26(g); NRCP 11(c); NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(A)(v); EDCR 7.21), Entry of Default Judgment.” Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Colleen R. Brown, Judge.

This court's preliminary review of the documents before it reveals a jurisdictional defect. Specifically, the August 20 order is interlocutory and not appealable. While it appears that summary judgment was granted as to the claims against Gustavo Aguilar, the claims against Blueberry Jewelers and counterclaims remain pending, such that no final judgment has been entered. Indeed, appellant asserts that trial was set to begin on September 21, 2026. See NRAP 3A(b)(1) (providing for an appeal from “a final judgment entered in an action”); NRAP 3A(b)(8) (allowing for appeals from special orders entered after final judgment); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (providing that a final judgment is one that adjudicates all of the rights and liabilities of all of the parties, except for certain post-judgment issues); Consol. Generator-Nev., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998) (explaining that interlocutory orders are not independently appealable but may be challenged in the context of an appeal from the final judgment). As a result, this court lacks jurisdiction, and therefore, we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.¹

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In light of this order, all pending motions, including appellant's emergency motion to stay the district court proceedings and motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, are denied as moot. We note that appellant's failure to first seek an order from the district court allowing him to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is an additional basis for denying his motion to waive the filing fees. NRAP 24(a).