YIORKIS PINEDA LAURENCIO YIORKIS LAURENCIO PINEDA v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition for genetic marker testing. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E. Delaney, Judge.

Appellant Yiorkis Pineda-Laurencio pleaded guilty to murder with the use of a deadly weapon, victim 60 years of age or older; first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon, victim 60 years of age or older; robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, victim 60 years of age or older; possession of stolen property; and two counts of burglary, all for offenses committed against Patricia Brafford. Pineda-Laurencio was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The convictions arose from the home robbery and murder of Brafford, who was found dead, bound and beaten, in the bedroom of her home, which had valuables missing. The evidence implicating Pineda-Laurencio included signed pawn slips indicating he sold jewelry taken from Brafford's residence.

One month after Brafford was murdered, Pineda-Laurencio killed Otilia Soares with a crowbar, took property from her person and residence, and pawned that property. Pineda-Laurencio had been working at Soares's residence as a day laborer, was arrested several days later, and admitted murdering Soares and pawning her property. Pineda-Laurencio pleaded guilty to multiple offenses arising from Soares's murder in exchange for the State withdrawing its intent to seek the death penalty.

While Pineda-Laurencio admitted his role in the Soares crimes, he maintains that he never confessed to the Brafford crimes, notwithstanding the admissions made in pleading guilty. Pineda-Laurencio admits pawning Brafford's property—his DNA was found on the jewelry, and his signature was on the pawn slips—but he argues that he was never inside the Brafford residence.

Thus, Pineda-Laurencio petitioned the district court for genetic marker analysis of six pieces of evidence taken from within Brafford's house. Specifically, he requested retesting of rectal and hip swabs from Brafford and a blue jacket and binding used to bind Brafford. Pineda-Laurencio also requested that his DNA be compared to the DNA profiles obtained from two stains on a pillow, a comparison not previously examined. The district court found overwhelming evidence of guilt and denied the petition.¹ Pineda-Laurencio appeals.²

Pineda-Laurencio argues that there is a reasonable possibility he would not have been prosecuted or convicted had the requested testing yielded exculpatory results. Reviewing the order denying genetic marker testing for an abuse of discretion, Anselmo v. State, 138 Nev. 94, 98, 505 P.3d 846, 850 (2022), we disagree. Taking the pieces of evidence in turn, favorable retesting would not lead to a reasonable possibility that Pineda-Laurencio would not have been prosecuted for the Brafford murder given the considerable circumstantial evidence of guilt. See NRS 176.09183(1)(c) (setting forth requirements for testing of evidence not previously subject to genetic marker analysis)

We consider first the rectal and hip swabs. The initial testing reported that the samples were negative for semen. Pineda-Laurencio attached a forensic report to the petition indicating that the result should have been presumptive positive as to the rectal sample and inconclusive as to the hip sample. Even assuming that retesting would yield an exculpatory result, Anselmo, 138 Nev. at 99, 505 P.3d at 850, Pineda-Laurencio has failed to show a reasonable possibility the State would not have prosecuted Pineda-Laurencio given that the prosecution did not rest on the initial test result, which was not inculpatory, see NRS 176.09183(1)(c). Further, an exculpatory result here would not negate the inculpatory circumstantial evidence the State relied on in charging Pineda-Laurencio.

We next consider the samples taken from the blue jacket and the binding. The initial test results found DNA mixture profiles from which Pineda-Laurencio could not be excluded. As to the jacket sample, approximately 80% of the population was excluded as potential contributors, and as to the binding sample, approximately 99% of the population was excluded. The forensic report attached to the petition observed that Pineda-Laurencio's DNA profile included alleles not present in the DNA profiles taken from the jacket and the binding samples, and those samples included alleles not present in Pineda-Laurencio's profile. The report thus challenged the original conclusion that Pineda-Laurencio was not excluded. Pineda-Laurencio argues that further testing would bolster this challenge to this evidence. This challenge, however, was available based on the original testing. Even assuming that the challenge would be strengthened by additional testing, see id., Pineda-Laurencio has failed to show a reasonable possibility that the State would not have prosecuted him given the other circumstantial evidence of guilt. Further, Pineda-Laurencio has failed to show “the previous analysis was inconclusive,” “the requested analysis may resolve an issue not resolved by the previous analysis,” or the requested analysis would be “significantly more accurate and probative of the identity of the perpetrator than the previous analysis.” See NRS 176.09183(2) (identifying requirements for reanalysis where evidence has been previously subject to genetic testing). While testing methods may continue to improve in precision, Pineda-Laurencio has not shown that the previous method of testing was unreliable such that retesting is merited or that newer methods are materially improved. Cf. State v. Harris, 627 S.W.3d 47, 52-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021) (observing that Missouri's postconviction-DNA-testing statute was not intended “to allow serial retesting of evidence due to a change in DNA technology” and that retesting was not warranted on the basis of advances in DNA testing methods (citation modified)).

Lastly, as to the two stains recovered from a pillow near where Brafford was found, Pineda-Laurencio has failed to show that exculpatory results would lead to a reasonable possibility that the State would not have prosecuted him. The DNA profiles obtained from the stains were not compared to Pineda-Laurencio's DNA profile initially and did not inculpate him, and the State did not rely on the stains in its charging decision. An exculpatory result regarding this evidence would not undermine the other circumstantial evidence inculpating Pineda-Laurencio.

Apart from the challenged evidence, Pineda-Laurencio admitted pawning Brafford's stolen property, and the record shows that the property was pawned three days after Brafford was killed. Brafford's home was only one street away from Pineda-Laurencio's and was visible from his driveway. And Pineda-Laurencio admitted committing a similar crime in the same neighborhood—the blunt-force killing and robbing of Soares, another woman older than 60 years of age, and pawning of her property—one month after the Brafford murder. The record repels Pineda-Laurencio's contention that no evidence connects him to the Brafford murder absent the challenged pieces of DNA evidence. In sum, Pineda-Laurencio has failed to show that the requested analysis of the challenged items of evidence would lead to a reasonable possibility that the State would not have prosecuted him, given the inculpatory circumstantial evidence, the persuasiveness of which would not be undermined by the new analysis. Pineda-Laurencio has thus failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying the petition. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

Cadish, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court's order contains the conclusory determination that relief was not merited because Pineda-Laurencio pleaded guilty, the evidence was overwhelming, and Pineda-Laurencio failed to carry the statutory burden. These abbreviated rulings, presented without reasoning or articulated support, hinder this court's review.We admonish the district court to properly and specifically explain its findings and conclusions to “enable an appellant to understand the precise basis for the district court's decision, as well as facilitate informed review in this court.” Jitnan v. Oliver, 127 Nev. 424, 433, 254 P.3d 623, 630 (2011).

2.   The State argued below that a petitioner who pleaded guilty is ineligible to petition for postconviction genetic marker analysis. The district court did not deny the petition on that basis, and the State abandons that position on appeal. Thus, although amici Rocky Mountain Innocence Center, Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and Professor Colin Miller raise that argument, it is not before us. We therefore do not resolve it. Cf. Associated Builders & Contractors Fl. First Coast Chapter v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 174 F.4th 26, 41 (11th Cir. 2026) (“[A]mici curiae ordinarily may not expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues not preserved by the parties.” (citation modified)); Saticoy Bay, LLC, Series 34 Innisbrook v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Tr. 2007-3, 138 Nev. 335, 342 n.7, 510 P.3d 139, 145 n.7 (2022) (“[A]mici may not present novel issues not argued by the parties.”).