KUNAL PARIKH LAS VEGAS SPORTS AND SPINE CENTER PLLC AND PARIKH MEDICAL HOLDINGS PLLC v. DARIUS JACKSON (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a motion to dismiss, purportedly certified as final under NRCP 54(b). Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mary Kay Holthus, Judge.

This court previously entered an order to show cause as to why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, this court noted that it appears that the district court's order did not resolve all claims, meaning the district court has not yet entered a final judgment. See NRAP 3A(b) (identifying appealable determinations); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (defining a final judgment); Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) (explaining this court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule”). In addition, this court noted that it does not appear the district court's order was properly certified as final. See NRCP 54(b); KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc. v. Workman, 107 Nev. 340, 343, 810 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1991) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal improperly certified as final pursuant to NRCP 54(b)); Taylor Const. Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 100 Nev. 207, 208, 678 P.2d 1152, 1152 (1984). This court cautioned appellants that failure to demonstrate that this court has jurisdiction may result in dismissal of this appeal.

In their response, appellants argue the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss based upon NRS 41A.071 fundamentally differs from an “ordinary” order denying a motion to dismiss. Specifically, appellants contend the district court's order “resolved a discrete, antecedent question of legal right” under the statute that should be immediately appealable, or amenable to certification under NRCP 54(b), to preserve the legislative purpose of NRS 41A.071. Alternatively, appellants argue if this court concludes the district court's order is not appealable, then it should treat this appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ relief.

Orders denying motions to dismiss are not appealable. Kirsch v. Traber, 134 Nev. 163, 168, 414 P.3d 818, 822 (2018). This court has not treated orders denying motions to dismiss based upon NRS 41A.071 differently. In fact, this court has specifically explained that such an order is not immediately appealable. Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. 64, 580 P.3d 756, 761 (2025). Instead, it is an interlocutory ruling that typically may only be challenged in conjunction with an appeal from a final judgment, which generally constitutes an adequate and speedy legal remedy. See id. Even in rare cases when an appeal would not constitute an adequate and speedy legal remedy, immediate review may only be sought by filing a writ petition. See id. Appellants did not do so.

Appellants’ arguments regarding the legislative purpose of NRS 41A.071 are unavailing. When the legislature wishes to authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss, it knows how to do so. Cf. NRS 41.660(4) (“If the court denies the special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to [Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute], an interlocutory appeal lies to the Supreme Court.”). Yet nowhere in NRS Chapter 41A did the legislature authorize an interlocutory appeal from a district court order denying a motion to dismiss based upon NRS 41A.071. See Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) (this court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule”). Thus, appellants have failed to meet their burden to show that this court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Moran v. Bonneville Square Assocs., 117 Nev. 525, 527, 25 P.3d 898, 899 (2001) (“[T]he burden rests squarely upon the shoulders of a party seeking to invoke our jurisdiction to establish, to our satisfaction, that this court does in fact have jurisdiction.”).

This court is not persuaded that this appeal should be treated as a writ petition. Indeed, this case is readily distinguishable from the extraordinary or compelling instances in which this court has taken such action. Cf. Clark County Liquor & Gaming Licensing Bd. v. Clark, 102 Nev. 654, 730 P.2d 443 (1986) (construing an appeal as a writ petition where this court had denied a prior related writ petition on the incorrect ground that the challenged order could be appealed); Jarstad v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 92 Nev. 380, 384, 552 P.2d 49, 51 (1976) (treating an appeal as a writ petition where “[i]t would be unfair to do otherwise in the light of confusing case precedent” concerning the appealability of orders quashing service); In re Temporary Custody of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 443, 777 P.2d 901, 902 (1989) (“because the order challenged in this proceeding affects the custody of children, and may thus have far reaching consequences for both the parents and the children, we elect to treat the instant appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus”). Given the clarity of our caselaw establishing that orders denying motions to dismiss are not immediately appealable, appellants cannot reasonably claim confusion. Nor have appellants demonstrated that other extraordinary or compelling circumstances warrant treating their appeal as a writ petition. This appeal is dismissed. Given this dismissal, appellants’ motion for stay pending appeal is denied as moot.

It is so ORDERED.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.