JOHN STELTER AN INDIVIDUAL v. SHULTIS TRUST DATED MARCH 2022 BRENDA MAY SHULTIS TRUSTEE (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a motion for reconsideration and relief under NRCP 59 and NRCP 60. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jessica K. Peterson, Judge.

Review of the docketing statement and other documents before this court reveals a jurisdictional defect. This court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule.” Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). No statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from the challenged order.

Appellant asserts in the docketing statement that the order is appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). “[A] final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs.” Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000). The challenged order is not appealable as a final judgment because it does not resolve any claims asserted in the amended complaint.

Orders denying motions pursuant to NRCP 59 or NRCP 60 are generally appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(2) or NRAP 3A(b)(8), if the motions sought relief from an otherwise appealable order. See NRAP 3A(b)(2); NRAP 3A(b)(8). Appellant's motions sought relief from an order granting a motion for summary judgment. However, the summary judgment order is not an appealable order. It is not a final judgment because it does not finally resolve the issue of damages—the amount of the damages award was left to be determined. And no other statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from the summary judgment order. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction and

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.