MOHAMED ABDALLA MAHMOUD v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This original petition for a writ of mandamus seeks to compel the district court to file a notice of entry of an order denying a pro se motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Petitioner Mohamed Abdalla Mahmoud argues that the district court was required by law to provide notice of its order entered on August 5, 2020, because the motion should have been treated as a postconviction habeas petition.

Having considered Mahmoud's petition, we conclude that writ relief is not warranted. See NRS 34.160; Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) (observing that the party seeking writ relief bears the burden of showing such relief is warranted); Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853 (1991) (recognizing that writ relief is an extraordinary remedy and that this court has sole discretion in determining whether to entertain a writ petition).

While the motion to withdraw the guilty plea should have been characterized as a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Harris v. State, 130 Nev. 435, 448-49, 329 P.3d 619, 628 (2014), our extraordinary and discretionary intervention is not warranted where Mahmoud could have raised this deficiency in any of several pleadings filed after the district court order was entered, e.g., Mahmoud v. State, No. 84880, 2022 WL 2703111 (Nev. July 8, 2022) (Order Dismissing Appeal) (pro se appeal from the order entered on August 5, 2020); Mahmoud v. State, No. 84408-COA, 2022 WL 14177219 (Nev. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2022) (Order of Affirmance) (pro se appeal from district court order characterizing second motion to withdraw guilty plea as postconviction habeas petition and denying it); Mahmoud v. State, No. 88596-COA, 2025 WL 945615 (Nev. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2025) (Order of Affirmance) (appeal from district court order denying postconviction habeas petition as procedurally barred). Moreover, Mahmoud's appeal from the order entered on August 5, 2020, shows that he was aware of the order's entry before pursuing those other postconviction vehicles. He cannot now assert that he did not have notice and seek relief on that basis. Cf. In re Est. of Herrmann, 100 Nev. 1, 25 n.18, 677 P.2d 594, 609 n.18 (1984) (“Where a party dissatisfied with a judgment invokes the action of the court to relieve him, either wholly or in part, from the effect thereof, he will be deemed to have waived service of notice.” (citation modified)); Porter v. Porter, 542 N.W.2d 448, 452 (S.D. 1996) (“[B]y filing a notice of appeal prior to receipt of a notice of entry of judgment, appellant waives his right to such notice.”). Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

Herndon, C.J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.