IN RE: the Parental Rights as to A.A.W. (2019)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order terminating appellant's parental rights as to her minor child.¹ Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Cynthia N. Giuliani, Judge.

To terminate parental rights, the district court must find clear and convincing evidence that (1) at least one ground of parental fault exists, and (2) termination is in the child's best interest. NRS 128.105(1); In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000). Evidence of parental fault may include neglect, unfitness, failure to adjust the circumstances that led to the child's removal, risk of serious injury to the child if the child is returned to the parent, and demonstration of only token efforts. NRS 128.105(1)(b). On appeal, this court reviews questions of law de novo and the district court's factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014).

Appellant argues that substantial evidence does not support the district court's findings of parental fault or that termination is in the child's best interest. Specifically, she contends that the district court improperly considered prior removals of the child from her care and that parental fault could not be established because respondent State of Nevada Department of Family Services (DFS) failed to provide her with referrals and services. She also argues that termination was not in the child's best interest because she shares a bond with the child.

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court's findings that the child was neglected and appellant is an unfit parent. NRS 128.105(1)(b); NRS 128.014(1) (explaining that a child is neglected when the child lacks “proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his or her parent”); NRS 128.018 (providing that a parent is unfit when “by reason of the parent's fault or habit or conduct toward the child or other persons, [the parent] fails to provide such child with proper care, guidance and support”). In determining a parent's neglect or unfitness, the court must consider “mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent which renders the parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or psychological needs of the child for extended periods of time,” “[c]onduct toward a child of a physically ․abusive nature,” and a “[c]onviction of the parent for a commission of a felony, if the facts of the crime are of such a nature as to indicate the unfitness of the parent.” NRS 128.106(1)(a), (b), (f).

The child was removed from appellant's care after suffering first- and second-degree burns on her back and ankle, leading to a stay in the hospital's burn unit and six months of follow-up treatment. The burns were caused by chemicals appellant applied to the child's skin in an attempt to treat the child for ringworm, even though appellant had been informed by medical personnel on numerous occasions that the child did not have ringworm. Appellant pleaded guilty to felony child abuse and was diagnosed with delusional disorder. Even though she was prescribed medication to address her mental health, she stopped taking the medication a few months later, claiming that it made the cartilage on her ears drip. At the termination trial, appellant asserted that she did not have a mental illness and she did not cause the child's burns. Thus, substantial evidence in the record supports the district court's parental fault findings of neglect and unfitness.²

We further conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court's findings that termination of appellant's parental rights is in the child's best interest. While the child may love appellant, she shares a bond with her maternal aunt, who has cared for the child previously wants to adopt the child, and the child has expressed an interest in remaining with the aunt forever. The child is entitled to permanency, and there is no evidence that the child could be reunified with appellant soon, as at the time of the termination trial, appellant was still incarcerated and had untreated mental health issues. Thus, substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that termination was in the child's best interest. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.

2.   Because only one ground of parental fault is required to support the termination of parental rights, see NRS 128.105(1)(b) (requiring a finding of a least one ground of parental fault), we need not review the district court's other findings of parental fault.