HONEYBADGERS HOLDINGS LLC v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC (2019)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elissa F. Cadish, Judge. Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005), we affirm.¹

We conclude that the district court correctly determined that the HOA's foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust, albeit for a different reason than that articulated by the district court.² See Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 267, 277 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2012) (recognizing that this court will affirm the district court's judgment if the district court reached the right result, albeit for different reasons). In particular, the record demonstrates that respondent's predecessor tendered $2,300.85 to the HOA's agent, which undisputedly exceeded 9 months of assessments. See Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 72, 427 P.3d 113, 117 (2018) (stating that, as explained in prior decisions, “[a] plain reading of [NRS 116.3116(2). (2012)] indicates that the superpriority portion of an HOA lien includes only charges for maintenance and nuisance abatement, and nine months of unpaid [common expense] assessments”). The tender of the defaulted superpriority portion of the HOA's lien cured the default as to that portion of the lien such that the ensuing foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. Id. at 118-121.

Although appellants contended in district court that (1) the tender was ineffective because it imposed conditions, (2) respondent's predecessor needed to record evidence of the tender, and (3) appellants predecessor was protected as a bona fide purchaser, we recently rejected similar arguments.³ Id. Accordingly, and albeit for an alternative reason, the district court correctly determined that appellants took title to the property subject to the first deed of trust.⁴ We therefore

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.

2.   Respondent has argued on appeal that affirmance on alternative grounds is justified, and appellants have not indicated that doing so would be improper.

3.   Appellants did not identify any condition that respondent's predecessor was not legally entitled to impose. County of Clark v. Blanchard Construction Co. is not contrary to Bank of America, as the tendering party in that case tendered less than the amount actually owed. 98 Nev. 488, 493, 653 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1982).

4.   In light of this disposition, we need not decide whether respondent was likewise entitled to summary judgment based on 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (2012) (the Federal Foreclosure Bar).