FERNANDO FRIAS v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from an amended judgment of conviction revoking appellant's probation and an oral district court order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration of the revocation. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Erika L. Mendoza, Judge.

When review of this appeal revealed a potential jurisdictional defect, this court ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, it appeared that appellant appealed from an oral district court order denying his motion for reconsideration of an amended judgment of conviction revoking probation, but that no statute or court rule provides for an appeal from an oral ruling. See Rust v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 689, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987). And even if the court's ruling was reduced to writing, no statute or court rule provides for an appeal from an order denying a motion to reconsider a probation revocation. Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349, 352, 792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990). Appellant has filed a response.

Appellant seems to assert that his notice of appeal challenged the amended judgment of conviction revoking probation in addition to the order denying the motion for reconsideration identified in this court's order to show cause.¹ He further asserts that the motion for reconsideration tolled the time to appeal from the amended judgment of conviction and the notice of appeal was timely filed after denial of the motion for reconsideration.

We agree that the notice of appeal is reasonably construed as an appeal from the amended judgment of conviction revoking appellant's probation. See Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 97 Nev. 88, 90, 624 P.2d 496, 497 (1981) (explaining that a notice of appeal designating the incorrect judgment will not be dismissed if the intention to appeal from a specific judgment can be reasonably inferred from the text of the notice of appeal and respondent has not been materially misled), cited by Abdullah v. State, 129 Nev. 86, 90-91, 294 P.3d 419, 421-22 (2013). However, we do not agree that the motion for reconsideration tolled the time for appellant to appeal such that the notice of appeal was timely filed as to the amended judgment of conviction.

As appellant appears to concede, this court's rules do not identify a motion for reconsideration as a tolling motion in criminal appeals. See NRAP 4(b)(3)(A) (identifying tolling motions in criminal cases). Appellant seems to argue, however, that a motion to reconsider should be afforded tolling effect in criminal matters. Appellant's precise argument in this regard is unclear. He indicates that motions to modify a sentence or to correct an illegal sentence are appealable under NRS 176.515(1)(b), which allows appeals from orders denying new trials, because motions to modify or correct are analogous to motions for new trial. He further asserts that motions to modify a sentence or correct an illegal sentence are analogous to civil motions to alter or amend a judgment. Appellant points out that, in the civil context, motions for reconsideration and motions to alter or amend judgements are analogous for the purpose of tolling. He then asserts that “[b]ecause motions to alter or amend judgments and motions to modify a sentence are analogous, a motion for reconsideration should similarly toll a motion to modify a sentence under NRAP 4(b)(3)(A)(ii).”²

NRAP 4(b)(3)(A)(ii) identifies a motion for new trial as a motion that tolls the time to appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case. Based on his citation to that rule, it appears appellant may be contending that his motion for reconsideration toiled the time to appeal from the amended judgment of conviction because a motion for reconsideration is analogous to a motion for a new trial for tolling purposes.

Even assuming, without deciding, that appellant's reconsideration motion can be construed as a motion for a new trial, a motion for new trial only tolls the time to appeal if it is timely filed. NRAP 4(b)(3)(A). A motion for new trial based on grounds other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilt, or within a deadline set by the court during the 7-day period. NRS 176.515(4). A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence tolls the time to appeal only if it is filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. NRAP 4(b)(3)(A)(ii).

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was filed 15 days after entry of the amended judgment of conviction revoking probation. Therefore, the motion was timely filed only if the district court extended the filing deadline or if the motion was based on the discovery of new evidence. Appellant does not assert that the deadline to file the motion was extended, acknowledge the differing deadlines for filing a motion for new trial depending upon the grounds of the motion, assert that the reconsideration motion was based on newly discovered evidence, or provide a copy of the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, appellant has not provided any basis for this court to conclude that the motion for reconsideration was grounded on the discovery of new evidence and thus timely filed under NRS 176.515(4) such that it tolled the time to appeal from the amended judgment of conviction. See Moran v. Bonneville Square Assocs., 117 Nev. 525, 527, 25 P.3d 898, 899 (2001) (“[T]he burden rests squarely upon the shoulders of a party seeking to invoke our jurisdiction to establish, to our satisfaction, that this court does in fact have jurisdiction.”); cf. Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (stating that it is the appellant's responsibility to make an adequate appellate record and, “[w]hen an appellant fails to include necessary documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the missing portion supports the district court's decision”).

Appellant next contends that NRS 177.015 (governing appeals in criminal actions) and NRS 2.090 (setting forth this court's jurisdiction upon appeal), in conjunction with this court's rules, have a disparate impact on criminal appellants versus civil appellants in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. In particular, appellant contends that civil litigants are afforded significantly more avenues to toll the time to file the notice of appeal than are criminal appellants.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids an enactment that “den[ies] ․ any person ․ equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The threshold question in equal protection analysis is whether a statute effectuates dissimilar treatment of similarly situated persons.” Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 703, 120 P.3d 812, 817 (2005). Appellant's response simply assumes, without any argument or even a direct assertion, that criminal appellants and civil appellants are similarly situated. He therefore fails to demonstrate that the equal protection clause is implicated. See Reel v. Harrison, 118 Nev. 881, 886-87, 60 P.3d 480, 484-85 (2002) (concluding that the equal protection clause was not implicated where the parties were not similarly situated).

Lastly, appellant argues that even if no equal protection violation is present and the notice of appeal was untimely filed, this court should nevertheless allow this appeal to proceed in the interest of judicial economy. We decline to do so. Considerations of judicial economy cannot confer appellate jurisdiction where such jurisdiction does not otherwise exist. This court may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule. Castillo, 106 Nev. at 352, 792 P.2d at 1135. No statute or court rule allows an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an amended judgment of conviction revoking probation. This court also lacks jurisdiction to consider untimely appeals. Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 352, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994). The amended judgment of conviction revoking probation was entered on June 22, 2025. As discussed above, appellant's motion for reconsideration did not toll the time to file the notice of appeal.³ Appellant's notice of appeal was not filed in the district court until September 12, 2025, long past expiration of the 30-day appeal period set forth in NRAP 3(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction and

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent appellant asserts that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is appealable because it is analogous to an order denying a motion for a new trial, we decline to consider the assertion because it is not supported by cogent argument. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006); Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987).

2.   Appellant actually cites NRAP 4(3)(A)(ii), but it appears he intended to cite NRAP 4(b)(3)(A)(ii).

3.   We decline at this time appellant's invitation to amend NRAP 4 to include motions to alter or amend or motions for reconsideration among those that toll the time to appeal in criminal cases.