SMITH v. Joy Quirimit, Real Party in Interest. (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

This original petition for a writ of mandamus challenges a variety of alleged procedural irregularities ¹ and a vexatious litigant order issued in a child custody matter. Petitioner has moved for emergency treatment of this matter under NRAP 27(e), citing an upcoming trial.

Petitioner's motion is granted to the extent it seeks expedited review of this matter. Further, having thus considered the petition and supporting documents, we conclude that petitioner has not met his burden to demonstrate that writ relief is warranted. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 468, 474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736-37 (2007) (explaining that writ relief rests within this court's sole discretion); Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) (recognizing that it is petitioner's burden to demonstrate that this court's extraordinary intervention is warranted). In particular, writ relief is typically unavailable to control the district court's case management, see Dornbach v. Tenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 305, 312, 324 P.3d 369, 373-74 (2014) (recognizing that “allowing district courts to manage the cases before them” “promotes the efficient prosecution of cases”); Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981) (“Mandamus will not lie to control discretionary action, unless discretion is manifestly abused or is exercised arbitrarily of capriciously.” (internal citations omitted)), and to the extent petitioner is ultimately aggrieved by any of the alleged procedural irregularities, those issues may be raised on appeal once an appealable order is entered, precluding writ relief, Pan, 120 Nev. at 228, 88 P.3d at 841 (“[T]he right to appeal is generally an adequate legal remedy that precludes writ relief.”).

Moreover, with respect to petitioner's request that the November 17, 2025, vexatious litigant order be vacated due to lack of notice, we conclude that petitioner has not demonstrated that notice was not properly provided. Petitioner did not provide this court with copies of all documents needed to review his argument, such as the moving papers, the district court docket entries, and any pertinent hearing notices. See id. at 229, 88 P.3d at 844 (“Our review in a writ proceeding is limited to the argument and documents provided by the parties. If essential information is left out of the petition and accompanying documentation, we have no way of properly evaluating the petition.”). Instead, he cites to Exhibit D, which he states is an August 6, 2025, notice of hearing listing only a motion for continuance. But the Exhibit D provided to this court is dated September 9, 2025, not August 6, and references an October 23, 2025, hearing on a motion for continuance, not any October 9 hearing, which is the date on which the vexatious litigant motion was heard. Thus, this document, alone, does not support petitioner's assertion. Further, we do not read the vexatious litigant order as barring petitioner's ability to file a notice of appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that our extraordinary intervention is not warranted and

ORDER the petition DENIED.²

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petitioner challenges opposing counsel's failure to file a notice of appearance; the “bulk filing” of “overdue orders” on November 17, 2025; an oral reprimand for appearing via Zoom, rather than in person; the oral continuation of trial and the scheduling of a hearing on a motion to settle the record after the trial date; an unnoticed judicial reassignment; and a January 27, 2025, order entered (on February 18, 2025) without findings, calculations, and enforcement terms. In a supplemental notice of post-petition events, he challenges a written order reflecting decisions made at a November 19 hearing and the January 16, 2026, trial date and the rescheduling of his motion to settle the record on the same day as trial.

2.   Several of the legal authorities petitioner cited in support of his arguments either do not say what petitioner asserts they say or do not appear to exist at all. For example, on page 6 of the petition, petitioner claims that “Alexander v. Lolavar, 127 Nev. 255 (2011),” supports the proposition that “oral pronouncements have no legal effect until reduced to writing and filed,” but 127 Nev. 255 is a page in the opinion Ruiz v. City of North Las Vegas, 127 Nev. 254, 255 P.3d 216 (2011), which does not concern oral pronouncements, and we have found no case by that name under a different citation. Petitioner is cautioned that citations to decisional law and other authorities in any future papers filed in this court should be reviewed for accuracy before filing.