SER v. OLIVER (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Appellant Georgio Mont. Ser was convicted at a jury trial of attempted second-degree kidnapping, second-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon, residential burglary while in the possession of a firearm, assault with a deadly weapon, battery with substantial bodily harm, and stalking. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction on direct appeal. Ser v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 57, 579 P.3d 559 (2025). While the direct appeal was pending, Ser filed a pro se postconviction habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Ser appeals, alleging seven instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.

To warrant an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must support his claims with specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and that, if true, would entitle him to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). We defer to the district court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the district court's application of the law de novo. Gonzales v. State, 137 Nev. 398, 404, 492 P.3d 556, 562 (2021).

The district court found that Ser's claims were bare and naked allegations, or were belied by the record, and therefore did not warrant an evidentiary hearing. We agree. The claims in the petition are a list of single-sentence allegations without any cogent argument or relevant facts. The petition references a motion that was filed with the petition and which the district court appears to have considered. But the assertions in that motion are not tied specifically to any claim stated in the petition. This does not meet the standard of pleading required for postconviction petitions, which requires specific factual allegations to support petitioner's claims for relief. See Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502-03, 686 P.2d at 225 (explaining a petitioner is not entitled to postconviction relief if his claims are bare or naked). Thus, we conclude Ser's claims do not warrant relief and address only one of Ser's claims in detail.

Ser argues that trial counsel should have requested a jury instruction on false imprisonment as a lesser-included offense of kidnapping and attempted kidnapping. Even assuming this claim was raised below, Ser cannot demonstrate prejudice. See Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (requiring a petitioner to show a reasonable probability that the result of trial would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984))). Substantial evidence at trial established Ser's guilt for second-degree kidnapping and attempted second-degree kidnapping. Ser himself testified that he intended to detain the victims, attempted to do so once armed with a taser, handcuffs, and pepper spray, and successfully detained one of the victims after breaking into the victim's home and wresting away her firearm. See NRS 200.310(2) (defining second-degree kidnapping): NRS 193.153(1) (defining attempts). Because a great deal of evidence supported Ser's kidnapping and attempted kidnapping convictions, there is no reasonable probability of a different result had counsel argued for false imprisonment. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.²

FOOTNOTES

2.   We deny Ser's motion to supplement the record as the record presented is sufficient for our disposition.