IN RE: the JOHN DOE IRREVOCABLE TRUST 2 (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This original petition for a writ of prohibition challenges a district court's exercise of jurisdiction over a Nevada trust.

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available when a district court acts in excess of its jurisdiction. NRS 34.320; Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 224, 228, 276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012). A writ of prohibition is not available when the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. NRS 34.330. The right to appeal is generally considered an adequate remedy precluding writ relief. See Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004). The discretion to grant writ relief rests entirely with this court. Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991).

Petitioner Sabina Singh asserts that the district court's order taking in rem jurisdiction over the trust prejudices her rights to assets she claims are community property that should be subject to division in a concurrent divorce proceeding in Washington. After considering Singh's arguments and reviewing the documents submitted in this matter, we are not convinced that our extraordinary intervention is warranted. See Pan, 120 Nev. at 228, 88 P.3d at 844 (addressing petitioner's burden). Singh has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 164.033(1)(a) allows interested parties to petition the probate court for an appropriate remedial order if the petitioner claims an interest in trust assets. Pursuant to NRS 164.033(5), the probate court may grant appropriate relief in response to such a petition. And appeals of such an order are authorized by statute. See NRS 164.033(6); NRS 164.005(1) (providing that NRS Chapter 155 applies “to proceedings relating to trusts”); NRS 155.190(1)(n) (authorizing appeals from orders in trust cases when, as here, the amount in controversy is $10,000 or more). We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to entertain the writ petition at this stage in the proceedings.

Singh has also requested this court to disallow the use of a fictitious name in these proceedings and to open up the proceedings and unseal most of the documents filed herein. However, rather than raise these issues in her petition, Singh instead filed various motions before this court, which included reference to the use of fictitious names and the unsealing of documents which had been sealed in the district court. On October 9, 2024, this court denied those requests, holding that Singh had not demonstrated why this court should depart from the district court's rulings and SRCR 7. In re Matter of the John Doe Irrevocable Tr. 2, Dated Feb. 25, 2020, Docket No. 89107 (Order Regarding Motions and Stay, Oct. 9, 2024). Despite the problems associated with Singh's challenges being made in appellate motion practice rather than within her writ petition, this court's denial was without prejudice and Singh was invited to file a singular motion, if she so chose, specifically addressing these issues and explaining why each individual document she was seeking to unseal should be unsealed. Thereafter, Singh filed a motion, but she did not address what this court requested. In fact, in neither the motion nor her reply did she even attempt to address any individual document and explain why each of those documents should be unsealed. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (declining to consider claims where the moving party “neglected” their “responsibility to cogently argue, and present relevant authority, in support of” their concern). We therefore deny Singh's motion to obtain an order prohibiting John Doe and Premier from using fictitious names and motion requesting the court to unseal portions of the record. Our denial is without prejudice to Singh raising these issues with the district court as appropriate.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition, the motion to obtain an order prohibiting John Doe and Premier from using fictitious names, and the motion requesting this court to unseal portions of the record are DENIED and the stay we imposed on the district court in our October 29, 2024, order is LIFTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

While I agree with the majority's denial of petitioner Sabina Singh's motion to prohibit use of fictitious names and to unseal portions of the record, this court should nevertheless entertain the instant petition for writ of prohibition, and I therefore dissent in part. In addition to challenging the propriety of the district court taking in rem jurisdiction over the trust, Singh also contests personal jurisdiction over her in the Nevada courts. “As no adequate and speedy legal remedy typically exists to correct an invalid exercise of personal jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition is an appropriate method for challenging district court orders when it is alleged that the district court has exceeded its jurisdiction.” Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 368, 374, 328 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2014). “[T]he right to appeal is inadequate to correct an invalid exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. 30, 35, 342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015).

Here, the district court held that it did not need to evaluate personal jurisdiction over Singh because it had in rem jurisdiction over the trust proceeding pursuant to NRS 164.010, which contravenes our caselaw addressing due process jurisdictional requirements in trust proceedings. See In re Richard H. Goldstein Irrevocable Tr., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 41, 575 P.3d 72, 77 (2025) (holding that personal jurisdiction over the trustee in the circumstances presented “was required despite the statutory grant of in rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010, as the statute, even by its own terms, does not—and indeed cannot—obviate the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution”); see also In re Paul D. Burgauer Revocable Living Tr., 138 Nev. 801, 805-06, 521 P.3d 1160, 1165 (2022) (recognizing that the requirements of NRS 164.010 as well as the Due Process Clause must be satisfied to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee). Such clear legal error is another basis for entertaining a writ petition. Archon Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 816, 819-20, 407 P.3d 702, 706 (2017) (explaining that writ relief is appropriate where the district court has committed “clear and indisputable” legal error (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consistent with our caselaw, this court should therefore entertain the petition and evaluate whether respondents have made a sufficient showing to assert personal jurisdiction over Singh, including whether she is a necessary party. See Goldstein, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 41, 575 P.3d at 76-77 (analyzing whether the trustee was a necessary party over which the court must have personal jurisdiction). I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.