IN RE: DISCIPLINE OF Richard SCHULZE (2026)

ORDER OF SUSPENSION

This is an automatic review of a Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board hearing panel's recommendation that attorney Richard Schulze be suspended from the practice of law in Nevada for two years, based on violations of RPC 1.7 (conflict of interest: current clients), RPC 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), RPC 8.4(c) (misconduct—misrepresentation), and RPC 8.4(d) (misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

The State Bar has the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Schulze committed the violations charged. In re Discipline of Drakulich, 111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715 (1995). To be clear and convincing, evidence “need not possess such a degree of force as to be irresistible, but there must be evidence of tangible facts from which a legitimate inference ․ may be drawn.” In re Discipline of Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496, 515, 25 P.3d 191, 204 (internal quotations marks omitted), as modified by 31 P.3d 365 (Nev. 2001). This court reviews the panel's findings of fact deferentially, SCR 105(3)(b), so long as they are not clearly erroneous and are supported by substantial evidence, see Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 129 Nev. 99, 105, 294 P.3d 427, 432 (2013).

In his brief before this court, Schulze conceded he violated RPC 1.7 (conflict of interest: current clients) and RPC 8.4(d) (misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Having reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments, we conclude substantial evidence supports the panel's findings that Schulze also violated RPC 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal) and RPC 8.4(c) (misconduct—misrepresentation). Schulze misrepresented a decedent's residency when filing a probate action in Nevada court. Schulze had represented Clifford Laughton for twenty years, assisting Laughton with the creation of multiple trusts, a name change, and a divorce. Laughton sold the real property he had owned during the divorce proceedings, and beginning in 2012 began indicating to Schulze that he needed a Nevada address. Laughton specifically asked, more than once, to use Schulze's address to register to vote in Nevada, to which Schulze declined. After Laughton died in Hawaii, Schulze filed a petition to administer Laughton's estate in Nevada, asserting that Laughton was a Nevada resident upon his death. In doing so, Schulze relied on Laughton's Nevada driver's license that listed a Nevada address on Wedge Parkway, which was actually a P.O. Box at a UPS Store. During the estate matter, when asked to provide an asset inventory, Schulze did not list the Wedge Parkway address as an asset, but did list a home in Hawaii. Laughton's former personal assistant challenged the estate action asserting the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction because Laughton was not a Nevada resident at the time of his death. The district court removed Schulze as trustee of Laughton's estate and declared the probate action void ab initio.

In his brief, Schulze asserts he did not knowingly violate the RPCs and that his mental state was negligent. We conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the hearing panel's findings that Schulze knowingly committed the alleged violations. RPC 1.0(f) defines “knowingly” as denoting “actual knowledge,” but provides that “[a] person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.” Substantial evidence in the record supports the panel's finding that Schulze knew that Laughton did not reside at the Wedge Parkway address and that Schulze knowingly made false statements to the contrary to the district court in the underlying probate proceedings. The evidence included Schulze's own testimony at the disciplinary hearing, tax documents, emails between Laughton and Schulze, and Schulze's failure to investigate Laughton's residence despite serving as Laughton's attorney and co-trustee of Laughton's estate. Additionally, substantial evidence in the record supports the panel's finding that Schulze knew of his obligation to confirm any waiver of a conflict of interest but failed to do so. There is evidence in the record that Schulze knowingly failed to disclose his interest in his wife's real estate listing agreement for two of Laughton's properties to the co-trustees of the Laughton Trust and failed to obtain informed consent from them for the transaction.

Further, we conclude substantial evidence of Schulze's mental state exists in the record independent of the findings of fact made by the district court in the order removing Schulze as trustee and declaring the probate proceedings void ab initio. We thus need not address Schulze's arguments concerning issue preclusion.

Turning to the appropriate discipline, we review the hearing panel's recommendation de novo. SCR 105(3)(b). In determining the appropriate discipline, we weigh four factors: “the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” In re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008).

Schulze knowingly violated one duty owed to his client (conflict of interest: current client) and three duties owed to the legal profession (candor toward the tribunal, misconduct—misrepresentation, and misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Schulze's violation caused actual or potential injury to his client and the profession. Therefore, the baseline sanction for the misconduct, before consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is suspension. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards, Standard 6.12 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2023) (recommending suspension for knowingly making false statements to the court and causing an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding); Standard 7.2 (“Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”). The record also supports the hearing panel's findings as to three aggravating factors (prior disciplinary offenses, pattern of misconduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law) and two mitigating factors (full and free disclosure to the disciplinary authority and cooperative attitude towards the proceedings; and character or reputation based on pro bono awards, services for elderly clients, and community service).

Considering the factors, we agree with the panel's recommendation for a two-year suspension. See In re Discipline of Arabia, 137 Nev. 568, 571, 495 P.3d 1103, 1109 (2021) (stating the purpose of attorney discipline is “to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession,” not to punish the attorney). Accordingly, we hereby suspend attorney Richard Schulze from the practice of law in Nevada for two years from the date of this order. Schulze shall also pay the actual costs of the disciplinary proceedings, including $2,500 under SCR 120, within 30 days from the date of this order. The parties shall comply with SCR 115 and SCR 121.1.

It is so ORDERED.