CORRAL MONTENEGRO REVOCABLE TRUST DATED 26 20 26 20 v. CORRAL (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

Initial review of the docketing statement and other documents before this court revealed a potential jurisdictional defect—it did not appear that the challenged order is a final appealable judgment as asserted by appellants. In particular, an order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is not a final judgment appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1) where, as here, the order does not resolve any claims. See Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, 129 Nev. 343, 346-47, 301 P.3d 850, 852 (2013). And no other statute or court rule appeared to allow an appeal from the order. See id. at 345, 301 P.3d at 851 (this court can only consider appeals that are authorized by statute or court rule).

In response, appellants maintain their contention that the order resolved all claims asserted in the district court and is appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). As explained in the order to show cause, however, the challenged order does not resolve any claims. To the contrary, the order states that the court maintains jurisdiction over the matter “to enforce the settlement and until dismissal consistent with the terms.” The plain language of the order thus specifically contemplates a later dismissal of the matter. And the mere fact that the challenged order uses the word “judgment” does not render it appealable. Cf. Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 445, 874 P.2d 729, 733 (1994) (“This court determines the finality of an order or judgment by looking to what the order or judgment actually does, not what it is called.”).

Accordingly, appellants fail to demonstrate that this court has jurisdiction, see Moran v. Bonneville Square Assocs., 117 Nev. 525, 527, 25 P.3d 898, 899 (2001) (“[T]he burden rests squarely upon the shoulders of a party seeking to invoke our jurisdiction to establish, to our satisfaction, that this court does in fact have jurisdiction.”), and we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.