LAW OFFICES OF MAXIMILIAN STOVALL v. STATE BAR OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This original petition for a writ of mandamus/prohibition challenges a State Bar decision declining to process an application for limited practice under SCR 49.5.

This court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition, and the issuance of such extraordinary relief is solely within this court's discretion. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4; D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 468, 474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736-37 (2007). Petitioners bear the burden to show that extraordinary relief is warranted, and such relief is proper only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. See Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 841, 844 (2004).

Having considered the petition, answer, and reply, we are not persuaded that our extraordinary intervention is warranted. Generally, this court will not hear a moot case. Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 155, 158, 460 P.3d 976, 981 (2020). That rule aligns with our obligation “to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue before it.” Id. (quoting NCAA v. Univ. of Nev., 97 Nev. 56, 57, 624 P.2d 10, 10 (1981)). As we have explained, “a controversy must be present through all stages of the proceeding, and even though a case may present a live controversy at its beginning, subsequent events may render the case moot.” Id. (quoting Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010)). Here, petitioners concede in their reply that this matter has been rendered “technically moot” by petitioner Griffin's successful admission to the bar. Further, we are not persuaded that this case falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine. Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.