IN RE: THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF: J.S.S. AND J.S.S. (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition to terminate parental rights. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Michele Mercer, Judge. Appellant Christina S. and respondent Joshua S. were never married and are the parents of two minor children. Christina filed a petition to terminate Joshua's parental rights, which the district court denied, concluding termination was not in the children's best interest.

To terminate parental rights, the district court must find clear and convincing evidence that (1) at least one ground of parental fault exists and (2) termination is in the children's best interest. NRS 1128.105(1); In re Termination of Parental Rts. as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000). On appeal, this court reviews questions of law de novo and the district court's factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rts. as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014).

First, Christina asserts the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from Joshua's expert witness, John S. Pacult, a licensed clinical social worker who assessed Joshua. “This court reviews a district court's decision to allow expert testimony for abuse of discretion.” Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 498, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008). Christina initially appeared to object to the designation of Pacult as an expert and the admission of Pacult's report. But Christina later stipulated to the expert designation, thus inviting any error. Accordingly, Christina cannot now complain about the expert-witness designation. See Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) (holding that the invited error doctrine “embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit.” (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962))). Additionally, Christina did not object when Joshua moved to admit Pacult's expert report and does not otherwise argue that the district court plainly erred by admitting the expert report. See Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 19, 174 P.3d 9 70, 981-82 (2008) (holding that issues to which a party does not object are generally deemed waived unless plain error exists). We therefore conclude that this claim does not warrant relief.

Second, Christina argues the district court erroneously determined that she failed to meet her burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Joshua's parental rights was in the children's best interest. We disagree.

The record reflects that the district court carefully weighed the evidence. As the district court acknowledged, Joshua was incarcerated for abusing one of the minor children and Christina at the time of the termination trial and had a history of abusing Christina that he continued to minimize. As the district court also acknowledged, Joshua was a first-time parent, he successfully engaged in supervised and unsupervised visits with the children before being incarcerated, and he had not been assessed as a high risk to reoffend. On the latter point, Pacult's assessment indicated that Joshua scored in the low range on various risk assessment tests. Pacult opined that reunification would be preferable to termination of Joshua's parental rights, provided that Joshua complied with several conditions aimed at showing growth in Joshua's understanding of his role as a parent while also protecting the children and Christina. In this respect, it also bears noting that Christina has sole legal and physical custody of the children, so Joshua poses no current risk to them.

Joshua may have fallen far below the ideal of what a father should be, but maintaining a relationship with two parents is the better option when possible. See NRS 125C.001(1) (declaring that “it is the policy of this State ․ [t]o ensure that minor children have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with both parents after the parents have ended their relationship”); see also New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. D.S.H., 40 A.3d 734, 742-43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“Two parents are better than one, even if one parent falls far below the ideal ․”); In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (recognizing “the possibility that terminating an unfit parent's parental rights is not always in the child's best interest”). And while Joshua's conduct may deserve serious consequences, as highlighted by his conviction on the related criminal charges, we have explained that “[t]he purpose of Nevada's termination statute is not to punish parents, but to protect the welfare of children.” In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 801, 8 P.3d 126, 133 (2000). This is because “terminating parental rights is an exercise of awesome power that is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty.” In re Parental Rts. as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759, 763 (2006) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court's determination regarding the children's best interest at this time.¹ To the extent Christina asks us to reconsider the holding in Matter of L.R.S., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 555 P.3d 1175, 1179 (2024), that the considerations in NRS 128.107 and the presumptions in NRS 128.109 do not apply to private termination proceedings, we decline to do so.

Lastly, Christina argues the district court abused its discretion by denying her countermotion for attorney fees and costs related to her opposition to Joshua's motion to remove Christina's counsel. Christina asserts Joshua's motion was brought in bad faith to increase costs and delay the proceedings. EDCR 5.219(b) permits attorney fees and costs as a sanction for “[m]ultiplying the proceedings in a case so as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously.” We review the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Mack-Manley vs. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 860, 138 P.3d 525, 532-33 (2006). Here, the district court found that “neither party brought or defended their action unreasonably, frivolously, or vexatiously.” Nothing in the record contradicts this finding. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Christina's motion for fees and costs. We therefore

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Herndon, C.J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because a party must establish both parental fault and that termination of parental rights is in the children's best interest, and here best interest was not established, we need not consider the parties’ arguments regarding parental fault. NRS 128.105.