IN RE: SUBJECT MINOR: O.F. (2025)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a pro se appeal of a juvenile delinquency dispositional order. Ninth Judicial District Court, Douglas County; Nathan Tod Young, Judge.

Initial review of the notice of appeal and documents before this court revealed a potential jurisdictional defect. Specifically, this appeal was filed by Mike Raby F., father of the minor child, O.F., and it appeared that Mike F. lacked standing to appeal. Accordingly, this court issued an order on October 17, 2025, directing the parties to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed because it was not brought by a party with standing to do so.

Mike F. and the State timely filed responses. In his responses, Mike F. argues that he has standing to appeal because he seeks to protect his fundamental parental rights to the care, custody, and control of O.F., and also to protect O.F's rights. The State argues that Mike F. is not an aggrieved party because the juvenile statutes do not give parents party status and the temporary nature of the order does not alter the legal status between Mike F. and O.F.

This court may entertain an appeal only where the appeal is authorized by statute or court rule. Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 444, 874 P.2d 729, 732 (1994). Appeals from juvenile court orders are taken in the same manner as in civil cases, NRS 62D.500, and civil appeals are allowed only by “aggrieved parties” per NRAP 3A(a).

A party is someone who has “been served with process, appeared in the court below and has been named as a party of record in the trial court.” Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 448, 874 P.2d 729, 735 (1994). NRS 62D.120 requires the juvenile court to provide written notice to parents for any proceeding following the initial detention hearing, but as the State argues, that notice alone does not serve to make Mike F. a party. Absent circumstances not shown to be present here, the parties to a delinquency proceeding are the state and the minor child; the parents are not “aggrieved” parties for purposes of appeal. See Matter of Pima Cnty. Delinq. Action No. 90101-1, 744 P.2d 20, 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). There is no indication in the papers before us that the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over Mike F. in a manner so as to make him a party of record in the proceedings.

To be aggrieved, Mike F. must demonstrate that a personal right was “adversely and substantially affected” by the juvenile court's order. Hughes’ Est. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 96 Nev. 178, 180, 605 P.2d 1149, 1150 (1980) (emphasis added). As Mike F. asserts, parents have a fundamental right to maintain the care, custody, and control of their own children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). However, while the dispositional order at issue may temporarily interfere with Mike F.’s allotted custodial time, the order did not permanently or finally alter Mike F.’s parental rights such that those rights were substantially affected for purposes of appeal.

Finally, we note that the child was represented in the juvenile court by counsel, who was served with this court's October 17 order. Counsel neither filed a response to this court's order nor indicated that he did not represent O.F. in this appeal. Given this lack of response, it appears that O.F. has declined the opportunity to appeal. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mike F. may not seek this appeal on O.F.’s behalf because a non-attorney may not represent another person, Guerin v. Guerin, 116 Nev. 210, 214, 993 P.2d 1256, 1258 (2000), and Mike F. is not otherwise an aggrieved party under NRAP 3A(a).

Accordingly, Mike lacks standing to appeal the juvenile court's order, and we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.¹

Pickering, J.

Cadish, J.

Lee, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In light of this order, Mike F.’s emergency motion for stay, along with his other requests for relief, are denied as moot.