MICHAEL RALSTON v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, victim being a vulnerable person, and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, victim being a vulnerable person. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Tierra Danielle Jones, Judge.

Appellant Michael Ralston was convicted of murdering a 41-year-old intellectually impaired woman. While the victim was diagnosed as intellectually disabled shortly after her birth and was not entirely independent, she lived alone and had stable employment. Ralston and the victim had a several-year romantic relationship, which ceased when Ralston began seeing another woman. On December 28, 2022, Ralston went to the victim's house, ostensibly to mend their relationship. According to Ralston, he and the victim engaged in consensual sex and then got in a fight where the victim stabbed Ralston in the leg with a pocketknife. Ralston got the knife away from the victim and stabbed her numerous times, killing her. The State sought a first-degree murder conviction based on two theories—premeditation or felony murder pursuant to an attempted sexual assault—while Ralston argued for voluntary manslaughter. The jury convicted Ralston of first-degree murder, and Ralston now raises four issues on appeal.

First, Ralston argues the jury instructions were misleading. Specifically, Ralston contends the jury instruction defining the victim as a vulnerable person based on her diagnosis with an intellectual disability allowed the jury to find the victim could not consent to sex. According to Ralston, the jury was thus able to convict Ralston of felony murder during the perpetration of a sexual assault without the State proving lack of consent.

The jury instructions did not conflate the victim's status as a vulnerable person under NRS 205.4629 with her ability to consent to sex. The jury instruction immediately following the definition of a vulnerable person stated that whether the victim was a vulnerable person had no bearing on the elements of any other crime, nor on the State's burden of proof. And no instruction indicated that the victim's status as a vulnerable person had any bearing on her ability to consent to sex. We conclude the jury was properly instructed that the victim's vulnerable person status did not affect the elements of the charges, and we presume the jury followed the instructions. Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1333, 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006). Further, during closing, the State explicitly acknowledged the victim had the capacity to consent to sex and argued lack of consent based on the evidence presented at trial, not the victim's status as a vulnerable person. Thus, we conclude the jury was not misled as to the victim's capacity to consent to sex.

Second, Ralston argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by misstating its burden of proof during voir dire. In reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we first determine if misconduct occurred, then assess whether the misconduct warrants reversal. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). Where, as here, the defendant fails to object to the purported misconduct, they must demonstrate “(1) there was an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘plain,’ meaning it is clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record; and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.” Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018). Ralston specifically points to the State's questions during voir dire asking whether prospective jurors were capable of deliberating together and how jurors would handle conflicting evidence. Ralston cites no authority indicating these questions were improper and has thus failed to meet his burden to demonstrate a plain error.

Ralston also argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing by telling the jury to disregard instructions on self-defense. Even though Ralston conceded in opening statements that he committed voluntary manslaughter, he requested and received a self-defense instruction. In closing the prosecutor told the jury, “you can absolutely disregard those instructions.” Again, Ralston did not object, so we review only for plain error. See id. While it is fair for the prosecutor to argue whether the evidence substantiates the defense's theory of the case, this comment improperly invited the jury to disregard their instructions. Thus, we conclude this was prosecutorial misconduct. Nevertheless, in light of the evidence, and the fact Ralston argued for voluntary manslaughter, not self-defense, this single instance of misconduct did not affect Ralston's substantial rights.

Lastly, Ralston argues cumulative error denied him a fair trial. Because we conclude only one error occurred—prosecutorial misconduct—there is nothing to cumulate. See Belcher v. State, 136 Nev. 261, 279, 464 P.3d 1013, 1031 (2020) (recognizing that a single error does not cumulate). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Herndon, C.J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.