LYFT INC v. STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND REHABILITATION EX REL CHRISTINA CHAGOLLA (2025)

ORDER DECLINING CERTIFIED QUESTION

This matter involves a legal question certified to this court, under NRAP 5, by the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Specifically, the U.S. District Court has certified the following question to this court:

Relator sues Defendant Lyft alleging that it has an obligation to pay unemployment taxes under NRS 612.085 and knowingly failed to do so. International Game Technology, Inc. v. Second Judicial District Court of Nevada (‘IGT’) held that where an Attorney General requests to dismiss an action under the [Nevada False Claims Act] NFCA, a showing that the resolution of the action requires a factual evaluation under or legal interpretation of the revenue statutes constitutes ‘good cause’ for such dismissal. 12 7 P.3d 1088, 1108 (Nev. 2006). Defendant Lyft argues that IGT requires dismissal of this action, although the Attorney General has neither intervened nor moved to dismiss for “good cause.” Does IGT require dismissal of this action?

Having considered the question, we are not persuaded that it presents an important and unsettled matter of state law, and therefore, we conclude that it is unsuitable for certification. See NRAP 5(a) (listing certification criteria). Instead, Nevada law is sufficiently clear to allow the “federal court to predict its course.” In re MD Helicopters, Inc., 641 B.R. 96, 102-03 (D. Del. 2022); see also United States v. Defreitas, 29 F.4th 135, 141 (3d Cir. 2022) (“Certifying a question where the answer is clear is inappropriate and unnecessary.”); BonBeck Parker, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 14 F.4th 1169, 1176 n.3 (10th Cir. 2021) (declining to certify a question because the court saw “a reasonably clear and principled course for resolving the issue on [its] own”).

Additionally, Lyft, Inc. removed the case from state court to federal court, and it appears to be seeking a second chance at victory through the NRAP 5 certification process after the district court denied its motion to dismiss. These circumstances also weigh against answering the question. See Defreitas, 29 F.4th at 142 (recognizing “judicial economy” as a certification factor, which includes considering “the timeliness of a request for certification” to ensure the moving party is not merely seeking “a do-over” after receiving “an adverse decision”); Brown v. Argosy Gaming Co., L.P., 384 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that certification is disfavored when the request “came from the party who chose federal jurisdiction in the first place”); Schmitt v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins., 161 F.3d 1115, 1117 (7th Cir. 1998) (declining to certify question in part because appellant, who “commenced the suit in federal court, is poorly situated to ask for a second opinion”).

Accordingly, we decline to accept the certified question.

It is so ORDERED.

Herndon, C.J.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

Cadish, J.

Lee, J.