MICHAEL ROBERT MARTIN v. DANIELLE PALMER DANIELLE DENISE MARTIN (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order awarding attorney fees and costs in post-divorce proceedings. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Heidi Almase, Judge.¹

Appellant Michael Martin and respondent Danielle Palmer divorced in 2017. They then litigated multiple issues relating to their three children. Danielle eventually moved to appoint a parenting coordinator. The district court granted that motion and ordered the parties to submit an order appointing a parenting coordinator. Michael appealed, and we affirmed, noting that “Michael's arguments appear[ed] to challenge unknown actions the parenting coordinator may take in the future once one is appointed.” Martin v. Martin, No. 85323, 2023 WL 3055103, at *2 (Nev. Apr. 21, 2023) (Order Affirming in Part and Dismissing Appeal in Part). The district court appointed a parenting coordinator after Michael refused to sign the proposed order or the parenting coordinator's contract. Michael filed a motion once again challenging the parenting coordinator before the parenting coordinator had taken any actions. The district court denied that motion and granted Danielle's countermotion for attorney fees and costs, awarding Danielle $2,000. Michael appeals. We review for an abuse of discretion, Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622, 119 P.3d 727, 729 (2005), and affirm.

Although Michael suggests that the district court deprived him of due process by failing to hold a hearing, we disagree. The record demonstrates that Michael had notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See J.D. Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Int'l Grp., LLC, 126 Nev. 366, 377-78, 240 P.3d 1033, 1041 (2010) (explaining that due process is satisfied when the parties “are provided a meaningful opportunity to present their case”); see also EDCR 2.23(c) (“The judge may consider [a] motion on its merits at anytime with or without oral argument, and grant or deny it.”); EDCR 5.702 (a)-(b) (allowing the court to grant or deny a motion at any time after an opposition has been filed).

Michael also argues that the district court awarded fees without conducting a proper Brunzell analysis. See Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). We disagree. The district court's order includes findings as to each of the Brunzell factors.

Michael next argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees for work performed by a third-year law student serving as a law clerk. But we have recognized that reasonable attorney fees may include fees for work performed by law clerks. See LVMPD v. Yeghiazarian, 129 Nev. 760, 769, 312 P.3d 503, 510 (2013) (concluding that reasonable attorney fees “includes charges for persons such as paralegals and law clerks”); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286-89 (1989) (approving of reasonable attorney fees including “billing for the services of paralegals and law students who serve as clerks” (internal citation omitted)). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Michael also argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees based upon redacted billing records. We disagree because the redacted billing entries contained sufficient information for the court to determine the nature and extent of the services performed. And we decline to address Michael's challenge to the authenticity of the billing records, given that Michael did not raise this issue below. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (“A point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal.”).

Finally, Michael raises issues based on two other district court orders dated September 20, 2023, and January 5, 2024. We decline to consider those issues because the orders were not designated in Michael's notice of appeal. See NRAP 3(c)(1); Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d 458, 459 (1960) (“Only those parts of the judgment which are included in the notice of appeal will be considered by the appellate court.”). To the extent that Michael raises constitutional challenges to the district court's appointment of the parenting coordinator, we similarly decline to reach them because they are beyond the scope of this appeal. Based upon the foregoing, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.²

Herndon, C.J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Having considered appellant's pro se brief, we conclude that a response is not necessary. NRAP 46A(c).

2.   To the extent Michael raises arguments not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not warrant a different result.