REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY v. GEIST (2025)

OPINION

Following a mistrial, the district court sanctioned appellant for misconduct under NRS 18.070(2), awarding respondent attorney fees and costs. Before the rescheduled trial commenced, appellant appealed from the sanctions order. Respondent has filed a renewed motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that no authority provides for an appeal from an interlocutory sanctions order. Appellant has opposed the motion, pointing out that this court recognized, in Mona v. Eighth Judicial District Court, that “[a] sanctions order is final and appealable.” 132 Nev. 719, 724, 380 P.3d 836, 840 (2016). Respondent has filed a reply.¹

No statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an interlocutory district court order imposing sanctions. See generally Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) (recognizing that this court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule”). Although appellant specifies NRS 15.040 (providing that when the district court enters an order requiring payment, “it may be enforced by execution in the same manner as if it were a judgment”) and Mona, 132 Nev. at 724, 380 P.3d at 840, as the bases for its appeal from the sanctions order, those authorities do not provide for an appeal from an interlocutory sanctions order.

This court's opinion in Mona appears to say the opposite, stating that “[a] sanctions order is final and appealable.” Id. Standing alone, this statement suggests appellant had an immediate right of interlocutory appeal from the sanctions order. However, when considered in context, Mona is distinguishable. The sanctions order in Mona was not interlocutory but rather arose post-judgment and involved a collection effort against a nonparty, who may not appeal and must instead seek writ relief, even when the order otherwise would be appealable by a party to the action. Because the decision's statement respecting the appealability of sanctions orders was made in the context of determining whether the petition for writ relief would be considered and was based on the procedural posture of the case, it was not a statement of generally applicable appealability and thus was dictum to the extent it could be read as such. Consequently, Mona does not alter the general rule that, where there is no final judgment and no court rule or statute otherwise authorizing the appeal, this court lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders imposing sanctions against a party to the case. See Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984); Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 Nev. 243, 245-46, 235 P.3d 592, 594 (2010) (exemplifying that an interlocutory order imposing sanctions may be challenged in the context of an appeal from a final judgment, per Consolidated Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998)). Accordingly, we grant the renewed motion to dismiss and order this appeal dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We originally resolved this motion by unpublished order. Respondent filed a motion to publish the order as an opinion, which we grant. See NRAP 36(e). We now issue this opinion in place of the order.

PER CURIAM: