SROUJI v. LLC LLC (2024)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This pro se petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenges a district court order denying a peremptory challenge of the presiding judge.

We elect to entertain the merits of Angelika Srouji's writ petition. See Reggio v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 4, 525 P.3d 350, 353 (2023) (observing that a writ petition is the appropriate means by which to challenge the denial of a peremptory challenge under SCR 48.1). Having done so, however, we are not persuaded that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in denying Srouji's peremptory challenge. See Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) (observing that the party seeking writ relief bears the burden of showing such relief is warranted); see also Scarbo v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. 118, 121, 206 P.3d 975, 977 (2009) (“This court may issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office or where discretion has been manifestly abused or exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Srouji preliminarily contends that the district court was bound by the chief judge's April 18, 2024, minute orders that reassigned the underlying cases to a judge other than Judges Williams or Denton. But at the May 16, 2024, hearing before the district court, Srouji agreed that the chief judge had not considered the merits of the peremptory challenge and acquiesced to either the district court or the chief judge ruling on the merits of real parties in interests’ (hereafter, Altimeter) motion to strike the peremptory challenge.¹ And contrary to Srouji's contentions, the record indicates that the chief judge did not intend for the minute order to supersede Srouji's peremptory challenge and Altimeter's motion to strike. Thus, we are not persuaded that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in ruling on the merits of Altimeter's motion to strike.

Srouji next appears to argue that the district court erred in finding that the peremptory challenge was untimely.² She appears to distinguish Reggio, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 4, 525 P.3d 350, because that matter dealt with consolidated cases whereas this matter deals with coordinated cases. While Srouji's distinctions in this respect are well-taken, we nonetheless are not persuaded that writ relief is warranted. Namely, Srouji has presented no authority—much less controlling authority—to suggest that the district court made a clearly erroneous application of the law by relying on Reggio. See State v. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 932, 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (“A manifest abuse of discretion is a clearly erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of a law or rule.” (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, Srouji contends that the district court erred by prematurely coordinating the 2019 cases with the 2023 case. But we have already concluded that this alleged error does not warrant writ relief. See Srouji v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., Docket No. 88440, 2024 WL 1652505, at *1 (Nev. Apr. 16, 2024) (Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus) (citing Walker v. Second. Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 678, 681, 476 P.3d 1194, 1197 (2020), for the proposition that “writ relief is available only when the district court has acted and manifestly abused its discretion, not to correct any and every lower court decision” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And in any event, Srouji's reliance on EDCR 2.50(a) is misplaced, given that EDCR 2.50(b) governs motions to coordinate.

To the extent that Srouji alleges other errors, Srouji did not cogently identify those alleged errors in district court, see Archon Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 816, 822, 407 P.3d 702, 708 (2017) (“[I]n the context of extraordinary writ relief, consideration of legal arguments not properly presented to and resolved by the district court will almost never be appropriate.”), or they do not warrant writ relief, see Walker, 136 Nev. at 681, 476 P.3d at 1197. Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While Srouji appears to have backtracked on this acquiescence in her May 22, 2024, motion, the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in taking her at her initial word.

2.   Srouji also contends that she was deprived of due process because the district court did not explain its reasoning for determining her peremptory challenge was untimely. While we recognize that the district court's explanation at the August 8, 2024, hearing left something to be desired, the district court nevertheless conveyed that its decision was based on the arguments raised in Altimeter's motion to strike.