ROSETE v. STATE (2000)

OPINION

On December 15, 1996, Clifton Sumsion (“Sumsion”) reported his 1986 Oldsmobile stolen.   On December 16, 1996, the Sacramento Police Department located Sumsion's vehicle in front of appellant Jorge Rosete's (“Rosete”) father's house in Sacramento, California.   The Reno Police Department arrested Rosete the next day.

On September 5, 1997, the State charged Rosete in an amended information with one count of grand larceny, a felony under NRS 205.220.   At trial, Reno Police Department Detectives Charles Dimino (“Detective Dimino”) and Mohammad Rafaquat (“Detective Rafaquat”) testified about their interview with Rosete.   During the interview, Rosete admitted that he acted as a lookout while two accomplices broke into Sumsion's vehicle.   Rosete identified one of the accomplices as Jason Antunovich (“Antunovich”).   The other accomplice, Elmer Marin (“Marin”), testified at trial that he acted as a lookout as Rosete and Antunovich broke into Sumsion's vehicle.   Moreover, during the interview with detectives, Rosete admitted to driving the vehicle to his parent's house in Sacramento.

Rosete testified that he did not take part in the theft of the vehicle.   Rosete stated that Marin and Antunovich drove by him in the vehicle and asked him to get in.   Subsequently, Rosete, Marin, and Antunovich drove to California and left the vehicle at Rosete's father's house in Sacramento.   Rosete acknowledged that he did drive the vehicle part of the time, but denied having knowledge that it was stolen.   Rosete denied making any incriminating statements to Detectives Dimino and Rafaquat.

On September 30, 1997, the jury found Rosete guilty of one count of grand larceny.   The district court sentenced Rosete to sixteen to seventy-two months in prison.

Rosete argues that the State failed to prove every element of the crime of grand larceny.   Specifically, Rosete asserts that the State failed to prove, under NRS 205.220(1)(a), that the value of the vehicle was $250.00 or more.   We agree.

It is well-settled that the State must prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.   See NRS 175.201;  Watson v. State, 110 Nev. 43, 45, 867 P.2d 400, 402 (1994).  NRS 205.220 provides, in relevant part:

[A] person commits grand larceny if the person:

1.  Intentionally steals, takes and carries away, leads away or drives away:

(a) Personal goods or property, with a value of $250 or more, owned by another person․

Thus, an essential element of grand larceny is that the stolen property must have a value of $250.00 or more.   See NRS 205.220(1)(a).

In this case, the State failed to offer any evidence regarding the value of the Sumsion's vehicle.   In fact, the State never asked Sumsion about the value of his vehicle.¹  In Cleveland v. State, 85 Nev. 635, 636, 461 P.2d 408, 408 (1969), we concluded that the value of the stolen property “is a material allegation that the state must prove in the prosecution of grand larceny as a felony.”   Moreover, we stated that “[t]he burden is upon the prosecution to provide the necessary proof of value of the particular merchandise then presented.”  Id. at 637, 461 P.2d at 409.

Accordingly, we conclude that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict Rosete of grand larceny under NRS 205 .220 because it offered no evidence regarding the value of Sumsion's vehicle.   For this reason, we reverse and vacate Rosete's conviction for grand larceny.²

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State correctly points out that under NRS 205.228 (grand larceny of a motor vehicle), the value of the vehicle is not an element of the crime.   However, in this case, the State charged Rosete under NRS 205.220, which does have a value element.

2.   Rosete also raises numerous other issues on appeal.   In light of our conclusion that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict Rosete of grand larceny, we find it unnecessary to address any of these issues.

PER CURIAM: