IN RE: THE: 23 PARTNERS TRUST I (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal of a district court order denying a motion to quash trial subpoenas and granting a countermotion to compel trustees to testify in person in a probate action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Veronica Barisich, Judge.

Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing the challenged order is not a final judgment, has not been certified as final pursuant to NRCP 54(b), and “does not fall within any category of appealable orders enumerated under NRS § 155.190.” Therefore, according to respondents, this appeal is premature and this court lacks jurisdiction. Appellants filed a response, conceding that they filed “this appeal as a protective measure to preserve their appellate rights[.]” Appellants also argue that the challenged order is appealable pursuant to NRS 155.190(1)(n) because “the order implicates an amount in excess of $10,000 because it expanded the trial scope to include ‘alleged mismanagement of funds, any missing funds” and other claims “beyond ․the claims affirmatively pled[.]” While the challenged order may eventually affect the distribution of assets that are in excess of $10,000, it does not directly resolve any controversy as to such assets.

Next, appellants argue the order “effectively ‘instructs’ [trustee-appellants] within the meaning of” NRS 155.190(1)(h) “by defining the scope of the [appellants’] accountability and exposure, which is tantamount to instructing them regarding their trust administration, and by instructing them to appear in-person for the trial.” We disagree. This is not, as respondents point out in their reply, the sense in which “instruct” is used in NRS 155,190(1)(h). To construe “instruct” in the sense advocated by appellants would, as respondents argue, render the “limited list of specific appealable orders” in NRS 155.190(1) as “superfluous.”

The challenged order does not appear to fall into any of the other categories of appealable orders set forth in NRS 155.190. Likewise, the challenged order is not—as appellants concede—a final judgment appealable pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(1), nor is it substantively appealable under any other provision of NRAP 3A(b). This court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule.” Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). As no other statute or court rule appears to allow appeal from this order, this court lacks jurisdiction. Respondents’ motion to dismiss this appeal is granted and this court

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED.

Stiglich, J.

Cadish, J.

Lee, J.