IN RE: SUBJECT MINOR: T.J. (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order certifying appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Linda Marquis, Judge.

Appellant T.J. is a juvenile charged with one count of reckless driving resulting in death or substantial bodily harm, one count of possession of a stolen vehicle, one count of failure to obey a red traffic light, and one count of driving without a valid license. The charges stem from a motor vehicle collision where T. J., at the age of 14, allegedly drove a stolen vehicle at reckless speeds, disobeyed a red traffic light, and struck the vehicle of another person, resulting in that person's death. Officers found T.J. lying next to the driver-side door of the stolen vehicle and the passenger of the stolen vehicle told officers that T.J. was driving at the time of the collision. T.J. was later arrested.

The State filed a delinquency petition alleging four counts of criminal activity and sought to certify T.J. as an adult under NRS 62B.390(1). After hearing oral argument, the juvenile court decided that the State established prosecutive merit for all counts and certified T.J. to be tried as an adult. The juvenile court filed a written order reflecting its findings the same day as the hearing. T.J. appeals, arguing that the juvenile court erred in finding prosecutive merit, misapplied juvenile caselaw, improperly considered T.J.’s prior adjudicated offense, and improperly considered T.J.’s subjective factors. We disagree with T.J.’s contentions and affirm.

The juvenile court did not err in finding that the State established prosecutive merit

In certification proceedings, the juvenile court must initially determine whether the charges have prosecutive merit. Matter of Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 437, 664 P.2d 947, 953 (1983), modified by In re William S., 122 Nev. 432, 441-42, 132 P.3d 1015, 1021 (2006). Prosecutive merit requires “probable cause to believe that the subject minor committed the charged crime.” Id. Probable cause “may be based on evidence taken from the petition, sworn investigative reports, witnesses’ affidavits, police affidavits, or other informal but reliable evidence.” Matter of Three Minors, 100 Nev. 414, 418, 684 P.2d 1121, 1124 (1984), modified by In re William S., 122 Nev. at 441-42, 132 P.3d at 1021. Additionally, probable cause “may be based on slight, even marginal evidence, because it does not involve a determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Dettloff v. State, 120 Nev. 588, 595, 97 P.3d 586, 590-91 (2004) (citation modified). A juvenile court's prosecutive merit ruling will not be overturned absent substantial error. Cf. Sheriff v. Provenza, 97 Nev. 346, 347, 630 P.2d 265, 265 (1981) (stating that the trial court, in a pretrial habeas corpus proceeding, is the most appropriate forum to determine whether or not probable cause exists and that a probable cause ruling will not be overturned absent substantial error).

T.J. first argues that despite repeated discovery requests, the State failed to timely disclose critical materials; disclosing them nearly two weeks after he filed his opposition. T.J. also posits that he objected to these materials, specifically the vehicle data, as being untested and unreliable. T.J. therefore contends that the juvenile court erred in relying on the late disclosed evidence in reaching its decision.

T.J.’s contentions here are unpersuasive. Juvenile certification proceedings must follow “a procedural standard of fundamental fairness,” which “requires that juveniles be given a hearing, the right to counsel, access to relevant court studies and reports, and a statement of reasons for the [certification] decision.” Three Minors, 100 Nev. at 417, 684 P.2d at 1123. “Due process does not require that a juvenile be given an adversary hearing comparable to the preliminary examination provided for in NRS Chapter 171․ Transferproceedings are essentially dispositional in nature and not adjudicatory. No determination of guilt or innocence is made.” Id. at 418, 684 P.2d at 1124. Considering these principles, in conjunction with the relaxed evidentiary standard for probable cause, due process in certification proceedings “mean[s] that [the juvenile] should not be foreclosed from presenting his side of the case. The nature and extent of such informal hearings will be left to the sound discretion of the hearing judge.” Id. at 419, 684 P.2d at 1124.

The juvenile court held a hearing, allowing both T.J. and the State to present arguments as to prosecutive merit and certification. In analyzing all available evidence, the juvenile court found that even if it were to disregard all statements made by T.J. and the vehicle event data records, the remaining evidence—witness statements, surveillance footage, DNA results, and law enforcement reports—was sufficient to establish prosecutive merit. Thus, the juvenile court did not err in determining that the charges were supported by prosecutive merit. Id. at 418, 684 P.2d at 1124 (“[A] probable cause finding may be based on evidence taken from the petition, sworn investigative reports, witnesses’ affidavits, police affidavits, or other informal but reliable evidence.”).

Even excluding the late-disclosed evidence, the record supports the juvenile court's findings. The arrest report, two witness statements, DNA evidence, statements from the passenger in the stolen vehicle, and the reports prepared for the certification proceedings all suggest prosecutive merit. The juvenile court conducted a full investigation, determined the charged offenses were supported by prosecutive merit, and noted its findings with sufficient specificity and evidentiary support. To the extent T.J. argues that the juvenile court's finding of prosecutive merit was conclusory. procedurally flawed, relied on improper late-disclosed evidence, and deprived him of due process and fairness, we disagree. The juvenile court did not err in finding prosecutive merit.¹

T.J. also argues that the juvenile system lacks a habeas mechanism that would allow juveniles to challenge a probable cause determination. The lack of post-certification relief requires juveniles to ask for this court's review, resulting in more time spent in custody.

T.J.’s assertion rests on the incorrect premise that juvenile certification proceedings must mirror criminal preliminary hearings. We have established that due process in certification proceedings does not require juvenile courts to conduct adversarial hearings like those in adult preliminary examinations, juveniles are not entitled to two preliminary hearings, and the certification hearing is not a substitute for a preliminary hearing. Id. at 418-19, 684 P.2d at 1123-24. Moreover, certified juveniles may seek to be transferred back to juvenile court under NRS 62B.390(3)(b) and may seek recourse through appeal. Thus, T.J.’s proposed habeas mechanism is unwarranted.

The juvenile court properly certified T.J. to adult status based on the nature and seriousness of the offenses charged and the persistency and seriousness of his prior adjudicated offenses

The juvenile court has broad discretion in certification decisions. In re William S., 122 Nev. at 441-42, 132 P.3d at 1021. A certification decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the juvenile court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason.’’ Id. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36-37 (citation modified) (quoting Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001)).

After a juvenile court finds a case has prosecutive merit, it must decide whether to certify the juvenile by following the decisional matrix established in Seven Minors, which lays out three categories to consider. 99 Nev. at 434, 664 P.2d at 952. The three categories are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the charged offenses; (2) the persistency and seriousness of past criminal offenses; and (3) subjective factors, such as age, maturity, character, personality, and family relationships. Id. at 434-35, 664 P.2d at 952. Of the three categories, the first two are given the “primary and most weighty consideration.” Id. at 435, 664 P.2d at 952. The decision to certify may rest on either or both of those factors. Id.

Regarding the third category, this court instructed that in close cases, when examination of the first two categories does not compel certification, the juvenile court may consider the subjective factors. Id. In such cases, the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction when the subjective factors “require a finding that the public interest and safety are best served by retaining the youth in the juvenile system.” In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36. The decision to transfer jurisdiction, however, “must never rest on the third factor alone.” Id.

Seven Minors acted as this court's purposeful choice to prioritize public safety and adopt a test that places juvenile courts in a better position to make objective judgments in certification proceedings. 99 Nev. at 434-35, 664 P.2d at 952. “By stressing objective records rather than subjective clinical factors, the court will be adopting much safer and fairer criteria for transfer decisions.” Id. at 435, 664 P.2d at 952.

T.J. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in certifying T.J. because it misapplied Seven Minors and Jeremiah B. v. State, 107 Nev. 924, 823 P.2d 883 (1991), modified by In re William S., 122 Nev. at 441-42, 132 P.3d at 1021, in finding T.J.’s offenses to be heinous and egregious. He further argues that the juvenile court failed to consider his completion of probation in considering his past adjudicated offense and failed to adequately consider his amenability for treatment and other subjective, personal factors.

Nature and seriousness of the charged offenses

Turning to the first consideration, T.J. argues the juvenile court misapplied Jeremiah B. because T.J.’s actions were factually different and did not rise to the same level of intentionality as the crimes considered in that case, especially when the evidence shows that he acted without an intent to harm others. T.J. argues the juvenile court distorted his alleged acts of speeding and running a red light into a rule that would permit the certification of juveniles whenever tragedy occurs.

We disagree; the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of the first category—the nature and seriousness of the charged offenses. In Jeremiah B., we established that juvenile courts may consider the consequences of a juvenile's conduct to determine whether the charged offenses are heinous and egregious. 107 Nev. at 928-29, 823 P.2d at 885-86. We also held that the severity and heinousness of charged offenses may be derived from the consequences of conduct demonstrating relatively less serious intentions. Id. at 929, 823 P.2d at 886. Here, the juvenile court found that T.J.’s conduct demonstrated an element of intentionality and resulted in the death of a person and thus that T.J.’s charged offenses were heinous and egregious. The record supports this finding, as T.J. was accused of willful possession of a stolen vehicle and intentionally driving 99 MPH in a 45 MPH zone, endangering public safety.

Moreover, we disagree that the juvenile court's decision creates a rule permitting certification whenever tragedy occurs. The Jeremiah B. court warned against this very concern, stating that “[t]he mere fact of the homicide does not in itself, however, bring these crimes into the range of heinousness and egregiousness.” Id. Thus, death is not dispositive, and instead, the juvenile court must use its broad discretion to apply the Seven Minors matrix to determine whether public safety requires certification. Id. at 926, 929, 823 P.3d at 884, 886. T.J. appears to have possessed and drove a stolen vehicle knowing that he could not drive under the law and chose to do so anyway at speeds up to 99 MPH. We therefore cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in its analysis of the first category.

To the extent T.J. argues that the analysis in Seven Minors is outdated and requires fresh guidance, we also disagree. Again, death does not result in quasi-automatic certification under Jeremiah B. 107 Nev. at 929, 823 P,2d at 886. Furthermore, the Nevada Legislature has given the juvenile courts broad discretion to conduct “a full investigation” and determine whether public safety concerns warrant certification. NRS 62B.390(1), Thus, we see no reason to re-assess the objective approach adopted by this court in Seven Minors.

Lastly, T.J. submits United States Supreme Court caselaw to argue that the Court has recognized reduced levels of culpability in younger juveniles like T.J. and older juveniles nearing adulthood, and that reduced culpability in youths leads to reduced intentionality, weighing against certification here. He also posits that depression of the brakes two seconds before impact diminishes the intentionality present in T.J.’s conduct.

We disagree with T.J .’s assertions. The Supreme Court caselaw T.J. cites is distinguishable and unpersuasive, as these cases analyzed the differences in the level of culpability between juveniles and adults in the context of varying criminal punishment and whether such punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005) (noting the difference between juveniles and adults to determine whether juveniles may receive the death penalty); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71-72 (2010) (confronting whether juveniles may be sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicidal crimes); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-73 (2012) (confronting whether juveniles may be sentenced to life without parole at all). True, the attributes of youth are important to consider in certification proceedings, but not under this first category. The first category requires juvenile courts to objectively consider the nature and seriousness of the charged offenses and, under Jeremiah B., determine whether the juvenile's conduct demonstrates an element of intentionality, rather than ascertaining the juvenile's individual level of intentionality. See Jeremiah B., 107 Nev. at 928-30, 823 P.2d at 885-86. Because the Seven Minors matrix provides juvenile courts with ample discretion to consider the unique attributes of each juvenile under the subjective factors category, T.J.’s contentions are unpersuasive here. See Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 434-35, 664 P.2d at 952-53. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the depression of the brake pedal two seconds before impact meaningfully affects our analysis here. Therefore, we are unconvinced that the juvenile court abused its discretion under this first category or that such consideration requires an update.²

Persistency and seriousness of past adjudicated offenses

Along with the nature and seriousness of the charged offenses, juvenile courts must also give primary consideration to the persistency and seriousness of past adjudicated offenses. Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 434-35, 664 P.2d at 952. The decision to certify may be based on the persistency and seriousness of past adjudicated offenses alone or on both of the two objective categories. Id. at 435, 664 P.2d at 952.

T.J. challenges the juvenile court's finding that based on his past adjudicated offense—grand larceny of a motor vehicle—T.J.’s conduct had continued to escalate. T.J. posits that he showed “inarguable success” by completing court supervised probation as a result of his prior offense.

T.J.’s appraisal of his probation is unpersuasive. Under the second category, the juvenile court analyzed T.J.’s prior adjudicated offense of grand larceny of a motor vehicle, his period of probation, and participation in a one-day rehabilitation program. The juvenile court noted that the prior offense occurred when T.J. was thirteen years old, involved a high-speed collision of a stolen vehicle in a residential area, and resulted in probation terminating in June 2024. The juvenile court found the underlying collision occurred just months after T.J. completed probation and, despite intervention, that T.J.’s conduct “continued to escalate.” Thus, it is clear that probation was not successful, as T.J. reoffended in a similar manner only months after completing probation. While the first offense only led to property damage, the second resulted in the loss of human life— hence the finding of escalating behavior. We therefore see no abuse of discretion as to the second category of the Seven Minors matrix.

Subjective factors

We have established that the subjective factors “are not the most weighty and controlling and may be considered only in close cases.” In re William S., 122 Nev. at 440, 132 P.3d at 1020. “[R]etention in the juvenile system favors the long-term public interest when the minor has a good chance of becoming a productive and law-abiding citizen under juvenile court cognizance.” Id. at 441, 132 P.3d at 1021. Again, juvenile courts have broad discretion in certification proceedings in accordance with Seven Minors. Id. at 441-42, 132 P.3d at 1021.

T.J. argues that the juvenile court disregarded Three Minors by failing to make findings as to the treatment available to T.J, in the juvenile system. He also argues the juvenile court failed to consider other subjective factors that warrant retention, demonstrate amenability to treatment, and indicate T.J.’s retention in the juvenile system favors the long-term public interest.

We disagree with T.J.’s assertions. Three Minors does not require juvenile courts to make findings of available treatment in the juvenile system. In close cases, when neither of the first two categories clearly compels certification, Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 435, 664 P.2d at 952, the third category requires juvenile courts to consider “other, subjective factors, for example, mitigating circumstances which appear from an evaluation of a minor's personal characteristics,” Three Minors, 100 Nev. at 420, 684 P.2d at 1125. The availability of treatment is not a personal characteristic. Moreover, the juvenile court here did not certify T.J. “because a ‘treatment program’ [was] supposedly unavailable to the juvenile court.” Id. at 421, 684 P.2d at 1125. Instead, it found T.J.’s crimes to be heinous, egregious, and indicative of escalating behavior, ultimately holding that public safety requires certification under the first two Seven Minors prongs. Thus, the juvenile court properly applied Three. Minors.

We are also not convinced the juvenile court abused its discretion in its analysis of T.J.’s subjective factors. Regarding certification decisions, we have established that juvenile courts must give “a statement of reasons” that is “sufficient to show that the statutory requirement of ‘full investigation’ has been met so as to permit meaningful appellate review.” Three Minors, 100 Nev. at 417, 684 P.2d at 1123.

Here, the juvenile court made findings as to T.J.’s age, family relationships, community support, substance abuse, mental health, education, and amenability to treatment. Though the juvenile court did not make findings as to all of T.J.’s subjective factors, such high standard is not required under the conventional findings of fact standard. See Robison v. Robison, 100 Nev. 668, 673, 691 P.2d 451, 455 (1984) (stating district court findings “must be sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the court's ultimate conclusions”). We further acknowledge that the juvenile court's findings satisfied the “statement of reasons” standard set forth in Three Minors, providing sufficient factual bases to show the juvenile court conducted a full investigation to permit meaningful appellate review. 100 Nev. at 417, 684 P.2d at 1123. We therefore cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion with regard to the subjective factors category.

In sum, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Seven Minors decisional matrix to certify T.J. The juvenile court's findings were supported with evidence from the record and do not contradict Nevada juvenile law or caselaw. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Herndon, C.J.

Pickering, J.

Bell, J.

Cadish, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Stiglich, J.

Lee, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We do not address T.J.’s arguments asserting that the juvenile court's findings were largely decided before oral argument since the written order was entered only 30 minutes after the hearing. Despite T.J.’s contention that the juvenile court merely rubberstamped LVMPD's arrest report instead of conducting a full investigation, there is nothing in the record to support this assertion.

2.   Because this case concerns discretionary certification, we do not address T.J.’s contentions pertaining to the Nevada Legislature's repeal of presumptive certification under NRS 62B.390. See A.B. 230, 81st Leg. (Nev. 2021; 2021 Nev. Stat., ch. 515, § 4, at 3421-22.