JOHN DOE 13 v. BOYS GIRLS CLUBS OF CENTRAL NEW MEXICO DOMINIC YANNONI DAVID MICHAELBACK (2026)

OPINION

{1} This appeal arises from a lawsuit brought by Appellant John Doe 13 against Appellee Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Inc. (BGCA), Defendants Boys & Girls Clubs of Central New Mexico (BGCCNM), and the latter's former directors Dominic Yannoni and David Michaelback. The complaint raised several allegations of sexual abuse spanning nearly a decade, and this case is one of thirteen filed against BGCA, BGCNM, Yannoni, and Michaelback. Appellant appeals the district court's order granting BGCA's three motions for summary judgment. Appellant primarily asserts that the district court erred in concluding that BGCA exercised no control over BGCCNM or its employees, and also in considering some and rejecting other evidence pertinent to that determination. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a jury trial.

BACKGROUND

{2} In the late 1980s, Appellant was a youth attendee at BGCCNM in Albuquerque, New Mexico. From ages ten to eighteen, Appellant alleges he was groomed and sexually abused by Yannoni and Michaelback on several occasions during his time as both an attendee and later as an employee of BGCCNM. As an adult, Appellant filed this suit against BGCA, BGCCNM, Yannoni, and Michaelback stemming from the abuse he alleged occurred at BGCCNM.

{3} Relevant to this appeal, Appellant's claims against BGCA—the overarching national organization with which BGCCNM affiliates—allege negligence (Count II), vicarious liability (Count III), and breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV). As stated, the district court granted BGCA's motions for summary judgment as to each claim. We discuss additional facts of the case as they become relevant below.

DISCUSSION

{4} “[When] reviewing an order on summary judgment, [this Court] examine[s] the whole record on review, considering the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of a trial on the merits.” Zamora v. St. Vincent Hosp., 2014-NMSC-035, ¶ 9, 335 P.3d 1243. “New Mexico courts, unlike federal courts, view summary judgment with disfavor, preferring a trial on the merits.” Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 8, 148 N.M. 713, 242 P.3d 280.

{5} “Where reasonable minds will not differ as to an issue of material fact, the court may properly grant summary judgment.” Montgomery v. Lomos Altos, Inc., 2007-NMSC-002, ¶ 16, 141 N.M. 21, 150 P.3d 971. However, summary judgment is inappropriate when there are disputed material facts in the record. Yurcic v. City of Gallup, 2013-NMCA-039, ¶ 18, 298 P.3d 500 (holding that summary judgment was improper where material disputed facts existed). “In New Mexico, summary judgment may be proper when the moving party has met its initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment.” Romero, 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 10. When such is established, “the burden shifts to the non[ ]movant to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the merits.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

I. Negligence

{6} We first address Appellant's claim that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to his negligence claim against BGCA. Appellant argues that the factual findings and legal conclusions reached by the district court regarding negligence are wrong, and that it erred in rejecting the evidence he submitted regarding BGCA's control of BGCCNM. BGCA answers that Appellant failed to present evidence that BGCA owed him a duty under New Mexico law.

{7} “Generally, a negligence claim requires the existence of a duty from a defendant to a plaintiff, breach of that duty, which is typically based upon a standard of reasonable care, and the breach being a proximate cause and cause in fact of the plaintiff's damages.” Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181. Although the existence of a legal duty is generally a question of law that this Court reviews de novo, in some cases “the existence of a duty may become a mixed question of law and fact[, requiring submission] to the jury for resolution.” Talbott v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 2005-NMCA-109, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 189, 118 P.3d 194 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{8} Because the absence of any of the elements mentioned above is fatal to a negligence claim, we first examine the predicate question of whether any duty was owed to Appellant by BGCA to begin with. See Romero v. Giant Stop-N-Go of N.M., 2009-NMCA-059, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 520, 212 P.3d 408. The law bestows no general duty to protect others from harm, Grover v. Stechel, 2002-NMCA-049, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 140, 45 P.3d 80; rather, for a duty to be imposed, “a relationship must exist that legally obligates [a d]efendant to protect [a p]laintiff's interest. Johnstone v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-119, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 596, 145 P.3d 76. We therefore look to what relationship exists between the parties, the nature of the plaintiff's interest, the defendant's conduct, and whether public policy favors imposing a duty on the defendant. Id. ¶ 9.

{9} Given the nature of Appellant's contention that he was owed a duty of care by BGCA, our central inquiry regards the existence or degree of control possessed by BGCA over BGCCNM—the New Mexico entity for which Appellant was an attendee and employee. Control in this context turns on the existence of some special relationship that “arise[s] out of particular connections between the parties, give[s] rise to a special responsibility, and take[s] the case out of the general rule that there is no general duty to protect others.” Thompson v. Potter, 2012-NMCA-014, ¶ 27, 268 P.3d 57 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). This Court has ruled that such a special relationship arises when “there is a supervisory or treatment relationship, or where there is direct custody and control over another.” Id. “[I]n order to create a duty based on a special relationship, the relationship must include the right or ability to control another's conduct.” Est. of Eric S. Haar v. Ulwelling, 2007-NMCA-032, ¶ 23, 141 N.M. 252, 154 P.3d 67 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{10} Contrary to the determination of the district court, our review of the record reveals asserted facts capable of establishing the presence of a special relationship between BGCCNM and BGCA, and consequently between BGCA and Appellant, as a member and employee of BGCCNM. Appellant points us to Enriquez v. Cochran, a case in which the plaintiff, an employee of a local Boy Scouts’ chapter, pursued a joint and several liability claim against the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) after being struck by a tree he had volunteered to help cut down at a scout camp. See 1998-NMCA-157, ¶¶ 12-17, 126 N.M. 196, 967 P.2d 1136. In reversing the contrary conclusion reached by the district court, this Court relied, in relevant part, on certain “indicators in the record” that supported existence of a duty to the plaintiff on the part of BSA. Id. ¶ 107. While we acknowledge that the analysis in Enriquez is built through the lens of joint and several liability concerning inherently dangerous activity, this Court still discussed factors relevant to duty that are useful to our analysis here.

{11} Enriquez cited to the organizational documents of BSA and its local chapters, observing that “BSA's rules and regulations allow BSA to retain a large degree of potential control of all aspects of [chapter] activities.” Id. Additionally and more notably, Enriquez emphasized the incentivization of local chapters belonging to bigger organizations like BSA to abide by the “rules, regulations, and other pronouncements” of the parent organization so as to not lose status as local chapters. Id. This Court explained that the influence an organization like BSA has over its local chapters is embodied in part by its authority to refuse the renewal of a local chapter and prohibit the local chapter from engaging in or claiming sponsorship by the national organization. Id. We view that same rationale as persuasive here.

{12} Appellant presented a document entitled, “Recommended Revised Requirements for Membership in Boys’ Clubs of America [(BCA)],” as evidence that “BGCA established, monitored and enforced strict membership requirements” for its local clubs. The four-page document contains scores of requirements, including the following four pertinent requirements we highlight here. First, BGCA required local chapters to “render a report annually of its organization, membership, activities, attendance and finances to BCA.” Second, BGCA also required local chapters to display the BGCA emblem on the outside of their buildings and on all “appropriate printed matter,” to personify its local chapters’ affiliation with BGCA. Third, BGCA's membership requirements stated that each local chapter conduct a self-evaluation of that chapter's “utilizing board, community and staff, based on standards approved by the [n]ational [c]ouncil and that a copy of this evaluation shall be submitted to the national organization as a requirement for continuing its membership.” Fourth, it was required that each local chapter “comply with state laws and local ordinances for protection and safety.” Finally, local chapter facilities were also required to be approved by BGCA to ensure they were “suitably equipped, for carrying on a diversified and constructive program of activities.”

{13} In its order granting summary judgment in favor of BGCA, the district court stated, “[T]here is no evidence that BGCA required, or had authority to require, compliance by [BGCCNM] with specific policies and procedures, that BGCA established standards on how employees were hired or managed at [BGCCNM], or that BGCA had control over which children could be part of the [BGCCNM's] programs.” Again, we view the evidence in the record differently.

{14} Similar to the local BSA chapter in Enriquez, there is evidence that BGCCNM was controlled by BGCA by and through what was required as stated in the organizational documents. The success and operation of BGCCNM as an appendage of BGCA apparently hinged entirely on its willingness to abide by the policies and procedures required by BGCA. The documents support the idea that this authority by BGCA is “epitomized” by its capacity to shutter the BGCCNM chapter should it fail to adhere to BGCA's policies and procedures. See id. ¶ 107 (“The potential reach of BSA's authority is epitomized by its authority to refuse to renew the charter of a local council.”). While the district court is correct that, in its policies and procedures, BGCA does not explicitly outline “how employees were hired or managed at the [BGCCNM], or that BGCA had control over which children could be part of the [BGCCNM's] programs,” these documents suggest that BGCA “required, or had authority to require, compliance by the [BGCCNM] with specific policies and procedures.”

{15} Beyond our own state case law, a fair number of appellate courts have also considered this same inquiry of whether organizations owe a duty of care toward minors in situations by which an adult under the control of the organizations sexually abused the minors. While not cited for his negligence claim, Appellant cites to Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Ass'n, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552, 564-65 (Ct. App. 2017), in which the court concluded that the national soccer association had a special relationship with the minor plaintiff who was sexually abused by her soccer coach, reasoning that she was a member of the association, played on a team that was a local affiliate of the association, the team was required to comply with the associations policies and rules, and the association had created the standards by which coaches were hired. Id. at 566.

{16} The record contains evidence that BGCA had sufficient control over BGCCNM for a jury to conclude a special relationship existed between BGCA and BGCCNM to the extent that BGCA had the ability to control the conduct of BGCCNM—in this case, the alleged sexual abuse—and therefore a duty was owed to the members of BGCCNM by BGCA. See Thompson v. Potter, 2012-NMCA-014, ¶ 27, 268 P.3d 57 (“The special relationship case law in New Mexico typically involves situations where there is a supervisory or treatment relationship, or where there is direct custody and control over another.); see also Est. of Eric S. Haar, 2007-NMCA-032, ¶ 23 (holding that an ongoing special relationship and ability to control are necessary to give rise to a duty). Having evaluated the facts and circumstances surrounding BGCA's relationship with BGCCNM, we conclude that the determination of whether a special relationship exists, giving rise to a duty, should have been assessed by a jury rather than the district court. See Talbott, 2005-NMCA-109, ¶ 22 (holding in pertinent part that conflicting factual inferences on the existence of a relationship between a hospital and an air ambulance service is an issue for a jury to resolve).

{17} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of BGCA regarding Appellant's negligence claim as to the element of duty.

II. Vicarious Liability

{18} The district court found that “[t]here [was] no evidence that Yannoni or Michaelback were agents of BGCA, that BGCA held [them] out as its agents, or that [they] consented to act on behalf of BGCA.” Appellant asserts that the district court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of BGCA on his claim of vicarious liability because BGCA's liability rests on its right to control BGCCNM and its employees, and there is evidence to support that control. In Appellant's complaint, he asserts that BGCA is vicariously liable for the actions of Yannoni and Michaelback under the aided-in-agency theory because he states there was evidence showing that the abuse Appellant suffered was facilitated by their status within BGCA.

{19} BGCA argues that New Mexico law has already held that sexual misconduct with minors, as alleged here, is conduct that falls outside the scope of employment or agency, and that the aided-in-agency theory of vicarious liability does not apply because Appellant has not shown anything other than “the mere existence of an employment relationship” between Yannoni and BGCA or between Michaelback and BGCA.

{20} Under the aided-in-agency theory, an employer may be held liable for the intentional torts of an employee acting outside the scope of their employment if the employee “was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1958). Our Supreme Court first adopted the aided-in-agency theory in addressing respondeat superior issues in Ocana v. American Furniture Co., addressing the question of whether this theory could apply in the context of sexual harassment by a supervisor upon an employee during the course of their employment. See 2004-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 30-31, 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d 58. The Court determined that to succeed under this theory, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence that the tortfeasor was aided by their status when committing the alleged tort. Id. ¶ 32. It was ultimately ruled in Ocana that the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that the tortfeasor—her supervisor—was able to commit his alleged acts by virtue of his supervisory status, and consequently she was unable to prevail under the aided-in-agency theory. Id.

{21} Similar to Ocana, we must decide whether Appellant presented sufficient evidence showing that Yannoni and Michaelback were aided by their status within BGCA in committing the alleged torts against him. See id. Appellant asks us to look at the facts of this case as analogous to Spurlock v. Townes, a case in which three former inmates of a correctional center were sexually assaulted by a correctional officer during the course of their time served. See 2016-NMSC-014, 368 P.3d 1213. Our Supreme Court noted concerns in Spurlock, writing that “[the] aided-in-agency as a theory independent of apparent authority risks an unjustified expansion of employer tort liability for acts of employees” and that this theory should not apply “to all situations in which the commission of a tort is facilitated by a tortfeasor's employment.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the Supreme Court ultimately held that under the aided-in-agency theory, the corrections officer used the “authority vested in him by his position” to coerce the former inmates into submitting to sexual assault. Id. ¶ 20. Moreover, it was held that the correction officer's employer, the Corrections Corporation of America, and the prison warden provided the agency authority to the corrections officer that enabled the crimes to be committed against the former inmates. Id. ¶ 21.

{22} Alternatively, BGCA asks this Court to analyze the facts as more analogous to Tercero v. Roman Catholic Diocese, a case concerning allegations of sexual molestation of a school boy by a priest. See 2002-NMSC-018, ¶ 1, 132 N.M. 312, 48 P.3d 50. Decided before the aided-in-agency theory was adopted in New Mexico, our Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the victim in Tercero failed to show that the alleged abuse occurred as a result of the Diocese's “inadequate supervision” of the priest. Id. ¶ 23. The Court held that at the time of the abuse, the Diocese exercised no control over the priest, but rather he was controlled by his direct employer, the Archdiocese of Santa Fe. Id. Further, the Court ruled that there was no indication in the record that the Diocese controlled, or even could control, any of the details of the priest's work within the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, and that the victim failed to prove that an employer/employee relationship existed between the priest and the Diocese. Id.

{23} Because we have already established that BGCCNM was under the control of BGCA and because Appellant argues vicarious liability specifically under the aided-in-agency theory, we reject Defendant's request to find any comparison between the facts here and the facts of Tercero. Moreover, we agree with Appellant that the facts here are consistent with those of Spurlock.

{24} To successfully invoke vicarious liability under the aided-in-agency doctrine, Appellant must show that the “employee has by reason of his employment substantial power or authority to control important elements of a vulnerable tort victim's life or livelihood.” See Spurlock, 2016-NMSC-014, ¶ 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellant urges this Court to hold that the abuse he endured at the hands of Yannoni and Michaelback was “motivated by, and a direct outgrowth of, their position of responsibility and authority over [him] while he was a minor under their care. By virtue of the significant power that Yannoni and Michaelback held over Appellant attendant to their roles as directors, they were in a position to groom and abuse Appellant.” While we acknowledge that the facts before us are not precisely akin to that of Spurlock, notably because the relationship between a prison guard and an inmate is “oriented around captivity and control” and that “this [power] disparity ․ facilitates sexual assault of the vulnerable party,” id. ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), our review of the record demonstrates that here Appellant—a minor—was a vulnerable party and by reason of their positions as directors and as counselors, Yannoni and Michaelback had substantial authority over Appellant when he was in their care at BGCCNM.

{25} In Spurlock, the Court cited to a federal case, Peña v. Greffet, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1135 (D.N.M. 2015), in comprehending the power wielded over employees by their employers. Spurlock, 2016-NMSC-014, ¶ 17. The United States District Court in Peña wrote:

when an employer vests an employee with power over another person—whether the other person is a subordinate employee or a non[ ]employee third party, like an inmate—the employer enables torts that might not otherwise happen—torts that are, essentially, an abuse of that power. There is danger inherent in granting one person extraordinary power over another, and the granting of that power should, thus, carry with it some accountability.

110 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.

{26} Appellant stated that the abuse he endured by Yannoni began when he was about ten years old while an attendee at the BGCCNM and continued for ten years. He further stated that the grooming started very young and was accompanied by “extreme sexual talk ․ of a very graphic nature,” which “allegedly was already part of the culture” at BGCCNM. Appellant also stated that the abuse occurred at sleepovers at BGCCNM or when he was called into Yannoni's office and made to undress so he could be sexually abused by Yannoni. The power dynamic between Appellant—a minor—and the adults here is similar to that of the inmates and the prison guard in Spurlock. Both adults had the authority vested in their positions to coerce Appellant, who was a helpless child entrusted into their care, into submitting to sexual abuse. See Spurlock, 2016-NMSC-014, ¶ 20.

{27} Because there are facts in the record suggesting that Yannoni and Michaelback were aided in the commission of the abuse through the agency awarded to them by and through BGCA, BGCA can be held vicariously liable under New Mexico law. See id. ¶ 17 (“ ‘Whether a particular type of case falls within this category should be a question for the court, not a jury.’ ” (quoting Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 1183, 1199 (Alaska 2009))). Yannoni and Michaelbeck were present at sleepovers, entrusted by the parents of young boys to keep their children safe, and posed as trustworthy adults who had presented themselves as “qualified in personality, character, experience, education and training for the leadership and guidance of boys, and each for the supervision of one or more activities of the ․ Club.” Appellant has presented sufficient evidence showing that Yannoni and Michaelback were aided by their status within BGCA in committing the alleged torts against him, so it follows that summary judgment should not have been granted regarding Appellant's claim of vicarious liability against BGCA.

III. Fiduciary Duty

{28} We lastly address Appellant's claim that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to his breach of fiduciary duty claim. The district court stated in its order for summary judgment that BGCA did not have a special or fiduciary relationship with Appellant, and that there was no evidence that BGCA undertook to act on behalf of Appellant as his fiduciary.

{29} “We determine whether a particular defendant owes a duty to a particular plaintiff as a question of law, and as such, de novo.” Moody v. Stribling, 1999-NMCA-094, ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 630, 985 P.2d 1210 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A fiduciary duty is a duty of loyalty.” Id. ¶ 27. Because “a fiduciary is obliged to act primarily for another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking, a fiduciary breaches this duty by placing his interests above those of the beneficiary.” Id. (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Our assessment of whether a fiduciary duty exists between two parties turns on “whether the relationship between the parties is one of trust and confidence.” Id. ¶ 17.

{30} As Appellant acknowledges on appeal, there is no New Mexico authority addressing similar circumstances to this one through the lens of fiduciary duty. Put differently, there is no state case law that this Court has found, nor that either party presented to us, in which a plaintiff has argued that a fiduciary duty is owed to a victim of sexual abuse. See Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co., 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”). Appellant instead points this Court to three appellate cases out of California, each with facts similar to this one. However, none argue the claim of fiduciary duty. See Doe v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 794 (Ct. App. 2015); Phyllis P. v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. Rptr. 776, 777-78 (Ct. App. 1986); Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552, 564-65 (Ct. App. 2017).

{31} Through our own review of the case law—or lack thereof—we have no basis to reverse the district court's determination that the circumstances surrounding Appellant's abuse while attending BGCCNM does not give rise to a fiduciary duty between him and BGCA. We find further support for this conclusion in Doe v. City of Belen School District, No. CIV 00-163 BB/LFG, 2000 WL 36739615, at *6-8 (D.N.M. Aug 10, 2000), a federal district court case in which it was found that a teacher did not have a fiduciary duty to a student under New Mexico state law. See C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 292 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[Plaintiff] does not cite, and we have not found, any authority stating that a fiduciary relationship exists between a school district and an individual student.”), rev'd on other grounds by C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699 (2012).

{32} In our view, parents and guardians entrust their children to schools, camps, clubs, and teams every day, and if the law does not recognize a fiduciary duty in those contexts as to those actors entrusted with their children's care and their institutions, it follows that the same rationale would apply here. See Doe v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., No. CIV 23-1025 GBW/JFR, 2024 WL 2185492, *11 (D.N.M. May 15, 2024). While a fiduciary duty can exist in any context, a party must still show that the relationship creates a “special confidence” in which one actor is “ ‘bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of one reposing the confidence.’ ” See Moody, 1999-NMCA-094, ¶ 17 (quoting Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 1999-NMSC-006, ¶ 37, 127 N.M. 1, 976 P.2d 1).

{33} Appellant has not convinced this Court that the record contains any evidence that BGCA had a fiduciary relationship with him while he was a member at BGCA, and therefore the district court's granting of summary judgment on this claim was proper.

IV. Inadmissible Evidence

{34} As to Appellant's remaining claim that the district court erred when it admitted and considered evidence presented by BGCA in its granting of summary judgment, we need not address it as we reverse and remand on other grounds, and we did not rely on the challenged evidence to reach our conclusion. See Crist v. Town of Gallup, 1947-NMSC-012, ¶ 14, 51 N.M. 286, 183 P.2d 156 (stating that appellate courts need not address questions unnecessary for the resolution of the case).

CONCLUSION

{35} We affirm the district court's granting of summary judgment as to Appellant's claim of fiduciary duty, and we reverse and remand for a trial as to Appellant's claims of negligence and vicarious liability.

{36} IT IS SO ORDERED.

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

WE CONCUR: JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Chief Judge KRISTOPHER N. HOUGHTON, Judge