STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. HAROLD RYAN (2010)

Defendant was indicted for three first-degree robberies, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1;  a second-degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1;  and a third-degree burglary, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2.   Defendant filed a motion to suppress an inculpatory statement he made following his arrest.

Before the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor offered to enter into a plea agreement under which the prosecutor would recommend an aggregate ten-year sentence and defendant would waive his right to a hearing on his motion to suppress.   The prosecutor made it clear on the record that this plea offer would be withdrawn if the hearing was held and the motion to suppress was denied.

Defendant insisted upon proceeding with the motion, and after hearing testimony, the trial court concluded that defendant's statement was admissible.   The prosecutor then offered to enter into a plea bargain under which defendant would be sentenced to an aggregate term of fifteen years for the three first-degree robberies, the second-degree robbery, and the third-degree burglary.   Defendant accepted this offer.   At sentencing, defendant made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied.

The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea bargain to fifteen-year terms of imprisonment, subject to the 85% period of parole ineligibility required by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for the three first-degree robberies, a seven-year term of imprisonment, subject to the 85% period of parole ineligibility required by NERA, for the second-degree robbery;  and a four-year term of imprisonment for the third-degree burglary, all of which were to be served concurrently.

On appeal, which we heard on an excess sentence calendar, see R. 2:9-11, we affirmed defendant's sentence.   State v. Ryan, A-6047-02T4 (May 25, 2004).   The Supreme Court subsequently denied defendant's petition for certification.   182 N.J. 140 (2004).

Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a motion for reduction of his sentence.   By written opinion dated January 22, 2008 and a memorializing order entered on that same day, the trial court denied both defendant's petition and motion.

On appeal from that order, defendant presents the following arguments:

POINT I:  THE LOWER COURT ORDER MUST BE

REVERSED SINCE DEFENDANT RECEIVED

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL

COUNSEL.

A. COUNSEL FAILED TO PROVIDE

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

DURING PLEA BARGAINING.

B. COUNSEL FAILED TO CONSULT

WITH DEFENDANT IN A

MEANINGFUL MANNER.

C. COUNSEL FAILED TO FILE A

SEVERANCE MOTION.

D. COUNSEL FAILED TO PROPERLY

PREPARE AN INTOXICATION

DEFENSE.

E. COUNSEL FAILED TO PROVIDE

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

DURING SENTENCING.

POINT II:  THE LOWER COURT ORDER MUST BE

REVERSED SINCE THE SENTENCE

SHOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED.

POINT III:  THE LOWER COURT ORDER MUST BE

REVERSED SINCE CUMULATIVE ERRORS

DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF DUE PROCESS

AND RENDERED THE SENTENCING

UNFAIR.

POINT IV:  THE LOWER COURT ORDER MUST BE

REVERSED SINCE THE NEGOTIATED

PLEA IS INVALID DUE TO PRO-

SECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS.

POINT V:  THE LOWER COURT ORDER DENYING

THE PETITION MUST BE REVERSED

SINCE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE NOT

PROCEDURALLY BARRED UNDER

R. 3:22-5.

POINT VI:  THE LOWER COURT ORDER DENYING

THE MOTION MUST BE REVERSED

SINCE DEFENDANT'S MOTION

IS NOT TIME BARRED UNDER

R. 3:21-10(a).

We reject these arguments, substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Geiger's January 22, 2008 written opinion.   Defendant's arguments do not warrant any additional discussion.   R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

PER CURIAM