STATE v. FERRELL (2026)

[¶1] The State appeals from a district court order dismissing without prejudice three counts of disobedience of a judicial order, a class A misdemeanor, against Tyson Olin Ferrell. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the charges against Ferrell because the pre-dispositional “bail orders” alleged to have been violated are not “among those kinds of orders punishable for disobedience under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1).” We affirm.

I

[¶2] On July 1, 2025, the State charged Ferrell with three counts of disobedience of a judicial order. An affidavit of probable cause was also filed, alleging that on June 30, 2025, while in custody, Ferrell placed a single phone call to Jane Doe, which resulted in a single voicemail being left. At that time, Ferrell was subject to the terms and conditions of bail orders in three underlying criminal actions—case nos. 51-2025-CR-00399, R15; 51-2025-CR-00067, R29; and 51-2025-CR-00158, R28—prohibiting Ferrell from having any contact with Jane Doe. His initial appearance was held on the same day.

[¶3] In August 2025, Ferrell filed a motion to dismiss and supporting brief, asserting grounds of “double jeopardy, multiplicity, and/or due process and pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, § 12 of the North Dakota Constitution, and/or N.D.C.C. § 29-01-07.” The State filed a response requesting his motion be denied, addressing the grounds raised by Ferrell, and contending Ferrell had contacted Jane Doe by telephone when he was prohibited from contacting Jane Doe by the bail orders’ terms. On September 10, 2025, the district court held a hearing on Ferrell's motion to dismiss. No transcripts were ordered for the hearings in this case.

[¶4] On October 10, 2025, the district court issued its order dismissing the three counts without prejudice. The court concluded there was no probable cause to believe Ferrell committed the offense of disobedience of a judicial order under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) “because, as a matter of law, the bail orders prohibiting contact Mr. Ferrell is alleged to have disobeyed are not among those kinds of orders punishable for disobedience under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1).” The court acknowledged this “threshold question” had neither been raised by Ferrell nor addressed by either of the parties in their briefs. The court dismissed the three counts and did not address Ferrell's constitutional arguments because they were moot.

II

[¶5] Section 29-28-07(1), N.D.C.C., provides the State may appeal from “[a]n order quashing an information or indictment or any count thereof.” This Court has held “an order dismissing a criminal case without prejudice is appealable under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1).” State v. Howard, 2021 ND 101, ¶ 5, 960 N.W.2d 775 (quoting State v. Gwyther, 1999 ND 15, ¶¶ 10-11, 589 N.W.2d 575). This Court has “consistently held that an order dismissing a criminal complaint, information, or indictment is the equivalent of an order quashing an information or indictment and is therefore appealable under the statute.” Gwyther, ¶ 11; see State v. Rodriguez, 2022 ND 102, ¶ 5, 974 N.W.2d 368. The district court's order dismissing three counts of disobedience of a judicial order is appealable.

III

[¶6] We review a district court's decision to dismiss a criminal case on its own motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Erickson, 2011 ND 49, ¶ 12, 795 N.W.2d 375. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner, if it misinterprets or misapplies the law or if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. Rodriguez, 2022 ND 102, ¶ 8, 974 N.W.2d 368. “The district court must have a sufficient legal basis to dismiss a criminal charge.” State v. Ferrie, 2008 ND 170, ¶ 7, 755 N.W.2d 890.

A

[¶7] The State argues the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed the charges against Ferrell sua sponte without notice to the State. The State asserts that it had no notice of the court's intent to dismiss for lack of probable cause and was not provided an opportunity to be heard and meaningfully argue against dismissal on this ground.

[¶8] In both criminal cases and civil cases outside of postconviction proceedings, this Court has “required notice of intent to dismiss before the district court may dismiss an action on its own motion.” Aune v. State, 2024 ND 99, ¶ 17, 6 N.W.3d 833. As explained, “Dismissing cases, without notice and an opportunity to respond, conflicts with our traditional adversarial system's principles.” City of Jamestown v. Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 12, 586 N.W.2d 494. “[I]t deprives the losing party ․ of the opportunity to present arguments against dismissal and tends to turn the court from an independent entity into a proponent.” Id.

[¶9] At oral argument the State acknowledged the district court's probable cause decision presents purely a legal question involving statutory interpretation and, further, stated that the State's “preference” would be for this Court to reach the merits on its second issue regarding the district court's decision rather than reversing and remanding. We treat the State's response as waiving its first issue regarding notice; we therefore only address the State's second issue.

B

[¶10] The State argues the district court erred in concluding that the pre-dispositional “bail orders” prohibiting contact that Ferrell is alleged to have disobeyed “are not among those kinds of orders punishable for disobedience under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1).” The State argues the court erred in interpreting § 12.1-10-05, which provides:

1. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if the person disobeys or resists a lawful temporary restraining order or preliminary or final injunction or other final order, other than for the payment of money, of a court of this state.

2. Notwithstanding the limitations of section 12.1-32-01, the defendant may be sentenced to pay a fine in any amount deemed just by the court.

(Emphasis added.)

[¶11] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Thesing, 2024 ND 219, ¶ 6, 14 N.W.3d 574. “Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Id.

Statutes must be construed as a whole and harmonized to give meaning to related provisions, and are interpreted in context to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence. In construing statutes, we consider the context of the statutes and the purposes for which they were enacted. When a general statutory provision conflicts with a specific provision in the same or another statute, the two must be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both provisions. When statutes relate to the same subject matter, this Court makes every effort to harmonize and give meaningful effect to each statute.

State v. Castleman, 2022 ND 7, ¶ 8, 969 N.W.2d 169. “Unless defined or explained in the code, a word in a statute is ‘understood in [its] ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears.’ ” Id. (quoting N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02). “Specific statutory provisions control over general provisions.” Beylund v. Levi, 2017 ND 30, ¶ 25, 889 N.W.2d 907 (citing N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07).

[¶12] The State contends “temporary restraining orders” and “preliminary injunctions” are not mechanisms limited to civil litigation, and the district court erred in its limited reliance on N.D.C.C. chs. 32-05 and 32-06, and N.D.R.Civ.P. 65 to construe N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05. The State argues that harmonizing N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05, § 29-08-01, and chs. 32-01 and 32-05 requires a “broader interpretation” to avoid a ludicrous result; that a “bail order” is preventive relief under N.D.C.C. § 29-08-01 and N.D.R.Crim.P. 46(a)(2)(E); and that violation of a bail order is a violation of a judicial order under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05. The State argues the no-contact release condition under N.D.R.Crim.P. 46(a)(2)(E) is consistent with the “temporary restraining order” definition in N.D.R.Civ.P. 65(a), as “short-lived injunctive relief,” i.e., the duration of a bail order. The State further asserts a bail order, as preventive relief, is not for purposes of enforcing a penal law or enforcing a penalty or forfeiture, prohibited under N.D.C.C. § 32-05-02, but rather for the security of a defendant's release under N.D.C.C. § 29-08-01.

[¶13] The State argues the district court erred in speculating that to allow the State to proceed risks “vastly expanding the types of orders subject to criminal prosecution and punishment” under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1). The State contends the court improperly intruded into the executive branch's purview and its prosecutorial discretion when it opined how the State could have proceeded in this matter. The State argues the inability to prosecute under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) for bail order violations, such as those in this case, undermines the efficacy and enforcement of bail orders.

[¶14] The State argues the legislature did not intend for victims of crimes that “do not fit within the narrow classification of violent crimes” to be afforded no protection; and if the State is unable to prosecute for violations of bail orders not issued under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02, the State's “sole remedy” is seeking the defendant's bail conditions to be amended or modified; or even when a third party is involved, the State would be limited to seeking to amend or revoke a defendant's bond conditions.

[¶15] In its order, the district court held the order prohibiting contact in the bail orders Ferrell is alleged to have disobeyed does not qualify as a “lawful temporary restraining order or preliminary or final injunction or other final order” under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1). In a thorough analysis, having concluded a bail order is not in any sense a “final order,” the court identified “temporary restraining order” and “preliminary or final injunction” as the only other “categories into which the order[s] prohibiting contact in this case must fit to be punishable,” explaining:

In North Dakota, the terms “injunction,” “preliminary injunction,” and “temporary restraining order” are all defined by statute and court rule, and their general concepts have been codified in one form or another since the Territorial Era. See Civ. C. 1877, §§ 1989, 2014; C. Civ. P. 1877, § 188. Under the legislature's most recent treatment of North Dakota's injunction statutes—enacted in 1943—an “injunction” is a form of preventive relief authorized in certain kinds of civil actions specified in N.D.C.C. ch. 32-05 and 32-06: “Preventive relief consists in prohibiting a party from doing that which ought not to be done. It is granted by injunction, temporary or final.” N.D.C.C. § 32-05-03. “Preventive relief may be given in the cases specified in this chapter and in no other cases.” N.D.C.C. § 32-05-01 (emphasis added). “Preventive relief cannot be granted to enforce a penal law, except in a cause of nuisance, nor to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case.” N.D.C.C. § 32-05-02 (emphasis added).

Rule 65 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure—which superseded a large swath of N.D.C.C. ch. 32-06 effective July 1, 2012—defines “temporary restraining order” as “short-lived injunctive relief that the court may issue with less notice than required for a preliminary injunction. It prevents irreparable injury until the court decides whether to issue a preliminary injunction.” N.D.R.Civ.P. 65(a). “A preliminary injunction prevents irreparable injury until the court decides whether to issue a permanent injunction at trial.” N.D.R.Civ.P. 65(b). The explanatory notes in Rule 65 clarify that “[g]rounds for granting a permanent injunction are listed in N.D.C.C. § 32-05-04. Grounds for granting a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction are listed in N.D.C.C. § 32-06-02.” N.D.R.Civ.P. 65, n. 3.

The traditional understanding of injunctions is stated in the early case of Forman v. Healey: “The provisional remedy by injunction in this state is of statutory origin, and is granted a plaintiff when necessary to protect his rights pending final determination of the case upon the merits.” 11 N.D. 563, 93 N.W. 866, 867-68 (1903). “The order can be awarded only in the cases and in the manner specifically prescribed, and is impliedly forbidden in any others.” Id. at 868. This same understanding continues to the present day. See Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 681 (N.D. 1994) (“A restraining order in North Dakota is a judicial remedy that is classified under NDCC 32-06, entitled Injunctions.”); see also Wrigley v. Romanick, 2023 ND 50, ¶ 38, 988 N.W.2d 231 (“[T]he purpose of a temporary or preliminary injunction ‘is to maintain the cause in status quo until a trial on the merits.’ ”).

The State may posit that the term “restraining order” as it appears in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) may permit a broader interpretation than its traditional understanding within the context of injunctive relief in civil cases. For instance, the terms “restraining order” and “protection order” appear elsewhere in the Century Code in the context of disorderly conduct restraining orders (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01), sexual assault restraining orders (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-01.2), and domestic violence protection orders (N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02). These orders are civil in nature and are unique creatures of statute, each with their own specific statutory procedures. During the 2025 legislative session, these orders were reclassified as “civil protection orders,” and, effective January 1, 2026, will share a common statutory procedure and framework. See N.D.C.C. ch. 14-07.7. However, these kinds of orders are the product of relatively recent enactments coming after the legislature's adoption of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05 in 1973, and well after the legislature's most recent revision of North Dakota's injunction statutes in 1943, which relevant sections are quoted above. Therefore, these more recent statutes and their appropriation of the term “restraining order” shed little—if any—light on the true meaning of “temporary restraining order” and “preliminary or final injunction” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1).

[¶16] The district court concluded the legislature's intent was not clear from the statute's face; considered the statute's legislative history as part of the 1973 overhaul of the criminal code, 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 116, § 10; and “look[ed] to the official commentaries of the drafters, contained in the Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, to glean the legislative intent and purpose underlying our statutory provisions.” State v. Moos, 2008 ND 228, ¶ 18, 758 N.W.2d 674. The court noted N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05 derived from the proposed Federal Criminal Code (§§ 1341 to 1349), codified at N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-10-01 to 12.1-10-06, and was aimed at codifying as specific offenses conduct previously treated as criminal contempt. The court explained:

Section 12.1-10-05(1), N.D.C.C., was adopted by the North Dakota legislature as part of a package of provisions in the proposed Federal Criminal Code (§§ 1341-1349) [codified in North Dakota as N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-10-01–12.1-10-06] aimed at codifying as specific offenses conduct that had previously been treated as criminal contempt. See I Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 601 (July 1970) (“Working Papers”). The drafters of the proposed Federal Criminal Code believed that exercise of the federal courts’ criminal contempt power, “which does not accord the defendant the protections he would have in a normal prosecution, remains an unsatisfactory way to deal with criminal conduct, and abuses—or, at least the potential for abuse—still exist.” Id.

The solution proposed by the drafters—and ultimately enacted by the North Dakota legislature—was for the courts to retain their criminal contempt power generally, but only as to certain limited forms of misconduct, with more traditionally recognized forms of contempt (failure to respond to a subpoena, refusal to testify, hindering proceedings through disorderly conduct, and violation of certain court orders) being reclassified as specific criminal offenses. See generally N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 116, § 10.

Under this revised scheme, courts’ general criminal contempt powers were retained in § 1341(1) of the proposed Federal Criminal Code [codified in North Dakota as N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-01], and included the power to punish, among other things, “[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.” See N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 116, § 10 (12.1-10-01(1)(c)). A contempt proceeding for such conduct was to be “deemed a prosecution for an offense for the purposes of chapters 12.1-01 through 12.1-05 and chapter 12.1-32” and was to be “treated as a class B misdemeanor, except that the defendant may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no more than six months.” See N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 116, § 10 (12.1-10-01(2)).

However, that subsection continues: “if the criminal contempt is disobedience of or resistance to a court's lawful temporary restraining order or preliminary or final injunction or other final order, other than for the payment of money, the defendant may be sentenced to pay a fine in any amount deemed just by the court.” See N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 116, § 10 (12.1-10-01(2)) (emphasis added). Section 12.1-10-05, N.D.C.C.—appearing only a few sections later—takes the added step of classifying “disobedience of or resistance to a court's lawful temporary restraining order or preliminary or final injunction or other final order” as a class A misdemeanor subject to an unlimited fine amount left in the discretion of the court. See N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 116, § 10 (12.1-10-05). As recognized by the drafters: “An exception is made for disobedience to lawful orders which constitute injunctions or restraining orders (section 1341(2)) [codified in North Dakota as 12.1-10-01(2)].” I Working Papers, at 604 (emphasis added).

The purpose and importance of this differentiation between disobedience of a court's general “writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command” and disobedience of a court's “lawful temporary restraining order or preliminary or final injunction or other final order” is explained by the drafters: “The draft of section 1345 [codified in North Dakota as 12.1-10-05] proposes that violation of a court's major orders be a specific offense which can be prosecuted in the normal manner as a Class A misdemeanor ․ without a limit on fines.” I Working Papers, at 624 (emphasis added). The “major orders” (a court's “lawful temporary restraining order or preliminary or final injunction or other final order”) contemplated in section 1345 of the proposed Federal Criminal Code are contrasted with “[m]inor orders such as to answer interrogatories by a certain date,” which the drafters consigned to the “petty category.” I Working Papers, at 604-05.

The reason for the exception is that such [major] orders may deal with serious misconduct for which there is no alternative mode of prosecution; and, even though it is conduct which has not been defined as a specific offense, the higher maximum is warranted because there has been a prior adjudication (or, in the case of a temporary restraining order, albeit ex parte, there has been careful consideration by the court) and a specific direction has been given to the potential defendant.

I Working Papers, at 605.

The drafters give further context for their differentiation between “major orders” and “minor orders”:

An alternative possibility for defining the class of orders deemed to be of sufficient importance to warrant increased penalties would be to refer to the provisions of the United States Code which govern appealability; such a definition would embrace all final orders, preliminary injunctions, and interlocutory orders which are appealable ․ (as well as temporary restraining orders, which are not ordinarily appealable). It is believed that the proposed provision defines the class of orders which are appealable, but if it were desired to refer to an existing, fairly definite standard for “important orders,” the appealability provisions could be used.

I Working Papers, at 604, n. 15 (emphasis added).

From these commentaries, we can discern that the drafters of § 1345 [codified in North Dakota as N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1)] intended the terms “temporary restraining order or preliminary or final injunction” to carry their commonly understood meanings as forms of preventive relief available in certain civil cases. These types of orders were considered “major” and “important” by the drafters primarily because such orders “deal with serious misconduct for which there is no alternative mode of prosecution.” I Working Papers, at 605 (emphasis added). Prosecution for violation of such orders—and imposition of potentially unlimited fine amounts—was, according to the drafters, warranted in such cases “because there has been a prior adjudication (or, in the case of a temporary restraining order, albeit ex parte, there has been careful consideration by the court) and a specific direction has been given to the potential defendant.” Id. The drafters believed that the types of “important orders” contemplated in § 1345 were of the same magnitude as those orders appealable under federal law. See I Working Papers, at 604, n. 15.

When orders of this kind are held up for comparison with an order prohibiting contact in a bail order under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02, it becomes evident that one is not like the others. An order prohibiting contact under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02 is a unique order that prohibits a criminal defendant from having contact with an alleged victim in certain types of criminal prosecutions. Such an order may be issued as a condition of release in a bail order (sometimes referred to as a “pre-dispositional order prohibiting contact,” see State v. Thesing, 2024 ND 219, ¶ 1, 14 N.W.3d 574), as part of a sentence, or as part of an order deferring imposition of sentence. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(1)(a)․

Given these unique qualities, an order prohibiting contact contained in a bail order under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02 is simply not among those orders contemplated by the drafters of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1). The types of cases in which an order prohibiting contact may be entered have no overlap with the types of cases in which injunctions may be entered under either N.D.C.C. ch. 32-05 (final injunctions) or N.D.C.C. ch. 32-06 (temporary injunctions). Instead, an order prohibiting contact is entered as part of a unique statutory process applying only in certain criminal cases, is always pre-dispositional in the context of a bail order, is subject to frequent review and modification, and is not an appealable order—the standard held out by the drafters as a key factor in determining which orders were punishable for disobedience under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1). For these reasons, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) is not applicable to the order prohibiting contact in the bail orders that are the subject of this action.

[¶17] The district court found the drafters had proposed Federal Criminal Code § 1345, codified at N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05, to apply to a court's “major” or “important” orders, which could be prosecuted in the normal manner as a class A misdemeanor, as opposed to “minor orders,” such as answering interrogatories by a certain date, consigned to the “petty category.” The district court also rejected a “hyper-literal” interpretation of “temporary restraining order” that the orders prohibiting contact in this case are both “temporary” and “restraining” and “therefore fall into the ambit of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1).” The court explained:

First, it would require the Court to interpret the term “temporary restraining order” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05 to mean something other than the definition of that term provided by the legislature in N.D.C.C. ch. 32-05 and 32-06, as well as the definition supplied in N.D.R.Civ.P. 65. As explained above, there is no indication of any such intention in the legislative history of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05. To the contrary, the legislative history is clear that the drafters of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05 intended that term to carry its ordinary and commonly understood meaning.

Second, it would require the Court to apply an interpretation that the North Dakota Supreme Court has never applied (or, it would seem, even been asked to apply) despite the 50-plus-year existence of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05. See generally State v. Baltrusch, 2019 ND 259, 934 N.W.2d 886 (prosecution for disobedience of final eviction judgment); State v. Holecek, 545 N.W.2d 800 (N.D. 1996) (prosecution for disobedience of TRO placing restrictions on protesters outside Fargo clinic); State v. Franck, 499 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 1993) (prosecution for disobedience of preliminary injunction restraining obstruction of Fargo clinic).

Third, such a view would render the enforcement provision in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(4) essentially meaningless. If the legislature intended violation of an order prohibiting contact to be enforced under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1), then why did it enact N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(4)? “We construe statutes in a way which does not render them meaningless because we presume the Legislature acts with purpose and does not perform idle acts.” State v. Neugebauer, 2023 ND 68, ¶ 9, 989 N.W.2d 86.

Fourth, doing so would risk vastly expanding the types of orders subject to criminal prosecution and punishment for disobedience under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1)—and the unlimited fines available under subsection 2—without any sensible limiting principle whatsoever. Take, for example, a protective order entered in a civil case under N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(c). Such an order is certainly both “temporary” in that it only applies only during the pendency of the litigation, and “restraining” in that it restrains parties and their attorneys from engaging in specified activities during the discovery phase of a civil action. If N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) applies as broadly as the State supposes, what would prevent the State from bringing charges—and subjecting to potential imprisonment and unlimited fines—a civil litigant or attorney alleged to have disobeyed a protective order entered pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(c) in a pending civil action?

Fifth, and finally, there is simply no good reason to apply a broad interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) in this case because the alleged disobedience complained of by the State is punishable under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(4), which states: “An individual who violates a court order issued under this section [authorizing the issuance of orders prohibiting contact] is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” For these reasons, the State's proposed application of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) is not supportable under our rules of statutory interpretation.

[¶18] In discussing the “important orders” contemplated by proposed Federal Criminal Code § 1345, the district court held that “an order prohibiting contact contained in a bail order under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02 is simply not among those orders contemplated by the drafters of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1).” As the court reasoned, “Instead, an order prohibiting contact is entered as part of a unique statutory process applying only in certain criminal cases, is always pre-dispositional in the context of a bail order, is subject to frequent review and modification, and is not an appealable order.” As such, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) is not applicable. We agree with the district court's scholarly and thorough decision.

[¶19] In Thesing, 2024 ND 219, ¶¶ 13-14, this Court further distinguished between a condition of release issued “exclusively under N.D.R.Crim.P. 46(a)(2)(E)” and a pre-dispositional order “issued pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(1), which authorizes a district court to enter an order prohibiting a criminal defendant from having contact with a victim of a ‘crime of violence or threat of violence, stalking, harassment, or a sex offense.’ ” In the present case, the State does not assert the bail orders’ no-contact conditions were issued under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(1), but contends only one of the charges in this case could be prosecuted under § 12.1-31.2-02, as the other two charges stemmed from bail orders in cases where there was not a qualifying offense.

[¶20] To the extent the State suggests it is without power to punish violations of no-contact conditions in “bail orders” not issued under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02, we are not persuaded. We note the legislature's 1993 redrafting and recodification of the courts’ contempt powers in N.D.C.C. ch. 27-10, which also repealed N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-01 addressing criminal contempt, provide an avenue for a sanction. See Endersbe v. Endersbe, 555 N.W.2d 580, 581-82 (N.D. 1996); 1993 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 89, §§ 10-13, 32.

[¶21] Section 27-10-01.1(1)(c), N.D.C.C., generally defines “contempt of court” as “[i]ntentional disobedience, resistance, or obstruction of the authority, process, or order of a court or other officer, including a referee or magistrate.” Notably, “a proceeding for a punitive contempt sanction is brought by a complaint by the state's attorney of a county, the attorney general, or a special prosecutor appointed by the court. N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.3(1)(b).” Endersbe, 555 N.W.2d at 582. “The proceeding for a punitive sanction can be requested by a party to the action.” Id. “When the complaint is filed, the alleged contemnor is entitled to a trial by jury in which the judge who originally presided over the case is disqualified.” Id. “However, when the contemptuous act occurs in the actual presence of the court, a punitive contempt sanction can be imposed by the judge. N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.3(2).” Id. at 582-83. The State's remedies, therefore, may properly include contempt proceedings.

[¶22] Moreover, some states have specifically made violation of a release condition an independent charge. See, e.g., State v. Bilynsky, 263 A.3d 163, 166-67 (Me. 2021); People v. Serra, 361 P.3d 1122, 1129 (Colo. App. 2015).

Violation of bail bond conditions is a charge independent of the underlying events that led to the imposition of bail bond conditions, and a defendant who violates the conditions of his bail bond is charged separately for doing so under a distinct legislative scheme. In order to prove that a defendant violated a statute regarding the crime of violation of bail bond conditions, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the terms of the bond were in effect at the time of the alleged illegal conduct.

8A Am. Jur. 2d Bail and Recognizance § 121 (May 2026 update) (and cases cited). North Dakota has defined an offense for failure to appear and bail jumping. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-08-05.

[¶23] Here, the State's construction of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1) to include no-contact provisions included in a bail order as a release condition is overly broad. As already noted, the State does not assert the bail orders’ no-contact conditions here were issued under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(1), and the State has not pointed this Court to a separate statute specifically creating an offense for violation of a release condition under N.D.R.Crim.P. 46. A no-contact provision included in a bail order's release conditions—issued “exclusively” under N.D.R.Crim.P. 46—has not been specifically defined by either the rule or other statute as a “temporary restraining order,” as that phrase is used in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1).

[¶24] We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charges based on a lack of probable cause.

IV

[¶25] We affirm the district court order.

Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.

[¶26] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese