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IN RE: the ADOPTION OF T.J.W.-H. D.W. and A.D., Petitioners v. T.J.W.-H.; K.J.H.; B.A.N.; and the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services, Respondents
[¶1] This case is before the North Dakota Supreme Court on the McKenzie County District Court's certified question of law: “Is an unmarried couple able to adopt a child pursuant to any provision of N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03?” We answer the question “no,” concluding section 14-15-03 does not authorize two unmarried adults to jointly adopt.
I
[¶2] The district court entered an order certifying a question of law to this Court. See N.D.R.App.P. 47.1(a). The court explained “an unmarried couple is seeking to adopt a child. There is an outstanding question of law of whether an unmarried couple living together may adopt a child, and it is determinative of this proceeding. It does not appear to the undersigned that there is controlling precedent regarding this question.”
[¶3] The district court's order includes a statement of facts. See N.D.R.App.P. 47.1(b)(3)(A) (providing a certification order must contain “[a] statement of facts relevant to the question certified, showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the question arose”). Although the question before us is one of law not dependent on the facts, we briefly set forth the facts to provide context for our decision.
[¶4] D.W. and A.D. petitioned to adopt T.J.W.-H. D.W. and A.D. have had T.J.W.-H. in their home since he was four months old. A.D. is T.J.W.-H.’s maternal grandmother; T.J.W.-H.’s mother left him in A.D.’s care. D.W. and A.D. have been in a relationship since 2007 and currently live together. T.J.W.-H. was three years old in February 2026 when the district court held a hearing on the petition for adoption.
[¶5] T.J.W.-H.’s biological parents consent to the adoption. The district court found there are “consents and relinquishment of parental rights of both parents on the birth certificate of [T.J.W.-H.]” and “[n]o withdrawal of consents to relinquishment of parental rights were filed with the Court by any party.” See N.D.C.C. §§ 14-15-07 (providing how consent is executed), 14-15-08 (providing how consent is withdrawn), 14-15-19 (providing for the relinquishment of parent and child relationship). “With the exception of the issue of whether two unmarried people can jointly adopt a child,” the court found “no reason to deny the adoption.”
[¶6] The district court certified the question: “Is an unmarried couple able to adopt a child pursuant to any provision of N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03?” Answering the question in the negative, the court read N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03 to mean “one unmarried adult may adopt, but not two unmarried adults together.” See N.D.R.App.P. 47.1(b)(3)(C) (providing a certification order must contain “[t]he district court's answer to the question”). The court noted that other district courts have granted joint petitions by unmarried couples and that “differing views” among the district courts “ought to be resolved by the Supreme Court.” The court stayed the proceeding under N.D.R.App.P. 47.1(b)(5) until the question is answered or ruled upon by this Court.
[¶7] Petitioners and the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services are aligned; both argue N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03 allows an unmarried couple to jointly adopt.
II
[¶8] Rule 47.1, N.D.R.App.P., authorizes this Court to answer questions of law certified by a state district court when two conditions are met:
(A) there is a question of law involved in the proceeding that is determinative of the proceeding; and
(B) it appears to the district court that there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court.
N.D.R.App.P. 47.1(a)(1).
[¶9] Certified questions from our state district courts are subject to a more stringent standard than certified questions from foreign courts, “requiring the question to be determinative because the parties have a right to appeal.” Olson v. Olson, 2025 ND 173, ¶ 6, 26 N.W.3d 664; see also Papenhausen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2024 ND 40, ¶ 5, 4 N.W.3d 246 (stating the standard under N.D.R.App.P. 47 for a certified question by a foreign court is “less stringent” because this Court may answer it “if the question could be determinative of the proceeding and no controlling precedent exists”). “This Court has discretion to hear certified questions of law by the district court and may refuse to consider a certified question if it is frivolous, interlocutory in nature, or not dispositive of the issues before the district court.” K.L.T. v. Exec. Dir. of Hum. Serv. Dep't, 2025 ND 76, ¶ 6, 19 N.W.3d 798; see also N.D.R.App.P. 47.1(c)(1). “A certified question will not be answered unless disposition of the case depends wholly or principally upon the construction of law determined, regardless of whether the answer is in the negative or affirmative.” K.L.T., ¶ 6. “Answering a certified question that does not wholly or principally dispose of the issues in the case would constitute issuing an impermissible advisory opinion.” Id.
[¶10] The district court determined that there is no controlling precedent by this Court interpreting whether an unmarried couple may jointly adopt under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03. We agree there is no controlling precedent. In K.L.T., a district court certified a similar question after it had denied the petition and dismissed the case. 2025 ND 76, ¶¶ 2–3, 19 N.W.3d 798. By the time the question reached us, the time to appeal had expired. Id. ¶ 7. We declined to answer the certified question because doing so would have been purely advisory. Id.
[¶11] The district court also concluded that resolution of the question of law is determinative of the proceeding. Specifically, the court found no reason to deny the petition other than the petitioners’ unmarried status. If N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03 authorizes the joint petition, the court may grant it; if it does not, the court must deny the petition. The Department agrees that determining whether two unmarried adults may adopt a child under section 14-15-03 “would be dispositive of the issue whether to grant or deny the petition for adoption before the district court.” Petitioners do not argue that we should decline to answer the question.
[¶12] We conclude that the certified question of law is not frivolous, the resolution of the certified question is determinative of the proceeding, and there is no controlling precedent. Because the question has now come to this Court twice, and district courts have reached different answers, we exercise our discretion to answer it.
III
[¶13] Adoption is entirely a creature of statute. Johnson v. Johnson, 2000 ND 170, ¶ 9, 617 N.W.2d 97. “Only a court may issue a final decree of adoption and then, only if it determines that statutory grounds for doing so have been satisfied.” Matter of Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 566 (N.D. 1993). Section 14-15-03, N.D.C.C., lists categories of individuals who are eligible to adopt. Our task is to interpret section 14-15-03 to determine whether it authorizes unmarried individuals to jointly adopt.
[¶14] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Fahey v. Cook, 2024 ND 138, ¶ 22, 9 N.W.3d 668. “Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine the legislation's intent, as expressed in the statutory language.” Id. “[T]he legislative intent that is controlling in the construction of a statute has reference to the Legislature which enacted it, not a subsequent one.” Linington v. McLean Cnty., 161 N.W.2d 487, 501 (N.D. 1968); see also St. Vincent's Nursing Home v. Dep't of Lab., 169 N.W.2d 456, 458 (N.D. 1969) (determining legislative intent at the time the act was passed).
[¶15] When interpreting a statute, we presume “the legislature intended all that it said, said all that it intended to say, and meant what it has plainly expressed.” Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 2020 ND 179, ¶ 34, 947 N.W.2d 910 (quoting Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 2013 ND 50, ¶ 12, 829 N.W.2d 453). We give words in a statute their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless they are specifically defined or contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. And we interpret the statute's language “in context and according to the rules of grammar, giving meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence.” Sargent Cnty. Water Res. Dist. v. Beck, 2023 ND 230, ¶ 20, 999 N.W.2d 175 (quoting Kutcka v. Gateway Bldg. Sys., Inc., 2023 ND 91, ¶ 6, 990 N.W.2d 605); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 1-02-03, 1-02-38(2). We construe a uniform act to effectuate its general purpose to make the law uniform among the states that enact it. N.D.C.C. §§ 1-02-13, 14-15-21.
IV
[¶16] Section 14-15-03, N.D.C.C., provides:
The following individuals may adopt:
1. A husband and wife together although one or both are minors.
2. An unmarried adult.
3. The unmarried father or mother of the individual to be adopted.
4. A married individual without the other spouse joining as a petitioner, if the individual to be adopted is not the adopting person's spouse, and if:
a. The petitioner is a stepparent of the individual to be adopted and the biological or legal parent of the individual to be adopted consents;
b. The petitioner and the other spouse are legally separated; or
c. The failure of the other spouse to join in the petition or to consent to the adoption is excused by the court by reason of prolonged unexplained absence, unavailability, incapacity, or circumstances constituting an unreasonable withholding of consent.
[¶17] In 1971, the legislature enacted the 1969 Revised Uniform Adoption Act (1969 Uniform Adoption Act). 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 1; Kottsick v. Carlson, 241 N.W.2d 842, 844 (N.D. 1976) (describing the “Uniform Adoption Act, 1969 Revised Act” as “the source for the North Dakota Act”). As enacted in 1971, N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03 reproduced § 3 of the 1969 Uniform Adoption Act verbatim. Compare 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 1, with Unif. Adoption Act § 3 (Unif. L. Comm'n 1969). In 1994, the Uniform Law Commission replaced the Uniform Adoption Act with a new Uniform Adoption Act. The 1994 Uniform Adoption Act eliminates the enumerated categories and provides that “any individual may adopt.” Unif. Adoption Act § 1-102 (Unif. L. Comm'n 1994). North Dakota has not adopted the 1994 Uniform Adoption Act. The legislature amended N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(4)(a) in 2003, but it did not amend subsection 2. 2003 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 126, § 2.
[¶18] Read as a whole, N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03 identifies who may adopt alone and who may adopt “together.” Subsection 1 is the only category that provides petitioners may adopt “together.” It defines those petitioners by marriage: “[a] husband and wife together[.]” The word “together” appears nowhere else in the statute. The legislature thus expressly authorized a husband and a wife to adopt “together.” The statute does not expressly authorize any other petitioners to adopt “together.” Rather, each remaining category describes a single petitioner: “[a]n unmarried adult,” “[t]he unmarried father or mother,” and “[a] married individual without the other spouse joining as a petitioner” if one of three specific circumstances is met.
[¶19] When interpreting statutes, we “consider the actual language, its connection with other clauses, and the words or expressions which obviously are by design omitted.” State v. Bell, 2025 ND 201, ¶ 9, 29 N.W.3d 270 (quoting State v. Long, 2020 ND 216, ¶ 7, 950 N.W.2d 178). “In construing statutes and rules, the law is what is said, not what is unsaid, and the mention of one thing implies exclusion of another.” Id. (quoting Long, ¶ 7). The legislature's inclusion of the word “together” in N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(1), and the word's exclusion from section 14-15-03(2), demonstrate the legislature did not intend for unmarried adults to adopt “together.”
[¶20] Petitioners and the Department argue N.D.C.C. § 1-01-35 requires us to interpret the singular “[a]n unmarried adult” as “unmarried adults.” Section 1-01-35 states that “[w]ords used in the singular number include the plural and words used in the plural number include the singular, except when a contrary intention plainly appears.” A contrary intention plainly appears here. As discussed, the legislature's inclusion of “together” in N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(1) and its obvious omission from section 14-15-03(2) demonstrate the legislature did not intend for unmarried adults to adopt “together.” See Herman v. Newman Signs, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 179, 181 (N.D. 1987) (declining to read “a specified county” as “specified counties” when doing so would nullify the statute's purpose). Reading subsection 2 to authorize unmarried adult petitioners to adopt “together” would add language the legislature did not include.
[¶21] Moreover, we construe statutes to avoid absurd, ludicrous, or illogical results. Malloy v. Behrens, 2022 ND 43, ¶ 24, 971 N.W.2d 392; Brossart v. Janke, 2020 ND 98, ¶ 12, 942 N.W.2d 856. The parties’ proposed interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03 would create an absurd and illogical result because it has no limiting principle. If the term “[a]n unmarried adult” authorizes multiple unmarried adults to adopt “together,” the statute provides no textual limit on the number of petitioners or on their relationship to one another. It would permit two, three, or more unmarried adults to adopt together, whether or not they are a couple, cohabitants, or otherwise connected. See In re J.W., 172 N.H. 332, 213 A.3d 853, 858 (2019) (expressing concern with judicially expanding the adoption eligibility requirements because “any ‘unmarried adult’ would be eligible to jointly adopt ․ regardless of the relationship between the two petitioners, because the plain language of the statute does not impose any requirements regarding the nature of that relationship, such as whether they must cohabitate”); In re Adoption of M.C.D., 2002 OK CIV APP 27, ¶ 24, 42 P.3d 873, 881 (stating “interpretation of the ‘unmarried person’ provision ․ to allow multiple petitions would mean, when extended, that the Legislature intended to allow an unlimited number of adoptive parents”). The absence of the word “together” and of any limit on when and how many unmarried adults may adopt supports the conclusion the legislature intended section 14-15-03(2) to apply to one unmarried adult, not to two or more unmarried adults. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 903(2)(c)–(d) (authorizing joint adoption under two circumstances: “[a] married couple petitioning jointly, provided they are not legally separated or living apart from each other” and “[a] nonmarried couple petitioning jointly, provided that they are cohabiting”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-C, § 9-301 (providing “[s]pouses or unmarried persons jointly or an unmarried person ․ may petition the court to adopt a person”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-B:4, I (providing “[t]wo adults together” may adopt); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 110 (McKinney 2019) (authorizing “any two unmarried adult intimate partners together” to adopt). Under the parties’ analysis, section 14-15-03(1) would also permit two or more married couples to adopt the same child.
[¶22] Petitioners’ reliance on the comment to § 1-102 of the 1994 Uniform Adoption Act is misplaced. The comment states marital status, like other general characteristics, “does not preclude an individual from adopting[.]” Unif. Adoption Act § 1-102 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm'n 1994). Because the 1994 Act has not been enacted in North Dakota, its commentary does not alter or provide guidance regarding the language of N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03. Rather, the comment 1 to § 3 of the 1969 Uniform Adoption Act, from which section 14-15-03 derives, provides guidance regarding the meaning of section 14-15-03. The relevant comment separately describes “a husband and wife acting together” and plainly states “[t]he Act permits an adult unmarried person to adopt a child[.]” The comment does not refer to “unmarried person” in the plural. The applicable comment does not support the parties’ position.
[¶23] Because the applicable language in N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03 is identical to the language of the 1969 Uniform Adoption Act, we may look to the decisions of other states that have adopted the 1969 Uniform Adoption Act for guidance in our interpretation of section 14-15-03. State v. McCleary, 2025 ND 24, ¶ 12, 16 N.W.3d 445 (“Uniform laws are interpreted in a uniform manner, and we may seek guidance from decisions in other states which have interpreted similar provisions of uniform laws.”). We may also look to “interpretations of the courts of other jurisdictions that have similar laws, not that they are controlling but, perhaps, persuasive.” St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 321 N.W.2d 483, 486 (N.D. 1982).
[¶24] In their briefs to this Court, petitioners and the Department do not cite a single case holding the words “an unmarried adult” or similar language authorizes two unmarried adults to jointly adopt a child. Some courts have concluded that language authorizing an unmarried adult to adopt or similar language does not authorize two unmarried adults to jointly adopt.
[¶25] In In re Jason C., 129 N.H. 762, 533 A.2d 32, 32 (1987), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held “two unmarried adults may not jointly petition to adopt a child” under New Hampshire's statute. The 1969 Uniform Adoption Act was the “basic underlying document” used in drafting the law, which contained language identical to § 3 of the 1969 Uniform Adoption Act. J.W., 213 A.3d at 857. The petitioner argued “[a]n unmarried adult” should be construed to include two unmarried adults because the “singular includes the plural ․ when consistent with the intent of the chapter.” Jason C., 533 A.2d at 33. The court explained “the categories of eligible petitioners to adopt” include “two classes of individuals described as unmarried and applying alone: an ‘unmarried adult,’ and the ‘unmarried father or mother of the individual to be adopted.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). “Married applicants must apply jointly with their spouses, however, except under narrowly limited circumstances.” Id.
[¶26] Later, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire rejected a joint petition by an unmarried parent and the parent's unmarried partner. J.W., 213 A.3d at 855–56, 858–60; but see id. at 863–67 (Hicks and Bassett, JJ., dissenting). The statutory language was based on the 1969 Uniform Adoption Act, including that “[a]n unmarried adult” may adopt. Id. at 855, 857. The court emphasized that the legislature, not the judiciary, determines the public policy of who is eligible to adopt. It stated:
[A]lthough we recognize that the modern family has taken on many different forms, it is the legislature's prerogative—subject to constitutional limitations—to limit eligibility to adopt to those categories of individuals that it believes are most likely to “provide a unified and stable household for the child” to be adopted․ It is not our role to inquire into the wisdom or desirability of the legislature's choice.
Id. at 859 (quoting Jason C., 533 A.2d at 33). The court reiterated “that legislative intent is the touchstone of [its] inquiry in matters of statutory interpretation, including the interpretation of adoption statutes.” Id. at 863. The court concluded the parent's unmarried partner cannot adopt the unmarried parent's minor child unless the unmarried parent surrenders his parental rights to the child. Id. at 862.
[¶27] In Adoption of M.C.D., the appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the petitions of a man and his former wife to adopt. 2002 OK CIV APP 27, ¶ 24, 42 P.3d 873. The statutory provision provided “[a]n unmarried person who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age” is eligible to adopt a child. Id. ¶ 12. One petitioner argued “the statute does not say one and only one unmarried person may adopt a child.” Id. Agreeing with the court's rationale in Jason C., the court held the petitioners failed “to fit within any of the statutory categories of those eligible to adopt.” Id. ¶ 23.
[¶28] Two unmarried petitioners appealed the trial court's order rejecting their application for the adoption of a minor child in Adoption of Meaux, 417 So. 2d 522, 522 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Louisiana law provided “[a] single person eighteen years or older, or a married couple jointly, may petition to adopt a child.” Id. (quoting La. Stat. Ann. § 9:422 (1978) (repealed 1991)). The court explained: “As two single persons jointly petitioning to become the adoptive parents, they are not ‘a single person’ under the statute.” Id. at 523. Therefore, the court held, the statute does not authorize petitioners to jointly adopt the child. Id.; but see id. at 523–24 (Doucet, J., dissenting); id. at 524–25 (Foret, J., dissenting).
[¶29] The Supreme Court of Wisconsin interpreted language similar to N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03 in Matter of Adoption of M.M.C., 2024 WI 18, 411 Wis. 2d 389, 5 N.W.3d 238. In that case, one of the unmarried cohabiting partners was the biological mother of the child. Id. ¶ 1. The court explained: “The legislature has made policy choices regarding the circumstances under which children may be adopted and by whom.” Id. The Wisconsin statute identified “three classifications of individuals who may adopt an eligible child: ‘A husband and wife jointly,’ ‘either the husband or wife if the other spouse is a parent of the minor,’ or ‘an unmarried adult.’ ” Id. ¶ 3 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(a)–(b)). The court stated: “The statutes do not allow two unmarried adults to jointly adopt a minor․ Omitting those categories of unmarried individuals from the list of eligible persons who may adopt means the law does not qualify them as adoptive parents.” Id.
[¶30] Most recently, the Wyoming Supreme Court answered the certified question whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(b) allows “for a joint petition for the adoption of a minor child by two unmarried individuals.” Matter of Guardianship of RTT, 2026 WY 23, ¶ 2, 584 P.3d 423. The petitioners, a maternal grandfather and his unmarried domestic partner who were the child's co-guardians, jointly petitioned to adopt. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. The Wyoming statute “provides in relevant part that a petition to adopt ‘may be filed by any single adult or jointly by a husband and wife who maintain their home together.’ ” Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(b)). The petitioners argued the singular “single adult” includes the plural. Id. The court rejected that argument:
Even if we were to consider the reference to a “single adult” to include the plural of that term, as Petitioners urge, nothing in section 104(b) authorizes the filing of a joint petition by multiple individuals who are not married. The only place the word “jointly” is used is in reference to a petition filed by a married couple.
Id. ¶ 12. The court continued: “In keeping with our rules of interpretation, we will not supply terms that the legislature omitted from the statute.” Id. ¶ 13. It explained: “When the legislature specifically uses a word in one place, we will not interpret that word into other places where it was not used.” Id. (quoting In re CRA, 2016 WY 24, ¶ 18, 368 P.3d 294, 299). Based on the statute's plain language, the court held, “Joint petitions may only be filed by married individuals.” Id. ¶ 20; see also id. ¶ 1 (“Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(b) (2025) does not allow for a joint petition for the adoption of a minor child by unmarried individuals.”).
[¶31] Although the reasoning applied in Matter of Guardianship of RTT applies to the legislature's use of “together” in N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(1) but not subsection 2, the case is distinguishable. Section 14-15-03, N.D.C.C., provides who may adopt, while the Wyoming statute “is purely procedural and prescribes only the manner of petitioning for adoption.” 2026 WY 23, ¶ 21, 584 P.3d 423. The court interpreted the statute that determined who may adopt to authorize multiple individuals to “separately petition” for adoption of a minor child. Id. ¶ 1; see also id. ¶¶ 22–24.
[¶32] Petitioners attempt to incorporate a brief in K.L.T., asserting “the petitioners in the K.L.T. case cited to numerous other jurisdictions who address this same issue and found in favor of allowing unmarried couples to adopt.”2 The brief in K.L.T. cites three cases from other jurisdictions: In re Adoption of Carl, 184 Misc.2d 646, 709 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000); Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993); and Petition of K.M., 274 Ill.App.3d 189, 210 Ill.Dec. 693, 653 N.E.2d 888 (1995).
[¶33] In Adoption of Tammy, two unmarried women filed a joint petition to adopt the biological daughter of one of them. 619 N.E.2d at 315. The court identified “[t]he initial question” as whether the probate court had jurisdiction “to enter a judgment on a joint petition for adoption brought by two unmarried cohabitants in the petitioners’ circumstances.” Id. at 318. The law provided “[a] person of full age may petition the probate court in the county where he resides for leave to adopt as his child another person younger than himself, unless such other person is his or her wife or husband, or brother, sister, uncle or aunt, of the whole or half blood.” Id. (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210, § 1). The court held “[t]here is nothing on the face of the statute which precludes the joint adoption of a child by two unmarried cohabitants such as the petitioners.” Id.
[¶34] Petition of K.M. involved two cases where one of the cohabitants was the natural or adoptive mother of the minor sought to be adopted. 210 Ill.Dec. 693, 653 N.E.2d at 890. The statutory provision provided:
(a) A reputable person of legal age and of either sex, provided that if such person is married, his or her spouse shall be a party to the adoption proceeding, including a husband or wife desiring to adopt a child of the other spouse, in all of which cases the adoption shall be by both spouses jointly.
Id., 210 Ill.Dec. 693, 653 N.E.2d at 893 (quoting 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 50/2(A) (West 1994)). Applying the state's rules of statutory construction, including that a statute susceptible of more than one construction should be given the construction which will effectuate or carry out its purpose or object, “even when such construction is not within the strict literal interpretation of the statute,” the court construed the act “to give standing to the unmarried persons in these cases ․ to petition for adoption jointly.” Id., 210 Ill.Dec. 693, 653 N.E.2d at 893, 899.
[¶35] Adoption of Tammy and Petition of K.M. are not persuasive authority. The cases do not interpret statutory language similar to N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03. Neither case involved a statute using “an unmarried adult” or similar language, or distinguish who may adopt by the selective use of the word “together.”
[¶36] Adoption of Carl is a decision by a New York Family Court. The court addressed whether two unmarried adults may jointly adopt a child who is not the child of either of them. Adoption of Carl, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 907. The version of the statute before the court provided: “An adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his adult wife together may adopt another person.” Id. (quoting McKinney's N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 110 (1999)). It also provided when an adult married person could adopt another person. Id. The court did not meaningfully grapple with the meaning of the statutory language “[a]n adult unmarried person” and the selective use of the word “together,” simply stating “[t]he adoption statute does not expressly prohibit this proposed adoption.” Id. at 909. The court found “the proposed adoption to be in [the child's] best interests, which is the determinative factor in deciding whether to grant an adoption petition,” and held the petitioners may jointly adopt the child because to deny the adoption would “create a family with two unmarried parents only one of whom would be allowed to formalize his or her parental relationship with [the child].” Id. at 910. The court's conclusory holdings in Adoption of Carl are not persuasive. It did not discuss legislative intent. Years later, the New York legislature amended its law to provide “[a]n adult unmarried person, an adult married couple together, or any two unmarried adult intimate partners together may adopt another person.” N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 110 (McKinney 2010, amended 2019). The law also provides when “[a]n adult married person” may adopt and when “[a]n adult or minor married couple together may adopt[.]” Id. Importantly, the legislature used the word “together” when it intended joint adoptions.
[¶37] Petitioners assert public policy favors this Court answering the certified question in the affirmative. However, “[i]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to identify and determine the public policy of the state.” In re Mangelsen, 2014 ND 31, ¶ 19, 843 N.W.2d 8; see also Int. of K.I.B., 2025 ND 157, ¶ 10, 26 N.W.3d 117 (“The legislature is the policy-making branch of government.”); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 423 (N.D. 1967) (“As a part of the law-making power of the Legislative Assembly, it has the right to determine legislative policy.”). “The policies which it adopts may be wise or otherwise, but it is not the prerogative of the courts to question the wisdom of the laws which the Legislature enacts.” Montana-Dakota Utils., at 423,.
[¶38] At oral argument, petitioners argued it is the courts’ role to determine whether an adoption is in the child's best interests. See N.D.C.C. § 14-15-13(3). However, whether an adoption is in the best interests of the individual to be adopted is an issue separate from who may adopt. The latter is a policy determination made by the legislature. “This Court's function is to interpret the statute as written by the legislature[.]” Mangelsen, 2014 ND 31, ¶ 19, 843 N.W.2d 8. Much has changed in the over five decades since section 14-15-03 was adopted. For example, in 1971 it was a crime for unmarried persons of the opposite sex to cohabit openly and notoriously. See N.D.C.C. § 12-22-12 (1960)3 (repealed by 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 117, § 4); N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-10 (1985)4 (repealed by 2007 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 131, § 4); see also N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, ¶ 10, 625 N.W.2d 551 (stating “North Dakota has prohibited unlawful cohabitation since statehood” and that the provision, as codified in 1895, “remained essentially unchanged until the 1970s”). If, based on societal changes or other policy reasons, the legislature determines unmarried individuals may jointly adopt under some or all circumstances, it is its prerogative to amend N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03. See Doyle ex rel. Doyle v. Sprynczynatyk, 2001 ND 8, ¶ 14, 621 N.W.2d 353 (“We have said many times if changes are to be made in the statute, we leave that matter to the legislature, as ‘it is for the legislature to determine policy, not for the courts.’ ” (quoting Treiber v. Citizens State Bank, 1999 ND 130, ¶ 16, 598 N.W.2d 96)).
V
[¶39] We answer the certified question “no.” Section 14-15-03, N.D.C.C., does not authorize an unmarried couple to adopt a child jointly.
FOOTNOTES
1. This section clarifies the list of persons entitled to adopt a child. In subsection (1) a husband and wife acting together are entitled to adopt even though one or both of them is a “minor,” that is, under the age of contracting as provided in this act or in general law. The Act lists several cases where a married person may adopt a child without the other spouse joining as petitioner and it lists one situation in which an individual may not be adopted-where the individual is a spouse of the petitioner. The Act permits an adult unmarried person to adopt a child; it permits any unmarried father or mother to adopt his own child; and it permits a married individual without the other spouse joining as a petitioner to adopt an individual if the other spouse is a parent of the person to be adopted and consents to the adoption or the petitioner and the other spouse are legally separated; or the nonjoining spouse is excused from participation by the court by reason of circumstances constituting an unreasonable withholding of consent. Thus, a married individual whose spouse is a missing person or is incapacitated may adopt an individual without the consent of the other spouse.Unif. Adoption Act § 3 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm'n 1969).
2. A statement incorporating arguments by reference does not meet the requirements of Rule 28(b)(7), and this Court generally does not consider arguments incorporated by reference. Bang v. Cont'l Res., Inc., 2025 ND 131, ¶¶ 7–8, 23 N.W.3d 895; see also N.D.R.App.P. 28(f)(2) (“A party may not incorporate by reference the contents of a brief filed elsewhere or in another case.” (effective September 1, 2026, after petitioners filed their brief)). Because the parties are aligned, we consider the cases incorporated by reference.
3. Section 12-22-12, N.D.C.C., provided “[e]very person who lives openly and notoriously and cohabits as husband or wife with a person of the opposite sex without being married to such person” is guilty of unlawful cohabitation. In State v. Hoffman, 68 N.D. 610, 282 N.W. 407 (1938), this Court interpreted the meaning of “openly and notoriously” in section 12.1-20-10. After defining “openly” and “notoriously,” this Court concluded: “It is not necessary that the living together should be more open and notorious than the living together of a married couple, but it should partake of the same quality-living and acting as husband and wife would do.” Id. at 409.
4. Section 12.1-20-10, N.D.C.C., provided a person is guilty of unlawful cohabitation “if he or she lives openly and notoriously with a person of the opposite sex as a married couple without being married to the other person.”
Bahr, Justice.
[¶40] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese
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Docket No: No. 20260097
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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