Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Zachary ARCHAMBAULT, Petitioner and Appellant v. STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee
[¶1] Zachary Allen Archambault appeals from a district court judgment and order granting summary disposition and dismissing his petition for postconviction relief. He argues the district court erred in dismissing the petition as untimely because the State waived the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. He argues dismissal without a proper motion or hearing results in a fundamentally unfair proceeding. He further argues that, even if the court could consider the statute of limitations, he is entitled to an exception based on a new interpretation of law applicable to his case and the court further erred in applying res judicata when the State's motion was grounded in misuse of process, not res judicata. We affirm.
I
[¶2] Archambault was found guilty of class AA felony continuous sexual abuse of a child for committing at least twenty sexual acts with a minor victim between November 2019 and August 2020. The district court sentenced Archambault in March 2022. Archambault appealed, and this Court affirmed his conviction in November 2022. State v. Archambault, 2022 ND 198, 982 N.W.2d 8.
[¶3] Archambault filed his first petition for postconviction relief in March 2023. The district court denied the petition on September 18, 2023. Archambault again appealed, and this Court affirmed on March 7, 2024. Archambault v. State, 2024 ND 38, 4 N.W.3d 212.
[¶4] On April 29, 2025, Archambault filed his second postconviction relief petition, on appeal here, alleging his conviction or sentence was imposed in violation of the state or federal constitution. Relying on Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 145 S.Ct. 612, 221 L.Ed.2d 90 (2025), Archambault asserted the United States Supreme Court “just recognized that when a State withhold[s] critical evidence of their star witness and fails to correct false testimony[,] it violates due process.” He alleged the State withheld video evidence in which the victim “never said anything happened,” and further led the victim at trial on what to say, “eliciting false testimony in violation of Glossip and due process.” Archambault also alleged in his petition the existence of evidence not previously presented that would require vacation of the judgment or sentence, but he did not identify the evidence or explain how it would require vacation.
[¶5] The State answered the petition in May 2025, raising as affirmative defenses the two-year statute of limitations for filing for postconviction relief, res judicata, and misuse of process. The State moved for summary disposition in October 2025 based on misuse of process, but did not raise the statute of limitations defense in its motion. Neither the State nor Archambault scheduled a hearing on the motion. The district court deferred ruling and ordered the parties to brief the statute of limitations and the application of Glossip. After considering the supplemental briefs, the court granted the State's motion for summary disposition and dismissed Archambault's petition for postconviction relief. Archambault appealed.
II
[¶6] On appeal, Archambault raises several challenges to the dismissal of his petition. He argues the State waived the statute of limitations defense and res judicata by omitting them from its motion for summary disposition, and the district court therefore erred in relying on those defenses. He argues the court further erred in granting summary disposition without allowing Archambault a hearing. Alternatively, Archambault argues, even if the court properly considered the statute of limitations defense, the court erred in dismissing his petition for postconviction relief because his petition falls within an exception to the two-year statute of limitations.
[¶7] “A motion for summary disposition of a postconviction relief application is analogous to, and governed by, the procedure for a motion for summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56.” Reller v. State, 2026 ND 106, ¶ 12, 36 N.W.3d 545. A district court may grant summary disposition “if the application, pleadings, any previous proceeding, discovery, or other matters of record show that no genuine issues exist as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09.1(1). Our standard of review for summary judgment is well established:
Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether the information available to the district court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record.
Reller, ¶ 13 (quoting Fiebiger v. Anderson, 2024 ND 156, ¶ 6, 10 N.W.3d 547).
A
[¶8] Archambault argues the State waived the statute of limitations defense when it failed to raise the defense in its motion for summary disposition, and the district court erred in relying on the defense. Alternatively, Archambault argues the court erred in relying on the statute of limitations when the State did not raise it in its motion.
[¶9] Although Archambault argues the State waived the statute of limitations defense, he does not cite to the record to show he preserved the waiver argument for appeal. An appellant's brief must contain a “citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved for review; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved.” N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(B)(ii). Archambault raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Because, generally, “issues not raised or considered in the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,” Archambault forfeited the waiver argument. Moe v. State, 2015 ND 93, ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d 510; State v. Dockter, 2019 ND 203, ¶ 8, 932 N.W.2d 98.
[¶10] Archambault argues we should review the forfeited issue applying obvious error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Forfeited errors may be reviewed for obvious error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b) in criminal proceedings. State v. Rende, 2018 ND 56, ¶ 8, 907 N.W.2d 361. Archambault acknowledges that postconviction proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and this Court follows the civil rules regarding motion practices. Nevertheless, Archambault relies on Coppage v. State, 2014 ND 42, ¶ 29, 843 N.W.2d 291, in which this Court applied the obvious error standard to a postconviction relief claim.
[¶11] Archambault's reliance on Coppage is misplaced. In Coppage, this Court applied the obvious error standard to vacate a conviction based on a non-cognizable offense. 2014 ND 42, ¶¶ 34, 40, 843 N.W.2d 291. We explained:
In a criminal case, under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b), “an obvious error or defect that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention,” and this rule “applies to both the trial courts and the appellate courts.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b), Explanatory Note. See State v. Whitman, 2013 ND 183, ¶ 7, 838 N.W.2d 401 (this Court has authority under N.D.R.App.P. 2 to suspend procedural rules to expedite our decision or for other good cause); see also Bell v. State, 1998 ND 35, ¶ 34, 575 N.W.2d 211 (despite waiver of a claimed irregularity, error may provide basis for reversal when constituting obvious error affecting a substantial right). We exercise our authority to notice obvious error cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances in which the defendant has suffered a serious injustice․
When analyzing claims of obvious error, we may notice a claimed error that was not brought to the attention of a trial court if there was (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights. When a forfeited plain error affects substantial rights, we have discretion to correct the error and should correct it if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. To constitute obvious error, the error must be a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law.
Id. ¶¶ 29-30 (cleaned up); see also Yoney v. State, 2021 ND 132, ¶ 18, 962 N.W.2d 617 (exercising discretion to notice error and vacating a conviction when the offense charged was non-cognizable).
[¶12] Here, Archambault does not argue an error affecting his substantial rights occurred in his underlying criminal case. Rather, he argues the district court erred in applying the procedure it used in granting summary disposition. We therefore decline to apply the obvious error standard under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b), and because of the unusual procedural posture of this case, we will exercise our discretion to review Archambault's arguments under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. See Interest of K.S.D., 2017 ND 289, ¶ 33, 904 N.W.2d 479 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (stating “we do not apply the obvious error jurisprudence developed under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b)” in a civil case). “At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.” N.D.R.Civ.P. 61; see K.S.D., ¶ 33.
[¶13] Rule 8(c), N.D.R.Civ.P., governs affirmative defenses and requires a party to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense” in response to a pleading. Res judicata and the statute of limitations are affirmative defenses that a party waives if not raised in its responsive pleading. Aune v. State, 2024 ND 99, ¶ 6, 6 N.W.3d 833. “In postconviction proceedings, as in other civil proceedings, we have treated the statute of limitations as waived when a responsive pleading is filed without raising it.” Id. (emphasis added). A “pleading” includes:
(1) a complaint;
(2) an answer to a complaint;
(3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim;
(4) an answer to a crossclaim;
(5) a third-party complaint;
(6) an answer to a third-party; and
(7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
N.D.R.Civ.P. 7(a)(1)–(7). While North Dakota's Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act uses the term “application” rather than “complaint,” the application for postconviction relief functions as the equivalent of a civil complaint—it initiates the proceeding, defines the claims, and is subject to dismissal under the same standards applied to civil complaints under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. See N.D.R.Civ.P. 7, 8; N.D.C.C. §§ 29-32.1-03, -04, -06. Here, the State did not raise the statute of limitations defense in its motion for summary disposition, but it did raise it in its answer to Archambault's petition for postconviction relief. Because an “answer” is a responsive pleading under N.D.R.Civ.P. 7(a), the State preserved the defense.
[¶14] Archambault argues that, even if the State preserved the defense, the district court could not decide the motion on that ground because the State did not raise it in its motion for summary disposition, and the omission shows the State was “not seeking summary judgment based on that issue.” While the State did not raise the statute of limitations in its motion for summary disposition, it did note on motion that Archambault made a vague reference to Glossip in his petition and that Glossip had not been decided at the time Archambault's first petition for postconviction relief was decided. The State argued Glossip reiterated the Supreme Court's holding in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), and Napue is not new law. In his response to the State's motion, Archambault relied on Glossip to support his argument that there was a due process violation. Rather than rule on the State's motion as filed and briefed, the court deferred its decision and ordered both parties to brief whether the petition was timely and whether Glossip created an exception to the statute of limitations.
[¶15] On appeal, Archambault relies on Chase v. State, 2021 ND 206, 966 N.W.2d 557, arguing “[t]he court may not substitute its own grounds for those advanced in the State's motion, even after inviting a response,” and the court's ordering of supplemental briefing did not cure the defect. Archambault's reliance on Chase is misplaced. In Chase, we held the district court erred in ordering summary disposition when the State did not file a motion for summary disposition separate from its answer. Id. ¶ 11. Here, unlike in Chase, the State raised the statute of limitations in its answer and also filed a separate motion for summary disposition. Archambault also misapplies the holding in Chase when arguing that the rules require a separate motion before summary disposition may be granted. In Chase, no separate motion was brought. Id. ¶ 9. Here, the State moved for summary disposition, as required by Chase, ¶ 9, so the State has not violated Chase by moving in a separate document for summary disposition.
[¶16] As to the question of whether the district court may raise the statute of limitations sua sponte, in Ortega v. Sanford Bismarck, we addressed the issue of whether the court may raise grounds not advanced by the parties in their motions for summary judgment. 2019 ND 133, ¶ 18, 927 N.W.2d 872. In explaining that the court may rely on reasons not advanced by the parties, we stated:
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court is not confined to the particular propositions of law advanced by the parties on a motion for summary judgment. 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725 (3d ed. 1998).
Courts should be cautious, however, when granting summary judgment on propositions of law that were not advanced by the parties. 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725 (3d ed. 1998)․ A court should notify the parties when it intends to rely on a legal doctrine or precedents other than those briefed and argued by the litigants. Id.; see also James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Rules Pamphlet § 56.4[2] (2004) (a court must give the party against whom the court is considering granting the judgment an opportunity to respond when the judgment is considered on a sua sponte basis) (citing Walker v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 138 F.3d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1998) (the district court's grant of summary judgment on a ground not raised in the summary judgment motion was reversed because the plaintiff was not given notice and opportunity to contest the issues)).
Ortega, ¶ 18 (quoting Jaste v. Gailfus, 2004 ND 94, ¶¶ 11-12, 679 N.W.2d 257). Here, the district court gave notice and an opportunity to respond to the issue it raised sua sponte.
[¶17] We conclude the district court satisfied the requirements for notice articulated in Ortega, and therefore the court did not err in considering an issue not raised in the State's motion for summary disposition.
B
[¶18] Archambault argues the district court erred in granting summary disposition without a hearing. Archambault requested a hearing on December 14, 2025, in his response opposing the State's motion for summary disposition. He renewed the request on February 17, 2026, in his supplemental brief.
[¶19] The State's motion for summary disposition was brought under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2. Under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(3), “[i]f the party requesting a hearing fails within 14 days of the request to secure a time for the hearing, the request is waived and the matter is considered submitted for decision on the briefs.” Archambault did not secure a time for the hearing as required by the rule. To the extent Archambault argues he was entitled to a hearing on the motion for summary disposition, he waived his requested hearing, and the matter was considered submitted for decision. The district court issued its order dismissing Archambault's petition on March 13, 2026, well outside of the 14-day period for scheduling the hearing. Archambault had notice of the court's intention to consider the statute of limitations, had an opportunity to respond, and waived his request for a hearing. See Pederson v. State, 2026 ND 1, ¶ 18, 30 N.W.3d 319 (holding a summary disposition order entered without a requested hearing was not error where the applicant failed to secure a time within 14 days). To the extend Archambault argues he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, no such hearing was necessary because the court did not err in granting summary disposition as discussed below.
[¶20] We conclude Archambault waived his requested hearing when he failed to secure the hearing, and the district court did not err by issuing its order without a hearing.
C
[¶21] Archambault concedes more than two years had passed after his conviction became final, but he argues his petition for postconviction relief falls within the exception to the statute of limitations based on a new interpretation of law that applies to his case.
[¶22] The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1, provides rules for the timeliness of postconviction relief and creates a statute of limitations. Section 29-32.1-01(2), N.D.C.C., articulates the two-year statute of limitations after a conviction becomes final:
Except as provided in subsection 3, an application for relief under this chapter must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final. A conviction becomes final for purposes of this chapter when:
a. The time for appeal of the conviction to the North Dakota supreme court expires;
b. If an appeal was taken to the North Dakota supreme court, the time for petitioning the United States supreme court for review expires; or
c. If review was sought in the United States supreme court, the date the supreme court issues a final order in the case.
As relevant here, under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(3), a court may consider an untimely petition if:
The petitioner asserts a new interpretation of federal or state constitutional or statutory law by either the United States supreme court or a North Dakota appellate court and the petitioner establishes that the interpretation is retroactively applicable to the petitioner's case.
[¶23] The district court treated Archambault's citation to Glossip as a claim asserting a new interpretation of law under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(3). The court concluded that Glossip is not a new interpretation of law but rather follows and applies existing case law—Napue, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173. Archambault argues the district court misapplied the new interpretation exception under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(3) because Glossip is a new interpretation of law that extends Napue's foundational principle and clarifies the prosecution's obligation to correct false or misleading testimony. He further argues this new interpretation applies retroactively to his case.
[¶24] It is unnecessary to discuss whether Glossip is a new interpretation of law. For the exception to the statute of limitations to apply, Archambault has the burden under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(3) to show not only that there is a new interpretation of law but also that it applies retroactively. North Dakota has adopted a three-prong test for determining whether a right articulated by the United States Supreme Court applies retroactively. See Addai v. State, 2022 ND 190, ¶¶ 7-9, 982 N.W.2d 287. Under that test, even when there is a new rule of law, the court must consider whether the rule meets one of the two exceptions to the general rule on nonretroactivity. Id. ¶ 8. The two exceptions include: “(1) the rule is substantive or places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State, or (2) the rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Id.
[¶25] Archambault argues Glossip is retroactively applicable, but he does not reference the test we apply on retroactivity or provide a citation supporting his argument that the test should be applied retroactively. Under N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(A), a brief must include the appellant's contentions, along with citations to supporting authorities. Even if we were to assume without deciding Glossip is a new interpretation of law, Archambault's argument on retroactivity is inadequately briefed, and he has not met his burden to show Glossip should be applied retroactively. Therefore, we decline to further address whether Glossip articulated a new rule of law that applies retroactively to Archambault's case.
[¶26] Archambault has not established an exception under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(3), and his petition is barred by the statute of limitations. The district court did not err in granting summary disposition and dismissing Archambault's petition for postconviction relief.
III
[¶27] The State preserved the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations by raising it in its answer, and its omission of the defense from its motion for summary disposition did not waive the defense. The district court gave Archambault notice and an opportunity to respond before granting summary disposition based on the statute of limitations. Archambault waived his requested hearing by not securing a time for a hearing. Archambault has not met his burden to show his petition falls within an exception to the statute of limitations, and he was therefore not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We have considered the remaining arguments made by Archambault and determine they are either without merit or unnecessary to our decision.
[¶28] We affirm the district court's judgment and order granting summary disposition and dismissing Archambault's petition for postconviction relief.
[¶30] I concur with the majority's affirmance of the district court's order granting summary disposition and dismissing Archambault's petition for postconviction relief. That includes the majority's analysis and conclusion that the State preserved its “statute of limitations” defense by raising it in its answer. Majority, ¶ 13. However, for the reasons stated in Chase v. State, 2024 ND 215, ¶¶ 26–28, 14 N.W.3d 37 (Bahr, J., specially concurring), I specially concur to note I question the accuracy of the majority's designation of the two-year period in N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) as an affirmative defense.
Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.
[¶29] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Mark A. Friese
Thank you for your feedback!
As the largest network of trusted legal brands, we help firms build authority across the platforms consumers and AI systems rely on most. Our network helps attorneys strengthen visibility, credibility, and preference where legal decisions begin.
Docket No: No. 20260132
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Make It a Preferred Google Search Source
Add to GoogleGet help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)