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STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Colton Kenneth DEFOE, Defendant and Appellant
[¶1] Colton Kenneth Defoe appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance – methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defoe argues improper jury instructions affected his substantial right to due process and there was insufficient evidence to convict him. We affirm.
I
[¶2] In December 2024, an officer with the McKenzie County Sheriff's Department initiated a traffic stop on Defoe's vehicle and detained Defoe on an outstanding warrant. The officer cleared the other passengers from the vehicle and deployed his K-9 unit to perform a narcotic sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. The K-9 alerted to narcotics in the vehicle, and a search of Defoe's vehicle was conducted.
[¶3] In the driver's side visor, the officer found a plastic baggie containing a white crystalline substance, believed to be methamphetamine, and a bindle containing a powdered substance, believed to be gabapentin. The officer also found a plastic tube with burn marks in the center console of the vehicle. Defoe denied possession of all three items, as did the passengers. The contents of the plastic baggie tested positive for methamphetamine residue and the bindle tested positive for 0.367 grams of methamphetamine. The plastic tube yielded an insufficient sample to test, making the results inconclusive. No gabapentin was detected in the contents.
[¶4] Defoe was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine; unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia; and driving under suspension. Defoe was initially charged with two additional counts, which were dismissed before trial. The jury found Defoe guilty of all three counts. The district court entered criminal judgment. Defoe appeals.
II
[¶5] Defoe argues the jury instructions did not properly inform the jury of the applicable law, affecting his substantial right to due process. Defoe argues the jury instructions relating to the possession of methamphetamine contained plain error for “not clarifying what specific item [or] substance Defoe was charged with in Count One, unlawful possession of methamphetamine.” Defoe argues this is a violation of his due process rights because he was not put on notice that the methamphetamine found in the bindle would be used to convict him of possession of methamphetamine. His argument appears to rest on evidence that officers initially, but mistakenly, believed one of two containers recovered from Defoe's car contained methamphetamine and the other contained gabapentin. Analysis revealed methamphetamine in both. The State dismissed the gabapentin allegation.
[¶6] Defoe concedes on appeal he did not object to the jury instructions at trial. However, Defoe argues he raised the issue in his motion for acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29. At trial, Defoe moved for acquittal on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Regarding the possession of methamphetamine charge, Defoe argued under his Rule 29 motion that it was unclear what evidence supported the possession of methamphetamine because the affidavit of probable cause alleged the bindle contained gabapentin—which ultimately turned out to be methamphetamine—and the charge for possession of gabapentin had been dismissed. The record does not include objections to the relevant jury instructions as part of the motion under Rule 29. This Court has held that when moving for acquittal under Rule 29, “if the defendant has asserted specific grounds in the trial court as the basis for a motion for acquittal, he or she cannot assert other grounds on appeal.” State v. Helm, 2020 ND 155, ¶ 6, 946 N.W.2d 503 (quoting State v. Yineman, 2002 ND 145, ¶ 15, 651 N.W.2d 648). Defoe did not preserve the issue for appeal by his arguments made under Rule 29.
[¶7] Following denial of the Rule 29 motion, the district court reviewed the jury instructions with the prosecution and defense attorneys, asking them to state whether they objected to each proposed jury instruction. Defoe did not object to the jury instructions regarding the charge of possession of methamphetamine or the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. Instead, when asked by the court, Defoe affirmatively stated “no objection” to each instruction, with the exception of the instruction regarding Defoe's notice of his suspended license—which is not on appeal here. “Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(c), to preserve a jury instruction issue for appellate review, a party must object on the record stating the issue ‘distinctly’ and specifying the grounds of his or her objection. If a party does not timely object, the issue is not preserved for review.” State v. Guthmiller, 2025 ND 162, ¶ 8, 26 N.W.3d 548 (quoting State v. Gaddie, 2022 ND 44, ¶ 4, 971 N.W.2d 811). As Defoe did not object to the specific jury instructions, Defoe did not preserve the issue for review.
[¶8] Defoe argues the jury instructions should be reviewed for plain and obvious error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b), stating:
[T]he jury instructions contained plain error in not clarifying what specific item/substance Defoe was charged with in Count One, unlawful possession of methamphetamine. This error affected Defoe's substantial right to due process as he was not put on notice that the substance from the “bindle” would be used as evidence to convict him of unlawful possession of methamphetamine, under Count One.
The State argues Defoe must demonstrate an error that is plain and affects his substantial rights, and the record does not support a serious injustice even if a plain error can be found.
[¶9] Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b), “[a]n obvious error or defect that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.” To establish obvious error, an appellant has the burden to show “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” State v. Miller, 2001 ND 132, ¶ 25, 631 N.W.2d 587. Defoe has not established error that is plain and affects substantial rights.
[¶10] Jury instructions are adequate if, as a whole, they correctly and adequately inform the jury of the applicable law and do not mislead or confuse the jury. See State v. Pemberton, 2019 ND 157, ¶ 21, 930 N.W.2d 125; State v. Martinez, 2015 ND 173, ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d 391; State v. Pavlicek, 2012 ND 154, ¶ 14, 819 N.W.2d 521. At the commencement of trial, the district court preliminarily instructed the jury as follows:
As to the charge of possession of controlled substance methamphetamine, in McKenzie County, North Dakota, the defendant, Colton Kenneth Defoe, willfully possessed a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine. Specifically, the defendant willfully possessed a white crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine.
Following closing arguments but before deliberations, the court's final instructions included the following jury instruction:
Count 1, possession of controlled substance, methamphetamine. A person who willfully possessed a controlled substance without a valid medical prescription is guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
Essential elements of offense. The State's burden of proof is satisfied if the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the following essential elements: One, on or about December 17th, 2024; two, in McKenzie County, North Dakota; three, the defendant, Colton Kenneth Defoe; four, willfully possessed methamphetamine; and five, the defendant did not have a valid prescription for the methamphetamine.
[¶11] The district court's jury instructions accurately stated the elements of the offense. The preliminary instruction's reference to a substance “suspected to be methamphetamine” described the charge at the outset of trial; it did not alter the State's burden, and the final instruction required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defoe “willfully possessed methamphetamine.” Because the gabapentin allegation had been dismissed and both containers were shown to contain methamphetamine, the jury was not asked to choose between substances. The court did not err by not instructing the jury that both containers contained methamphetamine or by not identifying which container held which substance. There was no error, let alone plain error.
III
[¶12] Defoe argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. “In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the defendant bears the burden of showing the evidence reveals no reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” State v. Cahoon, 2023 ND 178, ¶ 1, 996 N.W.2d 313 (cleaned up). Based on our review of the record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the verdicts. We summarily affirm the criminal judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3).
IV
[¶13] We affirm the criminal judgment.
[¶16] I agree that sufficient evidence exists to support the convictions and that Defoe has not demonstrated jury instruction error on this record. I also agree with the majority's application of plain-error review to the question of claimed jury instruction error. I write separately to highlight this Court's inconsistent application of that standard and to encourage this Court, in the proper case, to overrule recent cases applying an incorrect standard.
I
[¶17] The remedy for a defendant's failure to preserve jury instruction error is explicit and specified by N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(d)(2). Under this rule, when a defendant fails to preserve jury instruction error, review is not foreclosed; it is limited to the more demanding plain-error analysis.
[¶18] Rule 30, N.D.R.Crim.P., establishes how jury instruction error is preserved and what follows when it is not. “A party may assign as error: an error in an instruction actually given if that party made a proper objection under Rule 30(c), or a failure to give an instruction if that party made a proper request under Rule 30(a).” N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(d)(1)(A)-(B). A proper objection must be made “on the record, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(c)(1). When error has not been preserved in that manner, the rule does not foreclose review: “A court may consider a plain error in the instructions affecting substantial rights that has not been preserved as required by Rule 30(d)(1)(A) or (B).” N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(d)(2).
[¶19] The rule thus creates two categories. An error is preserved by a proper, distinct objection or request. Every other instruction error is unpreserved, and an unpreserved error remains reviewable for plain error. A statement of “no objection” is not an objection “stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.” By the rule's terms, an instruction error following such a statement “has not been preserved,” and this Court “may consider” it if the error is plain and affects substantial rights.
[¶20] When a district court seeks a defendant's approval of proposed jury instructions, and the defendant or counsel stands by silently but does not otherwise invite or preserve error, this Court reviews the instructions for plain error. State v. Wangstad, 2018 ND 217, ¶ 16, 917 N.W.2d 515 (stating “this Court's review is limited to whether the jury instructions constitute plain or obvious error” when the defendant did not assert an objection to the instructions and did not request an alternative instruction). For more than four decades, this Court likewise held that silence or an affirmative statement of satisfaction with the instructions limited appellate review to whether the alleged error constituted plain error affecting the defendant's substantial rights; it did not foreclose review. State v. Demery, 331 N.W.2d 7, 11 (N.D. 1983); State v. Allery, 322 N.W.2d 228, 232 (N.D. 1982); State v. Granrud, 301 N.W.2d 398, 401-02 (N.D. 1981).
[¶21] These early cases described the failure to object as a “waiver” but did not distinguish waiver from forfeiture in the modern sense; they reviewed the claimed errors for plain error. This Court recognized the modern distinction in State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d 658, defining forfeiture as “the failure to timely assert a right” and waiver as “the intentional relinquishment of a right.” Under that distinction, plain-error analysis under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b) applies only to forfeited errors, not waived errors. The waiver portion of that framework comes from United States v. Olano, which defines waiver as the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see State v. Edwards, 2020 ND 200, ¶ 9, 948 N.W.2d 832 (“This Court adopted the Olano framework in 1998.”). The “known right” element is thus part of the framework State v. Studhorse, 2024 ND 110, 7 N.W.3d 253, purports to apply. My disagreement is not with Olander's framework but with what now counts as waiver under it.
[¶22] Formerly, this Court entirely foreclosed appellate review of jury instruction and verdict form errors only when the defendant helped produce the error. State v. Houle, 2022 ND 96, ¶ 7, 974 N.W.2d 401 (“It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.”); see also State v. Yoney, 2020 ND 118, ¶¶ 12-13, 943 N.W.2d 791; State v. Rende, 2018 ND 56, ¶ 9, 907 N.W.2d 361; State v. Watkins, 2017 ND 165, ¶ 14, 898 N.W.2d 442; State v. White Bird, 2015 ND 41, ¶ 23, 858 N.W.2d 642; State v. Kautzman, 2007 ND 133, ¶ 17, 738 N.W.2d 1. These cases sometimes described the defendant's conduct as waiver, and some of their language anticipates what followed.
[¶23] In Houle, this Court stated that because the defendant “agreed to the jury instructions,” any error “was waived.” 2022 ND 96, ¶ 7, 974 N.W.2d 401. Yoney said much the same. 2020 ND 118, ¶ 13, 943 N.W.2d 791. And Watkins cited State v. Brewer, 2017 ND 95, ¶ 5, 893 N.W.2d 184, an evidentiary case in which counsel stated “no objection,” as an example of waiver. Watkins, 2017 ND 165, ¶ 14, 898 N.W.2d 442. But in each case the defendant did more than acquiesce. The district court gave the instruction Houle requested. Houle, ¶ 7. Yoney's own proposed instruction included the culpability language in the final instruction, and he agreed to it. Yoney, ¶ 13. Watkins agreed “as a matter of trial strategy” to leave a question off the verdict form. Watkins, ¶ 14. Kautzman invited the treatment of serious bodily injury as a sentence enhancement. Kautzman, 2007 ND 133, ¶ 17, 738 N.W.2d 1. Each case rested on the defendant's invitation of the error, not on a bare failure to object. Houle, ¶ 7; Yoney, ¶ 13; Watkins, ¶ 14; Kautzman, ¶ 17. That result is consistent with Olano. A defendant who requests an instruction, or deliberately chooses one as a matter of strategy, intentionally relinquishes a known right.
[¶24] Departure began with Studhorse. 2024 ND 110, 7 N.W.3d 253. When the district court asked whether there were requested amendments to the proposed jury instructions, Studhorse's attorney responded, “I don't believe so.” Id. ¶ 25. Studhorse quoted the forfeiture-waiver definition from Watkins and cited the invited-error cases, id. ¶ 24, but it identified no request, proposal, or strategic choice by the defendant. Its only authority for treating counsel's response as waiver was Brewer, the one case in this line that did not involve invited error. Studhorse thus kept the label these cases used and discarded the conduct that justified it. Id. ¶ 25.
[¶25] Subsequent cases deepened the departure. In State v. Goodale, 2024 ND 120, ¶ 9, 8 N.W.3d 271, the district court asked whether the instructions were acceptable, and counsel responded, “Yes.” This Court held that “by answering in the affirmative that the instructions were acceptable, [the defendant] waived her right to complain on appeal that the instruction” was improper. Id. This Court also stated more broadly that failure to object “when given the opportunity, operates as a waiver of the right to complain on appeal of instructions that either were or were not given.” Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 18, 575 N.W.2d 658 (quoting State v. McNair, 491 N.W.2d 397, 399 (N.D. 1992))). But the citation to McNair in Goodale lacks context. McNair itself analyzed the claimed error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 30 and N.D.R.Crim.P. 52. McNair, 491 N.W.2d at 399.
[¶26] Other decisions that followed Studhorse continued to gloss over the departure. In State v. Vervalen, 2024 ND 124, ¶ 8, 8 N.W.3d 816, the district court asked whether counsel had further objections to the jury instructions. Counsel answered, “No, Your Honor. That was it.” Id. This Court held the claimed error was waived, explaining, “[a] party waives an error when the party is given the opportunity to address it and intentionally relinquishes the opportunity.” Id. (citation omitted). In State v. Lewellyn, 2025 ND 97, ¶ 3, 21 N.W.3d 77, this Court summarily affirmed two felony convictions, holding jury instruction arguments were waived and unreviewable because, while finalizing the instructions, the district court asked whether “there was anything else to discuss” and Lewellyn's attorney “responded in the negative.” And in State v. Guthmiller, 2025 ND 162, ¶¶ 3-4, 9, 26 N.W.3d 548, this Court declined to address a claimed error in the instruction identifying the elements of the offense because Guthmiller, who represented himself at trial, told the district court he had no objection.
[¶27] This Court continues to cement its departure from the Olander framework. In State v. Prescott, 2024 ND 152, ¶ 2, 10 N.W.3d 95, this Court summarily affirmed, holding “[a] defendant's decision to not object to a jury instruction when given the opportunity constitutes a waiver of the right to argue on appeal that the instruction was erroneous.” This Court repeated the same sentence in State v. Alg, 2025 ND 59, ¶ 3, 18 N.W.3d 845. Under Prescott and Alg, a defendant is deemed to have waived jury instruction error by making no affirmative statement at all. Rule 30 requires the district court to give the parties an opportunity to object. N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(b)(1)(B). Read literally, then, Prescott and Alg leave nothing for Rule 30(d)(2) to do. A failure to object when given the opportunity is the definition of forfeiture, not waiver.
II
[¶28] We have inconsistently addressed claimed jury instruction errors, sometimes applying waiver and sometimes not. Application of waiver has not turned on whether it was briefed. In some cases, the parties briefed waiver. See, e.g., Studhorse, 2024 ND 110, 7 N.W.3d 253 (State argued Rule 52(b) obvious-error review does not apply to waived errors); Prescott, 2024 ND 152, 10 N.W.3d 95 (State argued the defendant could not assign error to an instruction without a timely objection); Alg, 2025 ND 59, 18 N.W.3d 845 (State argued the instruction challenge was waived and asked this Court to decline obvious-error review); see also Goodale, 2024 ND 120, 8 N.W.3d 271 (State argued defendant “waived” a lesser-included instruction but primarily argued plain error). In other cases, this Court resolved the case by applying waiver even though the State explicitly argued for plain-error review under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See, e.g., Lewellyn, 2025 ND 97, 21 N.W.3d 77 (State argued “this Court will only review for obvious error”); Guthmiller, 2025 ND 162, 26 N.W.3d 548 (State argued “this Court's review is limited to obvious error”). In one case, neither party mentioned waiver, but we applied it anyway. Vervalen, 2024 ND 124, 8 N.W.3d 816. In the present case, the State does not argue waiver and the majority does not apply it. The majority's approach is proper but conflicts with cases in which this Court has decided cases on waiver grounds when the State argued forfeiture or wholly failed to raise waiver. Lewellyn, ¶ 3; Guthmiller, ¶¶ 9-10; Vervalen, ¶ 8.
[¶29] We have been inconsistent not only between opinions but also within them. In Studhorse, the defendant's counsel said, “I don't believe so,” when asked about changes to the instructions, and we held that he waived his unanimity challenge. 2024 ND 110, ¶¶ 25-26, 7 N.W.3d 253. Yet in the same opinion we reviewed for obvious error, and reversed on, his unpreserved claim that the instructions on two of those same counts were not specific enough to keep the jury from convicting him twice for the same conduct. Id. ¶¶ 40-48. In Vervalen, we reviewed the omission of an intoxication instruction for obvious error, though the defendant never objected or requested one, but held a challenge to the attempted-murder instructions waived because counsel said he had no further objections. 2024 ND 124, ¶¶ 3, 8, 8 N.W.3d 816. Inconsistency in the application of waiver to jury instruction error deserves reconciliation, and we should start by overruling Studhorse.
III
[¶30] “Defoe affirmatively stated ‘no objection’ to each” relevant instruction. Majority, ¶ 7. “The State argues Defoe must demonstrate error that is plain and affects his substantial rights ․” Majority, ¶ 8. The majority expressly applies this proper standard, even though this Court has not consistently done so in prior cases. By stating “no objection,” Defoe did not waive but instead forfeited, and relief, if any, is limited to plain-error review.
[¶31] Because the majority applied the proper standard and reached the proper result, and because the parties did not ask us to revisit Studhorse, it is appropriate to await another case to overrule it and the cases applying its waiver formulation to claimed jury instruction error. I concur.
Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.
[¶14] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Douglas A. Bahr Gary H. Lee, D.J.[¶15] The Honorable Gary H. Lee, D.J., sitting in place of Tufte, J., disqualified.
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Docket No: No. 20260054
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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