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STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Daniel Philip CARPENTER, Defendant and Appellant
[¶1] Daniel Carpenter appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition and sexual assault. We affirm, holding the State did not exercise unconstitutional peremptory juror challenges; a comment made during opening statements was not prosecutorial misconduct; and the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.
I
[¶2] The State charged Carpenter with gross sexual imposition under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-03(1)(c), which prohibits engaging in a sexual act with a victim who is unaware. The State also charged Carpenter with sexual assault under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-07(1)(a), which prohibits offensive sexual contact. The State alleged Carpenter, who at the time was a sergeant in the North Dakota National Guard, committed the crimes against two subordinate soldiers during a hotel party after a training. The State claimed Carpenter touched R.H.’s breasts and vagina without her consent and that he had sex with N.C. while she was so intoxicated she had difficulty speaking and walking. The case proceeded to a two-day jury trial.
[¶3] The State exercised seven peremptory challenges during voir dire, each against a man. Carpenter objected, arguing the challenges were discriminatory and violated his right to a fair trial. The State provided reasons for its challenges, including that two jurors were attorneys, one juror was a convicted sex offender, one expressed an unwillingness to serve, one “answered negatively with regard to both feminism and the MeToo movement,” one responded that people “just jump on the bandwagon with regard to the MeToo movement,” and another “answered negatively with regard to feminism, with regards to the MeToo movement, with regard to people making up—he believed that they just make up allegations of sexual assault ․” The district court denied the motion, explaining it “doesn't find there's been purposeful discrimination in this case.” A jury was impaneled, but its gender composition is not in the record.
[¶4] During opening statements, the prosecutor told the jury that soldiers were drinking and partying at a hotel after their unit completed training. The prosecutor stated Carpenter “was a commanding [noncommissioned officer], and he should not have been partying with lower ranked enlisted soldiers. But you're going to hear that he had been doing this kind of thing with those lower enlisted soldiers[.]” Carpenter objected and moved for a mistrial. He argued the statement constituted prosecutorial misconduct because it was a deliberate violation of a pre-trial order prohibiting evidence of allegations related to Carpenter sexually assaulting one of the victims during a different party. The district court denied his motion. The court explained the statement “was the description of partying in the past,” and did not violate the order because it did not describe a sexual assault.
[¶5] After the State rested its case, Carpenter moved for judgment of acquittal under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court denied his motion. The case was then submitted to the jury, which returned guilty verdicts for each count. The court entered judgment. Carpenter appeals.
II
[¶6] Carpenter argues the district court erred when it overruled his objection during voir dire. He asserts his right to a fair trial was violated because the State exercised peremptory challenges that discriminated against men and that the court did not make the requisite findings.
A
[¶7] Criminal defendants have the right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the North Dakota Constitution. State v. Fredericks, 507 N.W.2d 61, 64-65 (N.D. 1993). Voir dire is the process courts employ to ascertain whether potential jurors can be fair and impartial. State v. Purdy, 491 N.W.2d 402, 407 (N.D. 1992); State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 432 (N.D. 1984). The court and parties question potential jurors during voir dire to discover bias or the potential for bias. State v. Hidanovic, 2008 ND 66, ¶ 25, 747 N.W.2d 463; N.D.R.Crim.P. 24(a)(2) (stating the court must permit each side to participate in the examination of prospective jurors).
[¶8] Each side may “challenge for cause” any juror who is discovered to be ineligible to serve. See State v. McLain, 301 N.W.2d 616, 620 (N.D. 1981) (explaining the term “challenge for cause” applies to jurors “failing to meet the statutory qualifications” or having “actual or implied bias”); see also N.D.C.C. §§ 29-17-33 through 29-17-38 (defining challenges for cause and providing for how they are taken). Each side is also permitted a number of peremptory challenges. See N.D.R.Crim.P. 24(b). A peremptory challenge “is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given but upon which the court must exclude that juror.” N.D.C.C. § 29-17-30. “Peremptory challenges are not aimed at disqualification, but rather are exercised against qualified jurors ‘as a matter of grace’ to the challenging party.” City of Dickinson v. Lindstrom, 1998 ND 52, ¶ 10, 575 N.W.2d 440 (quoting the explanatory note to N.D.R.Crim.P. 24). They may be based on an “instinct” that a juror would be unfavorable. State v. Grant, 2023 ND 62, ¶ 9, 988 N.W.2d 563.
[¶9] Peremptory challenges are not without limitation. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on the basis of race or gender. State v. Galvez, 2015 ND 14, ¶ 8, 858 N.W.2d 619. Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges diminishes “public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Such discriminatory challenges “bear no relationship to an individual's qualifications or ability to perform or contribute to society.” City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 744 (N.D. 1993). Gender-based challenges are unconstitutional because they violate equal protection rights of both the defendant and the excluded juror. Id. at 745.
[¶10] A three-part test determines whether a peremptory challenge is unconstitutionally gender-based. The defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the State exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of gender. Galvez, 2015 ND 14, ¶ 8, 858 N.W.2d 619. This showing requires the district court consider “all relevant circumstances,” including the composition of the empaneled jury, the number of peremptory challenges exercised against a specific gender, the conduct of the prosecutor while examining potential jurors, and whether a pattern of discrimination exists in similar cases. Id. ¶ 9 (quoting Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 749).
[¶11] If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of gender discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to provide a neutral explanation for the challenges. Galvez, 2015 ND 14, ¶ 10, 858 N.W.2d 619. A neutral explanation means a reason based on something other than gender. Id. The explanation does not have to be persuasive; it must only be neutral. Grant, 2023 ND 62, ¶ 10, 988 N.W.2d 563. The explanation must be “clear and specific,” Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 749, and cannot be “pretextual,” J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). Although gender-based strikes are prohibited, “strikes based on characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one gender could be appropriate, absent a showing of pretext.” J.E.B., at 145, 114 S.Ct. 1419. For example, challenging a man because he is a plumber may be permissible in a case relating to a broken water pipe. See id. at 143 n. 16, 114 S.Ct. 1419. Whether the State's explanation is neutral and not discriminatory is a legal question. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion).
[¶12] The third step requires the district court evaluate the prosecutor's credibility. Grant, 2023 ND 62, ¶ 7, 988 N.W.2d 563. The decisive question is whether the prosecutor's neutral explanation is believable. Id. “As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge's province.” Id. (cleaned up). “A trial court's findings in resolving a claim of purposeful discrimination during jury selection will not be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.” Galvez, 2015 ND 14, ¶ 11, 858 N.W.2d 619. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, when there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
B
[¶13] The State argues Carpenter failed to meet his prong one burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination. However, “[o]nce a prosecutor has offered [an] explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859; see also United States v. Walley, 567 F.3d 354, 357 (8th Cir. 2009) (same). We decline to assess whether the State was required to provide an explanation for its peremptory challenges because it volunteered one.
[¶14] Carpenter argues the State's explanations for its peremptory challenges are not gender neutral as required by prong two. He asserts the State's use of peremptory challenges based on responses to questions about the MeToo movement “are pretextual on their face” and reveal a “pattern of using attitudinal assumptions about gender-related issues as a proxy for gender itself[.]” He claims the State assumed “a male juror who expressed any skepticism toward issues associated with women's advocacy would be an unsympathetic juror in this case,” and that “generalized assumption about how men would behave as jurors ․ is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”
[¶15] We disagree. An opinion about the MeToo movement and feminism is not a gender attribute. Whether someone has strong feelings about accusations of sexual abuse is directly relevant to the case at hand, where the charges were gross sexual imposition and sexual assault. Firm views on the topic are indicative of the potential for bias. The State's peremptory challenges are gender-neutral as a matter of law. The State satisfied its burden under prong two.
[¶16] On prong three, Carpenter argues the district court failed to adequately assess the credibility of the State and its proffered gender-neutral explanations. He asserts the court's failure to explain its rationale “shields its decision” from “meaningful” review. He relies primarily on family law cases for the proposition that courts must detail their findings and provide “individualized analysis” on the record. However, those cases commonly require application of factual findings to detailed statutory factors that are not present in the Batson context, and they are governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The sole criminal case Carpenter identifies states that courts may not “expediently” disregard “uncontradicted and unchallenged” testimony by declaring a witness not credible. State v. Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600, 604 (N.D. 1992). That case says nothing about the degree of specificity required for findings generally or in the specific context of a Batson challenge.
[¶17] There is a split of authority on whether trial courts are required to make factual findings under prong three of the Batson framework. Compare United States v. Ongaga, 820 F.3d 152, 166 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[T]here is no requirement in this circuit that a district court make explicit factual findings during Batson's third step.”); Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[F]ederal law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge ․”) with United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e cannot presume that the prosecutor's race-neutral justification was credible simply because the district judge ultimately denied the challenge.”); Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring “explicit adjudication of the credibility of the non-movant's race-neutral explanations for the challenged strikes”).
[¶18] Our analysis is governed by the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Those rules “do not require a district court to state findings on the record when a motion is made during trial.” State v. Bazile, 2022 ND 59, ¶ 10, 971 N.W.2d 884 (comparing Rule 12, which governs pretrial motions, with Rule 47, which governs motions generally). Voir dire is part of the trial. State v. Decker, 2018 ND 43, ¶ 9, 907 N.W.2d 378. As with a court's determination of innocence or guilt after a bench trial, the court's Batson decision is the finding itself. See State v. Rufus, 2015 ND 212, ¶ 9, 868 N.W.2d 534 (“In a criminal case tried to the court without a jury, the court is not required to make findings of fact.” (quoting State v. Berger, 235 N.W.2d 254, 263 (N.D. 1975))). Under North Dakota law, district courts are not required to provide on the record individualized credibility findings regarding a prosecutor's peremptory challenge explanations. Although not required, we encourage courts to explain their credibility assessments under prong three when doing so would further the interests of justice. After reviewing the record in this case, we are not persuaded the court's credibility assessment is clearly erroneous.
III
[¶19] Carpenter argues the district court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial. He claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by referencing inadmissible prior bad act evidence during opening statements.
[¶20] “The purpose of an opening statement is to inform the jury what the case is all about and to outline to it the proof which the State expects to present, so that the jurors may more intelligently follow the testimony as it is presented.” State v. Lyman, 2022 ND 160, ¶ 6, 978 N.W.2d 734 (quoting State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55, 62 (N.D. 1967)); see also N.D.R.Ct. 6.2. North Dakota Rule of Evidence 404(b) proscribes the use of evidence of prior bad acts to show the defendant has a propensity to commit crime. State v. Villazana, 2024 ND 211, ¶ 12, 14 N.W.3d 76. Violation of Rule 404(b) can rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Gaddie v. State, 2024 ND 170, ¶ 18, 11 N.W.3d 21. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct require the defendant show: “(1) the prosecutor's actions constitute misconduct, and (2) the misconduct had a prejudicial effect.” Id. ¶ 9. Whether facts rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct is an issue we review de novo. Id.
[¶21] The prosecutor in this case told the jury that, based on Carpenter's rank and responsibilities, “he should not have been partying with lower ranked enlisted soldiers. But you're going to hear that he had been doing this kind of thing with those lower enlisted soldiers[.]” Carpenter objected. Outside the presence of the jury, he moved for a mistrial arguing the statement constituted prosecutorial misconduct because it violated a pretrial order declaring inadmissible allegations that one of the victims woke up to Carpenter inappropriately touching her in a hotel bed on a different occasion. The district court denied Carpenter's motion. The court explained the statement did not violate the pretrial order because it did not describe the sexual assault allegations.
[¶22] Carpenter argues the district court should have declared a mistrial because the prosecutor's use of the words “this kind of thing” in his opening statement was deliberately ambiguous and meant to “insinuate the prior bad act” the court ruled inadmissible. However, Carpenter does not claim the jury actually heard any evidence about the prior incident or those sexual assault allegations. A single comment that could possibly support the inference of some indeterminate prior bad act is not the type of behavior that rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Kruckenberg, 2008 ND 212, ¶ 20, 758 N.W.2d 427 (explaining inappropriate comments standing alone do not warrant reversal). The prosecutor's comment in this case accurately described evidence the jury ultimately heard—that Carpenter was at a hotel party with enlisted soldiers. The court did not err when it denied Carpenter's motion for a mistrial.
IV
[¶23] Carpenter argues the district court erred when it denied his N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 motion. He asserts the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for gross sexual imposition because the State did not meet its burden of showing he knew or had reasonable cause to believe N.C. was unaware he was committing a sexual act upon her as required by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-03(1)(c).
[¶24] “Rule 29 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the court to acquit the defendant when the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” State v. McAllister, 2020 ND 48, ¶ 29, 939 N.W.2d 502. This Court applies the following standard when reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence:
When the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction is challenged, this Court merely reviews the record to determine if there is competent evidence allowing the trier of fact to draw an inference reasonably tending to prove guilt and fairly warranting a conviction. The defendant bears the burden of showing the evidence reveals no reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. When considering insufficiency of the evidence, we will not reweigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses․ A trier of fact may find a defendant guilty even though evidence exists which, if believed, could lead to a verdict of not guilty.
State v. Nelson, 2023 ND 217, ¶ 5, 997 N.W.2d 849 (quoting City of Napoleon v. Kuhn, 2015 ND 75, ¶ 14, 860 N.W.2d 460).
[¶25] M.F., another soldier present at the party, provided testimony describing N.C. that evening as having “slurred speech,” as “clearly intoxicated,” and as “stumbling around the room” and “mumbling.” Other soldiers provided similar testimony. M.F. observed that toward the end of the evening N.C. was confused and “was not knowing what was going on at that time.” She heard N.C. call another soldier and ask him where he went despite the fact that N.C. had sent him home earlier that evening. M.F. testified Carpenter entered the room where she, N.C., and another woman were trying to sleep. She stated that N.C. kissed Carpenter while he was leaning over her, but M.F. thought N.C. was confused at that point. M.F. then heard “sounds that were not just kissing,” that it “was starting to move into sexual intercourse,” and she became “really afraid” because she “knew that [N.C.] was not capable of consenting to anything of the sorts.” M.F. heard N.C. express pain, Carpenter telling N.C. to be quiet, and then the two moving into an adjoining room. R.H. testified she found N.C. naked the next morning, with no covers, still intoxicated, and unable to do her hair, put her clothes on, or tie her boots. N.C. testified that she has no memory of the incident.
[¶26] The jury was presented with conflicting evidence. It heard N.C. initiated a kiss with Carpenter. But it also heard that N.C. was confused and did not know what was happening. Multiple witnesses testified N.C. was inebriated. Inebriation will not always equate to a lack of awareness, but here there was other circumstantial evidence of guilt, including direct testimony about N.C.’s confused state of mind that evening and her inability to function when she was found naked the next morning. “This Court does not sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ to make independent determinations of credibility of witnesses or other evidentiary weight.” State v. Stridiron, 2010 ND 19, ¶ 31, 777 N.W.2d 892 (quoting State v. Barendt, 2007 ND 164, ¶ 21, 740 N.W.2d 87). “[O]ur ability to examine a cold record is a poor substitute for the fact finder's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” Interest of T.J.K., 1999 ND 152, ¶ 17, 598 N.W.2d 781. We are required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. Nelson, 2023 ND 217, ¶ 5, 997 N.W.2d 849. After reviewing the record, we are not persuaded the evidence reveals no reasonable inference of guilt. There is evidence to support a finding that Carpenter knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, N.C. was unaware he was committing a sexual act upon her. The district court did not err when it denied Carpenter's N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 motion.
V
[¶27] The remaining issues are either without merit or are unnecessary to our decision. The State provided gender-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges. The district court's finding that those explanations were credible is not clearly erroneous. The prosecutor's comment during opening statements about Carpenter being present at a hotel party with enlisted soldiers does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. The evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. The judgment is affirmed.
Jensen, Justice.
[¶28] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese
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Docket No: No. 20260021
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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