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STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Royal Crazyhorse ROCKEFELLER, Defendant and Appellant
[¶1] Royal Rockefeller appeals a criminal judgment entered after a jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated assault. On appeal, Rockefeller argues the district court erred by ordering a physician to testify about the victim's injuries in violation of the physician-patient privilege, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by making a “golden rule” argument in its opening statement. We affirm.
I
[¶2] The State charged Rockefeller with aggravated assault, a class C felony, under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-02(1)(a). The charge arose from an assault in downtown Fargo on the night of August 4, 2025. The victim called 911 and reported he had just been assaulted. The responding officer found the victim covered in blood; the victim had a large laceration on his forehead between his eyes and a second large laceration on the back of his head. Security video from a nearby bank recorded the assault. The next day, officers found Rockefeller a few blocks from the scene wearing clothing and a chain necklace matching those worn by the assailant in the video. The victim did not testify at trial.
[¶3] On the night of the assault, the victim signed a Sanford Health “Authorization for Disclosure of Protected Health Information” form. The form authorized Sanford Health to release information to the Fargo Police Department for a “Legal” purpose. “Abstract” was marked on the form under “Information to be Released.” The form defined “Abstract” to include test results, labs, ER notes, and provider notes. The form separately listed “Radiology Reports” and “Radiology Images,” but those categories were not marked. The form did not reference testimony.
[¶4] Before trial, Rockefeller filed a motion in limine to exclude the victim's medical records and any medical testimony about the victim's injuries. The motion argued the evidence was hearsay, violated the Confrontation Clause, and was unfairly prejudicial under N.D.R.Ev. 403. The motion did not assert the physician-patient privilege under N.D.R.Ev. 503. At the pretrial conference, defense counsel told the district court the “primary concern” of the motion was evidence identifying Rockefeller as the assailant. Counsel later stated:
But it sounds like the State and I have more or less agreed that the medical records and medical testimony would be admissible under the medical records exception. So I would stipulate and agree to those, but I made it very clear with the State that any officer or medical professional, 911 call that identifies Mr. Rockefeller from the victim, who is not anticipated to testify, should not be included, if that make[s] sense.
[¶5] The parties agreed defense counsel would prepare a stipulation resolving the motion. The parties never filed a written stipulation. On the second day of trial, the court noted the motion was “withdrawn based on oral stipulation of the parties.”
[¶6] At trial, the State began its opening statement:
It's autumn. It's August 4th, 2025. I want you to come with me; put yourself in the shoes of [the victim]. You're walking down the street in downtown Fargo, Broadway between Main Avenue and NP. It's about 10:15 at night, it's dark out, you're by yourself, and you're minding your own business, when all of a sudden you get punched in the back of the head. Before you know what's happening, before you know what's going on, a second punch.
You turn around and you see your assailant, but you don't know who it is. It's a stranger. You don't recognize this person. They're not a friend, a family member. You try to reason with them, and then—a third punch. Except for this time, it's not the back of your head; it's in your face; in your nose. You stumble backwards, and as you're falling—a fourth punch.
That's what happened to [the victim] August 4th, 2025, just downtown; right over there.
[¶7] Rockefeller did not object to the State's opening statement. In his own opening statement, defense counsel told the jury, “We're not even going to dispute the fact that the victim suffered serious injuries here that rose to the level of serious bodily injury.”
[¶8] The State called Dr. Bryn Putbrese, a radiologist who reviewed the victim's CT images on the date of the assault, as a witness. When the State asked her to describe the injuries she observed, Dr. Putbrese answered: “Pursuant to HIPAA, I'm unable to discuss patients’ private medical information without being ordered to do so.” The State asked the court to order her to testify, relying on the authorization the victim signed the night of the assault. The following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: And is there any objection?
MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, the Defense was provided an authorization for disclosure of protected health information for [the victim]. I'll defer to the witness as to her comfort and testifying as to the injuries that the victim suffered.
[¶9] After reviewing the authorization, the district court stated, “Based on that, I will order the testimony at this time.” Dr. Putbrese testified the victim had “multiple facial fractures, mostly involving the nasal region and both orbits[.]” She provided no testimony identifying Rockefeller. After the State rested, the court received the authorization as an exhibit without objection.
[¶10] In closing argument, counsel told the jury, “We're not disputing that [the victim] suffered serious injuries[,]” and “[t]he only important question is, has the State proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual in that video is Royal Rockefeller?” The jury found Rockefeller guilty.
II
[¶11] Rockefeller argues the district court erred by ordering Dr. Putbrese to testify about the victim's injuries because the testimony was protected by the physician-patient privilege. He contends the authorization to release medical information to law enforcement did not waive the evidentiary privilege or authorize the testimony given. He further argues the testimony was prejudicial because it established serious bodily injury.
A
[¶12] This Court's review of a district court's evidentiary ruling is well-established:
This Court reviews a district court's evidentiary ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. A district court has broad discretion on evidentiary matters, and we will not overturn its admission or exclusion of evidence on appeal unless that discretion has been abused. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.
Hoff v. State, 2024 ND 235, ¶ 7, 14 N.W.3d 892 (quoting State v. Yousif, 2022 ND 234, ¶ 5, 982 N.W.2d 870).
[¶13] A party claiming error in a ruling admitting evidence must timely object and state the specific ground for the objection, unless the ground is apparent from the context. N.D.R.Ev. 103(a)(1). “If a party does not timely object, the issue is not preserved for review.” State v. Guthmiller, 2025 ND 162, ¶ 8, 26 N.W.3d 548 (quoting State v. Gaddie, 2022 ND 44, ¶ 4, 971 N.W.2d 811). This Court recognizes different categories of unpreserved error. “Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right, while waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a right.” Id. (quoting State v. Pulkrabek, 2022 ND 128, ¶ 7, 975 N.W.2d 572). “Although this Court may review forfeited errors for obvious error, this Court does not review waived errors.” Id. (citations omitted); see also N.D.R.Ev. 103(e) (“A court may take notice of an error affecting a substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.”). “The obvious error analysis under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b) does not apply to errors waived through the doctrine of invited error.” Guthmiller, ¶ 8 (quoting State v. Wiese, 2024 ND 39, ¶ 8, 4 N.W.3d 242).
B
[¶14] The State argues Rockefeller did not object to Dr. Putbrese's testimony based on N.D.R.Ev. 503 and, thus, that we can only review the alleged error under obvious error. The State does not argue Rockefeller invited the alleged error by affirmatively agreeing before trial that medical testimony would be admissible and withdrawing his motion in limine. See United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining under the doctrine of invited error, if a party “agrees to the admissibility of certain evidence, he cannot later complain that any resulting error is reversible”); see also United States v. Little, 119 F.4th 750, 776 (10th Cir. 2024) (a defendant who agreed to preadmit evidence of a handgun found in his truck and messages he sent waived his challenge to that evidence under the invited-error doctrine); Louidor v. State, 162 So. 3d 305, 311 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (“While simply failing to object to the admission and play-back of the DVD would not have triggered the doctrine of invited error, affirmatively agreeing to the admission and play-back of the DVD did trigger application of the doctrine.”); Moore v. State, 436 So. 3d 715, 720 (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) (concluding invited error doctrine barred defendant's challenge to the admission of a crime lab report when he stipulated to its admission); cf. State v. Roe, 2014 ND 104, ¶ 14, 846 N.W.2d 707 (recognizing “a party may waive his or her right to confrontation by stipulating to the admission of certain evidence”). Because the State did not argue Rockefeller invited Dr. Putbrese's testimony, and Rockefeller did not have the opportunity to respond to the issue, we do not consider whether he waived the alleged error under the invited error doctrine.
C
[¶15] Rockefeller argues he was not required to object to Dr. Putbrese's testimony because the physician-patient privilege belongs to the patient, not Rockefeller, and Dr. Putbrese invoked the privilege on the victim's behalf. The State responds that Rockefeller lacks standing to assert the physician-patient privilege as a shield against prosecution.
[¶16] Under N.D.R.Ev. 503(b), “[a] patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's physical, mental, or emotional condition[.]” The privilege is “intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him in making a full disclosure to the physician as to his symptoms and condition[.]” Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885, 894 (N.D. 1974) (quoting Booren v. McWilliams, 26 N.D. 558, 145 N.W. 410, 414 (1914)). Under N.D.R.Ev. 503(c), the privilege “may be claimed by the patient, the patient's guardian or conservator, or the personal representative of a deceased patient.” A physician is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege “but only on behalf of the patient.” Id.
[¶17] Because the privilege belongs to the patient, other courts have held a criminal defendant may not assert a victim's physician-patient privilege. See, e.g., State v. Miles, 211 Ariz. 475, 123 P.3d 669, 673 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (agreeing with “most, if not all, courts” that “a criminal defendant does not have standing to assert the privilege on the victim's behalf in an attempt to shield himself or herself from prosecution”); Wimberley v. State, 217 Ark. 130, 228 S.W.2d 991, 993 (1950) (“[T]he doctrine of privilege is for the benefit of the patient, and ․ the defendant in a criminal prosecution cannot object to the testimony of a physician concerning information gained from the victim by the physician in his professional capacity.”); People v. Palomo, 31 P.3d 879, 885 (Colo. 2001) (stating the defendant may not assert the privilege “to raise issues concerning the medical records in [the victim's] file”); Goodwin v. State, 573 N.E.2d 895, 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“The statutory psychologist/patient privilege is held by the patient or her legal representative, and may only be asserted by her or her representative.”); State v. Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding “that the physician-patient privilege is personal and may not be invoked by a criminal defendant to shield himself from prosecution”); In re Grand Jury Proc. (Doe), 56 N.Y.2d 348, 352, 437 N.E.2d 1118, 1120, 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (1982) (stating “a person or entity subject to proceedings for having committed crimes against an individual should not be permitted to assert the victim's physician-patient privilege as a bar to production of relevant medical records or testimony”); State v. Boehme, 71 Wash. 2d 621, 636–37, 430 P.2d 527, 536 (1967) (stating the purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to protect the patient and “should not, by unrealistic or impractical application, become a means whereby criminal activities of third persons may be shielded from detection, prosecution, and punishment”); State v. Echols, 152 Wis.2d 725, 449 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding a murder defendant lacked standing to object that a witness's therapist testified in violation of the witness's privilege because “a party has no standing to complain that testimony or other evidence will violate another person's privilege”).
[¶18] We agree with these courts. Rule 503(c), N.D.R.Ev., does not authorize a criminal defendant to claim the patient's privilege. “Allowing a criminal defendant to exclude relevant medical evidence by asserting the privilege of a victim who has not expressed any concerns about confidentiality would convert the privilege into a tool for shielding criminal activity from prosecution and would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d at 298. “By contrast, the purpose underlying the physician-patient privilege would be minimally frustrated, if at all, by not allowing a defendant to invoke the victim's privilege.” Id.
[¶19] The privilege belonged to the victim, not Rockefeller. If the district court erred in compelling Dr. Putbrese's testimony, that error infringed the victim's privilege, not a privilege belonging to Rockefeller. Rockefeller cannot take advantage of the alleged error. See United States v. Skolek, 474 F.2d 582, 584–85 (10th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (holding the defendant could not “take advantage of an error of the court in overruling” a witness's privilege because “[t]he privilege belonged to [the witness], not to [the defendant]”); Shinsky v. State, 250 Ark. 620, 466 S.W.2d 911, 913 (1971) (holding the defendant could not “take advantage of any error of the court in denying the privilege to the witness”); Goodwin, 573 N.E.2d at 897 (holding the rape victim's psychologist-patient privilege “may only be asserted by her or her representative” and “may not be used as a weapon by one accused of raping her”); cf. Torkelson v. Byrne, 68 N.D. 13, 276 N.W. 134, 138 (1937) (holding a party could not “take advantage of such error inasmuch as the privilege is purely personal to the elector”).
[¶20] Rockefeller relies on State v. Moore, 52 N.D. 633, 204 N.W. 341, 342 (1924), which held the trial court erred in receiving a physician's testimony concerning the defendant's examination and ordered a new trial. In Moore, the defendant was the patient, and he objected at trial on the ground the physician's testimony was privileged. 204 N.W. at 341–42. Moore does not stand for the proposition that a criminal defendant can take advantage of a victim's physician-patient privilege to shield himself from prosecution. Rockefeller cited no authority that supports that proposition.
[¶21] Rockefeller may not assert the victim's physician-patient privilege.
III
[¶22] Rockefeller argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by making an improper “golden rule” argument in the State's opening statement, inviting jurors to put themselves in the victim's shoes and depriving him of a fair trial.
[¶23] Rockefeller concedes he did not preserve this issue because he did not object to the State's opening statement. We have explained:
When there has been no objection to a prosecutor's argument, we do not reverse unless the challenged remarks constitute obvious error affecting a defendant's substantial rights․ In deciding if there was obvious error, we consider the probable effect of the prosecutor's improper comments on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly.
State v. Massey, 2024 ND 118, ¶ 14, 8 N.W.3d 308 (quoting State v. Evans, 1999 ND 70, ¶ 9, 593 N.W.2d 336).
[¶24] “A ‘golden rule’ argument asks jurors to place themselves in the shoes of a party, which is improper and should be avoided in both civil and criminal actions.” Massey, 2024 ND 118, ¶ 16, 8 N.W.3d 308. Such an argument is “universally condemned because it encourages the jury to ‘depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.’ ” United States v. Palma, 473 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lovett ex rel. Lovett v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 201 F.3d 1074, 1083 (8th Cir. 2000)).
[¶25] The State acknowledges the prosecutor's comments were “likely improper,” but argues they do not require reversal. The State emphasizes the comments occurred only once, during the opening statement, and were not repeated during closing argument. The State argues the evidence against Rockefeller was substantial and the opening statement did not affect the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
[¶26] The State's opening statement was improper. The prosecutor asked the jurors to “put yourself in the shoes of [the victim]” and then described the assault in the second person. See Massey, 2024 ND 118, ¶¶ 16–17, 8 N.W.3d 308. Because Rockefeller did not object, the question under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b) is whether the district court obviously erred by not intervening in the State's opening statement.
[¶27] Absent an objection, a district court's failure to intervene and stop an opening statement or closing argument will seldom rise to the level of obvious error. A district court has broad discretion over the progress and conduct of a trial. State v. Kennedy, 2025 ND 130, ¶ 31, 23 N.W.3d 878. That discretion extends to the scope of opening statements and closing arguments. State v. Driver, 2024 ND 48, ¶ 8, 4 N.W.3d 551; Zander v. Morsette, 2024 ND 80, ¶ 18, 6 N.W.3d 623. “A judge's role is to assure fairness and uphold due process throughout the proceedings.” Kennedy, ¶ 17. The parties, not the district court, are responsible for making objections. Id. ¶ 16. Absent an objection, a district court is ordinarily not required on its own initiative to interrupt counsel's opening statement or closing argument, although it certainly has discretion to do so. Blessum v. Shelver, 1997 ND 152, ¶ 35, 567 N.W.2d 844 (concluding the district court “was not required on its own initiative to interrupt the closing argument by Blessum's attorney, although it certainly could have done so”); see also Kennedy, ¶¶ 17–18 (explaining a trial judge may diminish the appearance of justice and impartiality by intervening in the proceeding, and doing so may also “usurp the role of counsel and hinder counsel's trial strategy”); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (“[I]nterruptions of arguments, either by an opposing counsel or the presiding judge, are matters to be approached cautiously.”). “There may be occasions when a party [makes a statement or argument] that is so prejudicial the court should intervene despite the lack of an objection.” Kennedy, ¶ 18. But a district court has great discretion in deciding whether to intervene and highlight a statement or argument by counsel when not invited to do so by a party.
[¶28] On the specific facts of this case—the jury instructions; the improper statement occurred once; the improper statement occurred at the start of the State's opening statement; and the only contested issue was the assailant's identity—Rockefeller has not demonstrated the district court erred by not addressing the State's opening statement when Rockefeller did not object to it. [¶29] Rockefeller may not assert the victim's physician-patient privilege. Although the State made an improper “golden rule” argument in its opening statement, Rockefeller has not established the district court obviously erred by not intervening in the State's opening statement. Rockefeller's remaining arguments are unnecessary to our decision or are without merit. We affirm the judgment.
IV
[¶29] Rockefeller may not assert the victim's physician-patient privilege. Although the State made an improper “golden rule” argument in its opening statement, Rockefeller has not established the district court obviously erred by not intervening in the State's opening statement. Rockefeller's remaining arguments are unnecessary to our decision or are without merit. We affirm the judgment.
Bahr, Justice.
[¶30] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese
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Docket No: No. 20260080
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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