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Sheila K. Boyda N/k/a Sheila K. TINDALL, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Joseph A. BOYDA, Defendant and Appellant State of North Dakota, Statutory Real Party in Interest
[¶1] Joseph Boyda (“Boyda”) appeals from an amended judgment modifying parenting time entered after our remand in Boyda v. Boyda, 2025 ND 193, 27 N.W.3d 706. Boyda argues the district court violated the mandate rule, failed to conduct a meaningful review, and erred in modifying his parenting time by delegating its authority and applying undefined standards. He also renews his challenge to findings we affirmed in the first appeal. Sheila Boyda, now Sheila Tindall (“Tindall”), requests an award of attorney's fees for defending a meritless appeal. We affirm the amended judgment and award Tindall double costs and $1,000 in attorney's fees.
I
[¶2] Boyda and Tindall married in 2005. They have two minor children and one adult child. The parties divorced in 2016. The district court entered judgment, awarding Tindall primary residential responsibility of the children subject to Boyda's right to reasonable and flexible parenting time. In December 2020, Boyda moved back to Fargo and parenting time resumed on an every-other-weekend daytime schedule.
[¶3] In May 2024, Boyda moved for contempt, alleging Tindall violated the parenting plan. Tindall responded and moved to modify parenting time and require Boyda to undergo a mental examination under N.D.R.Civ.P. 35. After evidentiary hearings, the district court denied Boyda's contempt motion, ordered a mental examination, and imposed a three-step parenting plan beginning with supervised visits.
[¶4] Boyda appealed. We affirmed the contempt denial, mental examination requirement, and decision to modify parenting time. But we reversed the stepped plan, concluding that “the district court's order fully delegates to the therapist what recommendations can be imposed on Joseph Boyda, and unilaterally permits the therapist to prevent Joseph Boyda from moving to the next step,” and that “[f]or each delegation, the district court did not provide the therapist with criteria for completion of each step.” Boyda, 2025 ND 193, ¶¶ 22-23. We remanded “for re-creation of a court-supervised plan for Joseph Boyda's stepped parenting time.” Id. ¶ 23.
[¶5] On remand, the same district court judge presided over the proceedings. Boyda moved “to enforce Supreme Court mandate and for judicial reassignment pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 63,” and “for court-ordered parent-child communication.” The district court denied the motions, concluding as to the communication motion that “[s]uch relief goes beyond the scope of ․ remand.”
[¶6] At the status conference, Boyda requested an evidentiary hearing. The district court declined to hold one, noting the remand was ordered to revise the decision-making authority improperly delegated to the therapist, and allowed the parties to file proposed revised orders. Boyda filed two written offers of proof, a request for written findings, and a 48-page proposed parenting plan requesting, in part, equal residential responsibility. Tindall filed proposed findings and an objection to the offers of proof.
[¶7] On February 17, 2026, the district court entered its order on remand (“Remand Order”). The court denied Boyda's post-remand requests, concluding they “go beyond the scope of the Remand.” The Remand Order carried forward the findings of fact from the 2024 order and the requirement that Boyda submit to a psychological evaluation and a parental capacity evaluation.
[¶8] Step 1 maintained Boyda's supervised parenting time (up to four hours every other weekend and two hours on one weekday each week) for at least 120 days. As before, to move to Step 2, Boyda must “exercise all the parenting time (minimum of 3 hours per week) during the entire 120-day period.” The Remand Order revised the remaining requirements for advancing to Step 2. The previous order stated, “Upon successful completion of the recommendations and with the approval of the children's therapists, Joseph shall begin Step 2.” The Remand Order now provides that Boyda “shall move the [c]ourt and provide proof of his progress,” that his therapists “are encouraged to provide letters of recommendation,” and that the court “shall determine if Joseph has sufficiently met the requirements of Step 1. Upon judicial approval, Joseph shall begin Step 2.”
[¶9] Step 2 maintained unsupervised, non-overnight parenting time: two hours on one weekday every week, and every other Saturday from 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., and Sunday from 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. The previous order provided, “Unless required by the therapist for parenting time to be public or with family, this non-overnight parenting time need not be exercised in a public setting or with family.” The Remand Order removed that provision and replaced it with “This non-overnight parenting time need not be exercised in a public setting or with family,” but Tindall may move to require that time be exercised in public or with family. To move to Step 3, the previous order required Boyda to satisfy the therapists’ recommendations and gain their approval. The Remand Order provides that “[u]pon completion of 120 days of Step 2,” Boyda may apply to the court for Step 3, and that the court “may give due consideration to, but is not bound by the recommendation of the therapist.” Step 3 maintained unsupervised, overnight parenting time: every other weekend from Friday at 4:00 p.m. or after school until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., and every Tuesday from 4:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m.
[¶10] The district court entered an order amending judgment and the amended judgment. Boyda appealed from the Remand Order, which we treat as an appeal from the consistent amended judgment. Taylor v. Taylor, 2022 ND 39, ¶ 6, 970 N.W.2d 209.
II
[¶11] Boyda argues the district court violated the mandate rule and failed to conduct a meaningful review on remand because it did not hold an evidentiary hearing. “The mandate rule requires the district court to follow the appellate court's pronouncements on legal issues in subsequent proceedings in the case and to carry the appellate court's mandate into effect according to its terms.” Pennington v. Cont'l Res., Inc., 2021 ND 105, ¶ 10, 961 N.W.2d 264. We retain “the authority to decide whether the district court scrupulously and fully carried out the mandate's terms.” Id. “[W]hen we remand for redetermination of an issue without specifying the procedure to be followed, the district court may decide the issue based on the evidence already before it or may take additional evidence.” Sorenson v. Slater, 2011 ND 216, ¶ 9, 806 N.W.2d 183. “The decision whether to take additional evidence is within the district court's discretion, and its determination will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Id. A remand is not an invitation to the court “to re-adjudicate matters previously decided.” Berdahl v. Berdahl, 2024 ND 73, ¶ 5, 5 N.W.3d 778; see also Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2012 ND 203, ¶¶ 18-19, 821 N.W.2d 760.
[¶12] The scope of our mandate was narrow: “the district court improperly delegated its authority [to the therapist] and we reverse and remand for recreation of a court-supervised plan for Joseph Boyda's stepped parenting time.” Boyda, 2025 ND 193, ¶ 23. The Remand Order removes the therapist's veto and replaces it with express judicial control: “The Court shall determine if Joseph has sufficiently met the requirements of Step 1. Upon judicial approval, Joseph shall begin Step 2.” “In determining whether to approve or deny Joseph's move to Step 3 parenting time, the Court may give due consideration to, but is not bound by the recommendation of the therapist.” The court complied with the mandate, re-creating a court-supervised plan rather than the primarily therapist-supervised plan previously ordered.
[¶13] Boyda's reading of “re-creation” as necessarily requiring a new evidentiary hearing finds no support in the mandate's words or the case law. Our decision did not require an additional evidentiary hearing, and the district court was free to re-create the parenting plan on the existing record. See Kautzman v. Kautzman, 2000 ND 116, ¶ 8, 611 N.W.2d 883. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Boyda's request to hold an evidentiary hearing.
[¶14] Boyda also argues the district court failed to conduct a meaningful review because it did not substantively analyze his post-remand filings. As proof, he points to the date on the Remand Order, which precedes his filings.
[¶15] Although the Remand Order is dated January 17, 2026, the notice of entry of order shows that the Remand Order was entered February 17, 2026, after all submissions. Boyda's inference that the court did not review his submissions does not survive review of that document. Moreover, the Remand Order specifically references documents filed after January 17. The January 17 date is a clerical mistake and, at most, harmless error under N.D.R.Civ.P. 61. Boyda's offers of proof went to the credibility of testimony at the 2024 evidentiary hearing, bearing on findings we affirmed. That material was outside the remand's scope on any reading. Boyda's proposed parenting plan requested equal residential responsibility on a “week-on/week-off rotation ․ [e]ffective immediately upon the entry of this Order.” Residential responsibility was not before the district court on remand. A submission seeking that relief supports rather than undermines the court's conclusion that Boyda's post-remand filings “go beyond the scope of the Remand.” We conclude the district court did not err in its remand proceedings.
III
[¶16] Boyda argues the district court erred in re-creating the parenting plan. “A district court's parenting time decision is a finding of fact and will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous.” Vetter v. Vetter, 2026 ND 36, ¶ 9, 31 N.W.3d 662. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence to support it, if the finding is induced by an erroneous view of the law, or if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id.
A
[¶17] Boyda argues the district court improperly delegated judicial authority over parenting time.
[¶18] A district court generally “cannot delegate to anyone the power to decide questions of child custody or related issues.” Paulson v. Paulson, 2005 ND 72, ¶ 21, 694 N.W.2d 681. An order that invites a professional's recommendation but reserves the decision to the court does not improperly delegate that authority. See Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 26, ¶ 40, 778 N.W.2d 786.
[¶19] On remand, the district court removed the provisions requiring therapist approval before moving to the next step and replaced them with provisions inviting therapist recommendations while reserving approval to the court. The Remand Order states that the therapists “are encouraged to provide letters of recommendation,” but that the court “shall determine if Joseph has sufficiently met the requirements of Step 1. Upon judicial approval, Joseph shall begin Step 2.” When Boyda applies to the court to move to Step 3, the court “may give due consideration to, but is not bound by the recommendation of the therapist.” The Remand Order makes therapist letters of recommendation permissive and vests the decision in the court. That is Wolt’s invited-recommendation structure, 2010 ND 26, ¶ 40, not Paulson’s grant of wide authority to “set the visitation schedule, carte blanche,” 2005 ND 72, ¶ 21. Cf. Vetter, 2026 ND 36, ¶¶ 15-17 (reversing a parenting plan that delegated the parenting time decision to a therapist and the minor child). Requiring a motion between steps keeps the decision with the court. In Wolt, ¶ 40, we construed a provision for counselor recommendations as neither limiting the parent's access to the court nor an improper delegation. The court also removed the provision giving the therapist unilateral authority to require that Boyda exercise his Step 2 parenting time in public or with family.
[¶20] We conclude the Remand Order does not improperly delegate judicial authority over parenting time.
B
[¶21] Boyda argues the parenting plan is indefinite, unworkable, and lacks defined standards. He claims the plan sets “minimum durations for early stages but no fixed endpoint for restoration of normal parenting time,” does not define sufficient “progress,” permits renewed motion practice on changed circumstances, and imposes cumulative supervision, therapy, and evaluation costs with no defined end.
[¶22] The parenting plan fixes a schedule for each step, a 120-day minimum for Steps 1 and 2, a make-up mechanism for missed Step 1 time with a stated extension formula, and a terminal step: “Step 3. After Court confirmed completion of Step 2, and thereafter, Joseph shall have alternating weekends with the children” and “every Tuesday” evening, all of which is “unsupervised.” That is a defined endpoint approximating ordinary parenting time. To complete Step 1, Boyda must provide “proof of his progress, including whether or not he has completed supervised parenting time hours and completed the recommendations of his parental capacity evaluation.” Those are objective criteria. We conclude the district court did not err in providing standards for the parenting plan. We previously affirmed the requirement that Boyda pay for the examination and supervised parenting sessions. Boyda, 2025 ND 193, ¶¶ 16, 30.
IV
[¶23] Boyda challenges several of the district court's findings. The court carried those findings forward unchanged from the 2024 order. In Boyda, we concluded the court's parenting time modification findings “were supported by the children's testimony and other evidence” and not clearly erroneous. 2025 ND 193, ¶ 13. “Under the law of the case doctrine, a party cannot on a second appeal relitigate issues which were resolved by the Court in the first appeal or which would have been resolved had they been properly presented in the first appeal.” Kortum v. Johnson, 2010 ND 153, ¶ 9, 786 N.W.2d 702 (cleaned up). Under the law of the case doctrine and mandate rule, Boyda could not continue to challenge those findings on remand or in this second appeal. See id. ¶¶ 6-10; Pennington, 2021 ND 105, ¶¶ 15-20.
V
[¶24] Tindall requests attorney's fees under N.D.R.App.P. 38, which allows the Court to “award just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees,” if it determines an appeal is frivolous. “An appeal is frivolous if it is flagrantly groundless, devoid of merit, or demonstrates persistence in the course of litigation which evidences bad faith.” Buchholz v. Buchholz, 2022 ND 203, ¶ 43, 982 N.W.2d 275 (quoting Harty Ins., Inc. v. Holmes, 2022 ND 45, ¶ 2, 971 N.W.2d 400).
[¶25] Our mandate on remand was narrow: the district court was to re-create a court-supervised stepped parenting plan without the improper delegation to the therapist. Boyda's challenges to the remand proceedings and to the re-created parenting plan are not so devoid of merit that he should have understood success on appeal would be impossible. See Bauer v. Adam, 2026 ND 67, ¶ 21, 33 N.W.3d 1. But we may award costs and attorney's fees under N.D.R.App.P. 38 when an argument on appeal “is devoid of merit and demonstrates persistence in the course of litigation which evidences bad faith,” even though other arguments in the appeal are not frivolous. Orwig v. Orwig, 2023 ND 113, ¶ 47, 992 N.W.2d 552; see Buchholz, 2022 ND 203, ¶ 43.
[¶26] Boyda's challenge to the district court's findings is such an argument. In the first appeal, we held the findings supporting the modification of parenting time “were supported by the children's testimony and other evidence” and were not clearly erroneous. Boyda, 2025 ND 193, ¶ 13. On remand, Boyda attacked the credibility of the hearing testimony underlying those findings through two written offers of proof. In this appeal, he challenges the same findings again. Boyda's challenge to the findings is flagrantly groundless and devoid of merit, and it demonstrates persistence in the course of litigation evidencing bad faith. See Orwig, 2023 ND 113, ¶ 48 (awarding damages and double costs for an argument “specifically decided” in a prior appeal). We award Tindall double costs and $1,000 in attorney's fees.
VI
[¶27] Any remaining issues are either unnecessary to the decision or without merit. We affirm the amended judgment and award Tindall double costs and $1,000 in attorney's fees.
[¶28] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J.
Jerod E. Tufte
Jon J. Jensen
Douglas A. Bahr
Mark A. Friese
Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.
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Docket No: No. 20260126
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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