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Douglas Stramer, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Todd Stramer as an individual, as trustee of the Elaine Stramer Irrevocable Trust, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Elaine Stramer, Defendant and Appellant Ann Stramer, as an individual and as Power of Attorney for Elaine Stramer, Defendant and Appellee
IN RE: the Estate of Elaine E. Stramer, Deceased Todd Stramer, Former Personal Representative, Petitioner, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee v. Ann Stramer, Respondent, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant Douglas Stramer; Respondent and Appellee
Matthew Stramer; and Steve Stramer, Personal Representative, Respondents IN RE: the Elaine Stramer Irrevocable Trust Ann Stramer, Petitioner, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant v. Todd Stramer, Respondent, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee Douglas Stramer; Respondent and Appellee Matthew Stramer and Steve Stramer, Respondents
[¶1] Todd Stramer appeals and Ann Stramer cross-appeals from judgments entered after a bench trial. We affirm in part, concluding the district court did not clearly err in finding that Todd Stramer was not actively farming and thus did not validly exercise his option to purchase the farm. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in removing Todd Stramer as trustee and personal representative. We reverse in part, concluding the court clearly erred in finding that Douglas Stramer's option to purchase included the 25 acres identified in the plat, misapplied the law on damages, and erred in failing to award damages for Todd Stramer's wrongful occupation of the farm from 2023 to 2025. We remand for the court to amend judgment to state that Douglas Stramer shall have the option to purchase the 5.96 acres identified in Exhibit T, and to determine damages for the wrongful occupation.
I
[¶2] William Stramer and Elaine Stramer were husband and wife; they had five children: Todd Stramer, Ann Stramer, Douglas Stramer, Steve Stramer, and Matthew Stramer. In July 2013, William Stramer and Elaine Stramer executed mirror-image wills. The wills granted Douglas Stramer the option to purchase the farmyard surrounding his house, which may be identified by a plat or survey. The wills provided Todd Stramer the option to purchase the remaining farmland for $100 per acre within one year of the surviving spouse's death if he moved back to North Dakota and “actively farm[ed]” the land. If Todd Stramer exercised his option, he also received the machinery, equipment, and any balance in the checking account.
[¶3] In 2014, Douglas Stramer and his parents discussed his purchasing additional land surrounding his home for his beekeeping operation. Douglas Stramer reduced the discussion to a writing that he and his parents signed in September 2014. In November 2014, Douglas Stramer paid for a survey and plat identifying 25 acres around his house.
[¶4] William Stramer died in January 2015, and Todd Stramer moved back to North Dakota. On March 11, 2015, Elaine Stramer disclaimed any interest in William Stramer's estate. Under William Stramer's will, the disclaimed assets were distributed to the William M. Stramer Disclaimer Trust (“Disclaimer Trust”), and Elaine Stramer was appointed trustee of the Disclaimer Trust, followed by Todd Stramer if she was unwilling or unable. Upon Elaine Stramer's death, the Disclaimer Trust property was to be distributed in equal shares to Matthew Stramer, Todd Stramer, Steve Stramer, and Ann Stramer. On the same day Elaine Stramer disclaimed William Stramer's assets, the Elaine Stramer Irrevocable Trust (“Elaine Stramer Trust”) was created to hold her assets, including her one-half interest in the Stramer farm. The Elaine Stramer Trust named Todd Stramer the trustee and provided him the same option to purchase; Douglas Stramer's option was not included.
[¶5] Elaine Stramer died in November 2022. In January 2023, Todd Stramer commenced an informal probate in Case No. 08-2023-PR-00005 and was appointed personal representative of Elaine Stramer's estate. In February 2023, Douglas Stramer gave notice of his intent to exercise his option. On March 20, 2023, Todd Stramer sent a letter to his parents’ estate planning attorney, Charles Chapman, stating he was exercising his option to purchase the farmland. For the 2023 farming season, instead of leasing the farmland to the Stramers’ longtime renter, Mike Appert, Todd Stramer contracted with Appert to plant corn and soybeans on the property. Todd Stramer did not pay rent; Appert supplied the seeds and planted, sprayed, and harvested the crops using his own employees and equipment. The Elaine Stramer Trust paid for the 2023 farming expenses and reported the profits and losses on its 2023 tax filings.
[¶6] In June 2023, Douglas Stramer filed suit in Case No. 15-2023-CV-00050 to invalidate and rescind the Elaine Stramer Trust alleging lack of capacity and undue influence. In July 2023, Ann Stramer petitioned in the probate case to remove Todd Stramer as personal representative of Elaine Stramer's estate and in Case No. 08-2023-CV-01634 to remove Todd Stramer as trustee of the Elaine Stramer Trust. In August 2023, Chapman notified Ann Stramer's counsel that Todd Stramer was exercising his option and was actively farming the land. In September 2023, Ann Stramer moved for a temporary restraining order prohibiting Todd Stramer from harvesting crops on the Stramer farmland. The district court denied the motion but ordered Todd Stramer to maintain a minimum bank account balance of $233,000—the approximate annual rental value of the farmland—to allow for an adequate remedy if it ultimately determined Todd Stramer did not validly exercise his purchase option.
[¶7] In November 2023, Todd Stramer executed a second written notice stating his intent to exercise his option and sent the notice to the other beneficiaries. In January 2024, Todd Stramer executed two contracts for deed on behalf of William Stramer's estate and the Elaine Stramer Trust, transferring the Stramer farmland to himself.
[¶8] The three cases were consolidated for trial. In July 2025, the district court held a two-day bench trial. The court determined that the Elaine Stramer Trust was void because she lacked the capacity to create the trust; that Douglas Stramer exercised his option to purchase the 25 acres identified by the 2014 plat; that Todd Stramer did not actively farm the land within one year of Elaine Stramer's death and thus did not meet the requirements to exercise his option; that the contracts for deed executed by Todd Stramer were invalid; that Todd Stramer violated his duties as trustee and personal representative and thus was removed from both positions; that Steve Stramer would be appointed trustee and personal representative; and that it had insufficient information to calculate damages for Todd Stramer's use and possession of the farm from 2023 to 2025. Judgments were entered in the three cases.
II
[¶9] No party challenges the district court's finding that Elaine Stramer lacked the capacity to create the Elaine Stramer Trust or the court's determination that the trust is void. Therefore, the relevant document for interpreting Douglas Stramer's and Todd Stramer's options is Elaine Stramer's will. Our standard of review for interpreting a will is well established:
When interpreting a will the primary objective is to determine the testator's intent. Interpretation of an unambiguous will presents a question of law that is fully reviewable on appeal. Whether ambiguity exists is a question of law. A will is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Extrinsic evidence may be considered to resolve an ambiguity. The district court's resolution of an ambiguity is a question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
In re Est. of Almer, 2024 ND 102, ¶ 9, 7 N.W.3d 281 (cleaned up).
[¶10] “An estate may be granted upon a condition, either express or implied, upon performance or breach of which the estate shall either commence, be enlarged, or be defeated.” In re Est. of Paulson, 2012 ND 40, ¶ 8, 812 N.W.2d 476. “A condition precedent must occur before an interest can vest, and if the condition does not occur, the conditional devise is inoperative.” Id. “Words associated with creating a condition precedent include ‘on condition,’ ‘so that,’ ‘provided,’ and other similar language.” Id. Both options contain conditions precedent, requiring certain events to occur before the option is validly exercised and the interest vests.
A
[¶11] Todd Stramer argues the district court erred in finding Douglas Stramer's option included the 25 acres in the 2014 plat.
[¶12] Douglas Stramer's option in Elaine Stramer's will states:
If my son Doug still resides in the house, which he presently occupies on our land, and if he has not previously received conveyance of land around this house, he shall have the option to purchase an amount of acres, adjacent to the house, constituting what the Personal Representative determines, in the sole discretion of the Personal Representative, to be the immediate farmyard for his house; provided, if the land around the house was previously surveyed/platted by us to identify the farmyard, Doug's option shall apply to the surveyed/platted acreage. This option to purchase shall continue until that date which is six months after the date of death of the survivor between my spouse and me; otherwise, the option to purchase shall lapse. The option price shall be $100 per acre, payable in cash, and Doug shall be responsible for any required survey and/or platting expenses, and for all expenses of abstract preparation/update, curative title work, or other costs associated with closing the purchase.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶13] There is no dispute that Douglas Stramer resided in the house on the land and that he provided notice of his intent to exercise his option within six months. Further, no party asserts that the 2014 document, signed by Douglas Stramer and his parents, was a final agreement conveying the land; Douglas Stramer testified it was a “proposal.” The only dispute is whether “the land around the house was previously surveyed/platted by [William and Elaine Stramer] to identify the farmyard.”
[¶14] Todd Stramer contends that the “surveyed/platted acreage” condition precedent was not met. He asserts that the 2014 plat did not “identify the farmyard”; rather, it was created as part of the negotiations between Douglas Stramer and their parents to obtain land in addition to the farmyard. Todd Stramer emphasizes that Douglas Stramer testified that the farmyard is about five acres, not the 25 acres that were surveyed and platted, and that the extra 20 acres were for his beekeeping.
[¶15] The district court determined that Douglas Stramer's option applied to the 25 acres identified in the 2014 plat that his parents told him to have completed:
Doug testified that in the spring of 2014, he had discussions with William and Elaine about purchasing the farm where he lived. Doug testified they discussed his wanting some additional acreage to keep his bees. He indicated his parents told him if he wanted 25 acres, he should have a survey performed. Doug typed a document based on his notes, and it was signed by William, Elaine, and Doug. The date on the document is not entirely clear, but it appears to be a summary of their conversations and has a purchase price of $1,000.00 per acre. This price was to Doug's detriment as the price for exercising his option under William and Elaine's wills was only $100.00. Doug paid to have 25 acres around the Shiermeister farm platted in November 2014.
The court found that the Stramers’ wills “anticipated they might have the farm surveyed/platted for Doug to have more acreage,” and that his option thus includes the 25 platted acres.
[¶16] The district court did not expressly state Douglas Stramer's option was ambiguous; however, it relied on extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of the survey provision. We therefore conclude the court found the provision ambiguous. See Almer, 2024 ND 102, ¶ 9 (“Whether ambiguity exists is a question of law.”). The parties also rely on the evidence presented at trial in interpreting the provision. As a matter of law, the condition precedent—“the land around the house was previously surveyed/platted by [William and Elaine Stramer] to identify the farmyard”—is ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence is needed to resolve it.
[¶17] Douglas Stramer testified that he was unaware of the option and that his parents requested the survey. He argues this uncontested evidence shows that William and Elaine Stramer wanted the surveyed land to pass to him under the option. Douglas Stramer asserts there is no other reasonable basis to have the survey completed. Further, he contends that the wills show the Stramers were considering or planning to sell him land either outright—“if he has not previously received conveyance of land around this house”—or through the option after having the land surveyed and platted.
[¶18] The district court stated, “William and Elaine's wills anticipated they might have the farm surveyed/platted for Doug to have more acreage.” On the basis of the 2014 survey obtained by Douglas Stramer, the court concluded, “The condition precedent occurred.” But the condition precedent was not that “the farm [be] surveyed/platted for Doug to have more acreage.” The survey provision applies only if William and Elaine Stramer survey “the land around the house ․ to identify the farmyard[.]” There is no evidence to support a finding that William and Elaine Stramer completed or requested a survey “to identify the farmyard[.]” To the contrary, Douglas Stramer's testimony and the September 2014 “proposal” signed by him and his parents show the survey was not to identify the “farmyard.”
[¶19] Douglas Stramer is a commercial beekeeper. He testified that in the spring or first part of June 2014 he had discussions with William and Elaine Stramer about purchasing “additional acreage to go with the farm site, so that [he] would have a place to work with bees, set them out, spread them out, do husbandry, feeding.” According to Douglas Stramer, he asked his parents for an “additional 20 acres” beyond the home site, “which would make it 25 acres.” Douglas Stramer testified that acreage would be sufficient for him to continue his beekeeping operation. He also testified his parents agreed to his request and he prepared an “outline” of what they discussed “on the additional acreage and the price.” Referring to the outline (Exhibit Q), Douglas Stramer testified it “is the proposal and what we agreed on.” Douglas Stramer and his parents signed the proposal on September 21, 2014. Douglas Stramer further testified his parents told him to get the land surveyed, so he did. Douglas Stramer testified the proposal accurately reflects what he discussed with his parents.
[¶20] Exhibit Q, the proposal, is in outline form with four numbers followed by letters. Number 1 is “Purchase of farm site where I currently reside.” Letters A and B read:
A. Price previously discussed [a]nd agreed upon. 1. Value agreed upon $1000.00 per acre
B. Additional acreage available at the same price 20 acres
Addressing the proposal during trial, Douglas Stramer provided the following testimony:
Q Okay. And I think you said you wanted to have an additional 20 acres to supplement the farmyard of—I think we've referred to it as the Schiermeister Farm, correct?
A That is under item 1, letter B.
Q Right. So that would make the Schiermeister farmyard approximately five acres?
A Yes.
Later, Douglas Stramer agreed the 25 acres reflected in the plat (Exhibit 11) are basically the farmyard and an additional 20 acres. He also addressed Exhibit T, an aerial photo of the Schiermeister farm where he lives. Douglas Stramer provided the following testimony regarding Exhibit T:
Q Okay. And it indicates that the sort of blocked in area below 68th Street and then west of what appears to be a section line road is approximately 5.96 acres?
A That's what it says here.
Q Okay. Does that appear to be what you would consider the farmyard of where you reside?
A Yes.
Q Okay. So that's accurate as to what the actual farmyard is?
A Yes.
[¶21] The proposal and Douglas Stramer's testimony show he believed the farmyard to be approximately five acres and that his proposal to his parents was to purchase an additional 20 acres “to go with the farm site” for his beekeeping business. His proposal was not to purchase the “land around the house” or the “farmyard,” which is what the option to purchase is limited to. His discussions with his parents and his proposal were to purchase acres in addition to the farmyard. Although William and Elaine Stramer requested the 2014 survey, its purpose was not “to identify the farmyard”; the survey was performed to identify property Douglas Stramer wanted to purchase for his commercial beekeeping business (the farm site and approximately 20 additional acres).
[¶22] Douglas Stramer testified he did not know about the purchase option in the will when he prepared the proposal. When asked if he was aware of the terms of the will when he prepared and signed the proposal, Douglas Stramer responded, “No, sir.” He was later asked, “And again, when that was done, did you have any idea what the terms were in the will?” Douglas Stramer responded, “No.” That testimony is consistent with his earlier testimony that the purpose of the survey was to identify the acres he wanted to purchase for his beekeeping business, not to identify the “farmyard” in the will's option to purchase. His discussions with William and Elaine Stramer, and the inclusion of 20 additional acres in the proposal they signed, demonstrate that William and Elaine Stramer did not request Douglas Stramer have the survey done to identify the farmyard.
[¶23] The terms in the proposal also differ from the terms of the option to purchase in the will. In the proposal, Douglas Stramer agreed to pay $1,000 per acre; the option price was “$100 per acre.” In the proposal, and in his testimony, Douglas Stramer stated he would “prefer” or that he wanted a contract for deed. In the will, the $100 per acre was “payable in cash[.]” The proposal also noted Douglas Stramer and his parents discussed an option to purchase the “home farm site” (his parents’ home place), which “would have a higher value,” the value of which “has not been determined at this time.” The amount of land discussed, the price per acre, and the method of payment in the proposal all differ from the terms in the will's option to purchase. Moreover, Douglas Stramer's option to purchase the farmyard existed only “if he has not previously received conveyance of land around this house[.]” Thus, the will indicates William and Elaine Stramer anticipated Douglas Stramer might purchase the farmyard in a separate transaction rather than as a purchase option under the will. The proposal and the survey were steps toward a purchase of the farmyard and additional acres outside of the will's option to purchase, not steps toward exercising the option.
[¶24] Under the will, “if the land around the house was previously surveyed/platted by [William and Elaine Stramer] to identify the farmyard,” Douglas Stramer's option applies to the “surveyed/platted acreage.” The record is devoid of any evidence that William and Elaine Stramer surveyed the land around the house, or requested a survey be performed, “to identify the farmyard[.]” To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates Douglas Stramer's discussions with his parents about purchasing 25 acres, and the subsequent survey, were unrelated to his exercising his option to purchase the “farmyard.” The reason for the survey, the number of acres to be purchased, the purchase price, and the method of payment all demonstrate the survey was not done “to identify the farmyard[.]” The survey obtained by Douglas Stramer thus does not comply with the condition precedent in the will.
[¶25] We conclude the district court clearly erred in finding Douglas Stramer's option to purchase the farmyard included the 25 acres identified in the plat. Because Douglas Stramer resided in the house and timely exercised his option, and the survey condition precedent was not satisfied, the personal representative was required to determine in his sole discretion what constitutes the “immediate farmyard,” allowing Douglas Stramer to purchase that “amount of acres, adjacent to the house.” Todd Stramer, the personal representative of Elaine Stramer's estate during the relevant time, testified and argued that the farmyard constituted the approximately five acres surrounding Douglas Stramer's house. Douglas Stramer agreed, testifying that the approximately 5.96 acres shown in Exhibit T constituted the farmyard. No other party testified otherwise. We conclude as a matter of law that the personal representative determined the acreage constituting the farmyard is the 5.96 acres identified in Exhibit T. We reverse the portion of the judgment determining that Douglas Stramer shall have the option to purchase the 25 acres identified in the 2014 plat, and direct the court to amend that portion to state that Douglas Stramer shall have the option to purchase the 5.96 acres identified in Exhibit T.
B
[¶26] Todd Stramer argues the district court erred in finding he did not validly exercise his option to purchase the farm.
[¶27] Todd Stramer's option in Elaine Stramer's will states:
If my son Todd moves back to North Dakota and actively farms the farm/ranch, then Todd shall have an option to purchase the land, either by purchasing all of the land, or, at his option, by purchasing specific parcels; provided, specific parcels purchased must be contiguous, so that the land is not unduly separated; further provided, if my son Doug exercises his option to purchase land under Paragraph 10.08.01, Todd's option rights shall not include Doug's land. This option to purchase shall continue until that date which is one year after the date of death of the survivor between my spouse and me; otherwise, the option to purchase shall lapse; once Todd has given written notice of the exercise of the option to purchase, he shall have a reasonable period of time to close the transaction. The option price shall be $100 per acre, and Todd shall be responsible for any required survey and/or platting expenses, and for all expenses of abstract preparation/update, curative title work, or other costs associated with closing the purchase. Todd can complete the purchase by a cash payment or, at his option, by a contract for deed, payable in annual payments over a term of 20 years, 20% down, with interest at the rate which is 1% below the interest rate then charged for similar farm real estate transactions by Farm Credit Services, or its successor in interest, in Mandan, North Dakota; Todd shall have the right to prepay the contract balance at any time. If Todd exercises this option to purchase the land, all machinery, equipment, and tools, relating to the farm/ranch, shall be transferred to Todd, and, in addition, any balance in the checking account shall be transferred to Todd. Todd shall be allowed to credit his entitlement to twenty-five per cent (25%) of the residuary estate as a credit and setoff against the requirement for a twenty per cent (20%) down payment on purchase; Todd, as a residuary beneficiary of the estate, shall also be entitled to receive[ ] twenty-five per cent (25%) of his payments against purchase price․
(Emphasis added.)
[¶28] The only dispute is whether Todd Stramer was actively farming the land in 2023. Because the term “actively farms” was “rationally susceptible to different meanings,” the district court found the term ambiguous and relied on extrinsic evidence to define it. Specifically, the court relied on the testimony of Attorney Chapman and Mike Appert. Chapman testified that William and Elaine Stramer chose the language “actively farms,” and when Chapman asked William Stramer what the term meant, he responded that “anybody who knows anything about farming knows what that means.” Chapman acknowledged that in his deposition he stated that William Stramer told him, “Anybody who farms knows what that means; active farming under the programs.” Chapman testified that he understood William Stramer to be referencing the federal farm programs’ definition.
[¶29] Appert testified that he has been farming “35 years plus” and farms about 47,000 acres. In addition to farming his own land, he rented land from the Stramers from 1993 to 2023. The court found that Appert was “an experienced farmer with significant knowledge of the agricultural industry.” When asked whether Todd Stramer farmed the land in 2023, Appert testified that Todd Stramer was the farmer of the property in 2023 but acknowledged that he would rely on the definition used by the Farm Service Agency (FSA).
[¶30] The FSA defines “actively engaged in farming” in 7 C.F.R. § 1400.201 (2025), which states:
(a) To be considered eligible to receive payments with respect to a particular farming operation, a person or legal entity must be actively engaged in farming with respect to the operation.
(b) Actively engaged in farming means, except as otherwise provided in this part, that the person or legal entity:
(1) Independently and separately makes a significant contribution to a farming operation of:
(i) Capital, equipment, or land, or a combination of capital, equipment, or land and
(ii) Active personal labor or active personal management, or a combination of active personal labor and active personal management;
(2) Has a share of the profits or losses from the farming operation commensurate with the person's or legal entity's contributions to the operation; and
(3) Makes contributions to the farming operation that are at risk for a loss, with the level of risk being commensurate with the person's or legal entity's claimed share of the farming operation.
(c) All of the following factors will be taken into consideration in determining if the person or legal entity is independently and separately contributing a significant amount of capital, equipment, or land, or a combination of capital, equipment, or land, to the farming operation:
(1) A separate and distinct interest in the land, crop, and livestock involved in the farming operation;
(2) The demonstration of separate and total responsibility for the interest in the land, crop, and livestock in the farming operation; and
(3) All funds and business accounts of the farming operation are separate from that of any other person and legal entity.
(d) In determining if the person or legal entity is independently and separately contributing a significant amount of active personal labor or active personal management, all of the following factors will be taken into consideration:
(1) The types of crops and livestock produced by the farming operation;
(2) The normal and customary farming practices of the area;
(3) The total amount of labor and management necessary for the farming operation in the area; and
(4) Whether the person or legal entity receives compensation for the labor and management activities.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶31] The district court found that Todd Stramer contributed “active personal management” to the 2023 farming operation, satisfying § 1400.201(b)(1)(ii). But the court found that he did not “independently and separately make significant contributions to the farming operation of capital, equipment, land, or a combination thereof” under § 1400.201(b)(1)(i). The court found the trusts provided the land and capital, and Appert provided the equipment:
[T]he land that was the farm belonged to William's Disclaimer Trust and Elaine's Irrevocable Trust, which has been deemed void. Todd did not lease the land. The crops were paid for by the Irrevocable Trust. The Irrevocable Trust reported the profits and losses related to the crops on its tax returns. Todd did not have a separate and distinct interest or responsibility for the land other than his option.
The capital that funded the farming of the Stramer land in 2023 came from the bank account for Elaine's Irrevocable Trust. Todd did not have a separate independent business account. He did not contribute any direct out-of-pocket input towards the farming. Elaine's Irrevocable Trust paid for everything. It reported all profits and losses on its tax returns.
Todd did not provide any equipment for the farming operation. All equipment that was used belonged to Appert. Any payments for the use of this equipment came from Elaine's Irrevocable Trust.
[¶32] First, Todd Stramer argues the district court erred by using the FSA definition of “actively engaged in farming” found in the C.F.R. He asserts this phrase is used to determine whether one qualifies for payments through a federal farm program, which is different from what his parents meant by “actively farm[ing].” Appert, an experienced farmer, testified that he would apply the FSA definition; Chapman testified that he understood William Stramer himself to be referencing the federal farm programs’ definition. The FSA definition applies here not as a default construction but because the extrinsic evidence showed the testators used the phrase in that sense. The court did not err in applying the FSA definition.
[¶33] Second, Todd Stramer argues that at least portions of the FSA definition cannot be squared with the language of Elaine Stramer's will. He asserts that because the estates and trusts own the land until he exercises his option and purchases it, there is no separate and independent land contribution he could have made. Further, he notes that Elaine Stramer's will provides that, after exercising his option, he is to receive the checking account balance and equipment, and can set off and reduce the down payment and purchase price with his 25% interest in the residuary estate. He contends that this shows his parents did not intend to require him to contribute substantial capital or equipment.
[¶34] Ann Stramer argues that the will is clear: Todd Stramer had to exercise his option to purchase before he would receive the checking account funds and equipment. She asserts their parents wanted Todd Stramer to make a substantial and meaningful investment in the farm before he could purchase it.
[¶35] Todd Stramer's argument that the other provisions in his option were included for his benefit does not alter the condition precedent that he actively farm the land. Both Appert and William Stramer, according to Chapman, understood that term to be synonymous with the FSA definition. The court did not err in using the FSA definition.
[¶36] Third, Todd Stramer argues the district court erred in finding he did not independently and separately make a significant contribution of capital, equipment, or land. He asserts that the requirement that he independently contribute land makes no sense here because the trusts and estates own the land until he actively farms it, and thus by definition he cannot own it. He alternatively contends that although he did not own the land in fee simple, he owned an interest through his option, allowing him to occupy and use the land, and an interest as a residuary beneficiary under Elaine Stramer's will.
[¶37] The Code of Federal Regulations defines capital, equipment, and land. “Capital means the funding provided by a person or legal entity to the farming operation for the operation to conduct farming activities.” 7 C.F.R. § 1400.3 (2025). “In determining whether a person or legal entity has independently contributed capital, in the form of funding, to the farming operation, the capital must have been derived from a fund or account separate and distinct from that of any other person or legal entity with an interest in the farming operation.” Id. “Capital does not include the value of any labor or management that is contributed to the farming operation or any outlays for land or equipment. A capital contribution must be a direct out-of-pocket input of a specified sum or an amount borrowed by the person or legal entity ․” Id. “Equipment means the machinery and implements needed by the farming operation to conduct activities of the farming operation, including machinery and implements involved in land preparation, planting, cultivating, harvesting, or marketing of the crops involved.” Id. “The equipment may be leased from any source. If the equipment is leased from another person or legal entity with an interest in the farming operation, the equipment must be leased at a fair market value.” Id. “Land means farmland ․ The land may be leased from any source. If the land is leased from another person or legal entity with an interest in the farming operation, the land must be leased at a fair market value.” Id.
[¶38] The district court found the Elaine Stramer Trust provided the funding and land, and Appert provided the equipment, which the trust paid to use. Although Todd Stramer is correct that the trusts and estates owned the land, under the C.F.R. definition he could have contributed by leasing the land, which he did not do. The same is true of the equipment. Other than highlighting his interest in the land through his option, Todd Stramer does not challenge the court's findings concerning the capital, equipment, and land. We conclude the court did not clearly err in finding that Todd Stramer did not independently and separately make a significant contribution of capital, equipment, or land; that he did not actively farm the Stramer land within one year of Elaine Stramer's death; and that he did not validly exercise his option to purchase the farm.
III
[¶39] Todd Stramer argues the district court erred in removing him as trustee of the Elaine Stramer Trust and as personal representative of her estate. His arguments depend on his prevailing on the option issue: he asserts that because he validly exercised his option, he had no obligation to pay rent or sell the farm equipment. Because the court did not err in finding Todd Stramer failed to validly exercise his option, we conclude his arguments here—which rest on a valid exercise of the option—also fail.
[¶40] We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by removing Todd Stramer as trustee and personal representative.
IV
[¶41] On cross-appeal, Ann Stramer argues the district court misapplied the law on damages and erred in failing to award compensation for Todd Stramer's use and possession of the farmland from 2023 to 2025. She asserts that Todd Stramer owes $700,104 for the three years based on the amount Appert paid to rent the farmland in 2022 ($233,368). The court concluded it had “insufficient information to accurately calculate the amount required to restore the value of the trust property and trust distributions to what they would have been had a breach not occurred.” The court noted that the Disclaimer Trust, which is not at issue in these actions, owns 50% of the land. Todd Stramer contends the court concluded that Ann Stramer failed to meet her burden to prove what damage, if any, she sustained. “The appropriate standard of review in an appeal challenging a trial court's award of damages in a bench trial is whether the trial court's findings of fact on damages are clearly erroneous.” Roth v. Meyer, 2024 ND 113, ¶ 37, 9 N.W.3d 469. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law. Id.
[¶42] Because Elaine Stramer disclaimed any interest in William Stramer's estate upon his death, the Disclaimer Trust received a one-half interest in the farmland, which upon Elaine Stramer's death was to be distributed to Matthew Stramer, Todd Stramer, Steve Stramer, and Ann Stramer. Because the Elaine Stramer Trust was void, Elaine Stramer's estate owns the other one-half interest in the farmland. Under Elaine Stramer's will, that interest should have passed in equal shares to Matthew Stramer, Todd Stramer, Steve Stramer, and Ann Stramer upon Elaine Stramer's death.
[¶43] Because Elaine Stramer died in November 2022, the farm income from her interest in the farm should have been divided among Matthew Stramer, Todd Stramer, Steve Stramer, and Ann Stramer for 2023 through 2025. Instead, Todd Stramer occupied the farm in an effort to exercise his option. Because Todd Stramer failed to validly exercise that option, he wrongfully occupied the Stramer farm to the detriment of the beneficiaries.
[¶44] Section 32-03-21, N.D.C.C., states, “The detriment caused by the wrongful occupation of real property ․ is deemed to be the value of the use of the property for the time of such occupation ․ and the costs, if any, of recovering the possession.” “[T]he value of the use may be found by requiring the party at fault to make an accounting and deliver over the fruits of the illegal possession, or to pay the fair rental value of the property.” Hartman v. Grager, 2021 ND 160, ¶ 54, 964 N.W.2d 482.
[¶45] Because Todd Stramer wrongfully occupied the farm, Elaine Stramer's estate may recover damages for the wrongful occupation, including fruits of the illegal possession or fair rental value. Hartman, 2021 ND 160, ¶¶ 54, 56. The estate's beneficiaries are owed, in equal shares, the detriment to Elaine Stramer's estate from 2023 to 2025, measured either by the fair rental value of her 50% interest in the land or by the income traceable to that interest (the fruits of the illegal possession). Appert's 2022 rent is in evidence, and Ann Stramer argues it should be imputed for 2023-2025. That lease, however, was a joint lease by both trusts of 2,333.68 acres at $100 per acre; Appert paid the $233,368 total in two equal checks of $116,684, one to the Disclaimer Trust and one to the Elaine Stramer Trust. The rental value attributable to Elaine Stramer's 50% interest is therefore $116,684 per year. Ann Stramer's requested $700,104 is three years of the whole-farm rent and thus includes the Disclaimer Trust's half, which is not before us. There appears to be no dispute that the lease reflected a fair rental value in 2022. As the district court noted, however, the Elaine Stramer Trust received farm income in 2023, and presumably received farm income in 2024 and 2025. The record does not show whether the Elaine Stramer Trust received all of the income or whether Todd Stramer received income directly or indirectly. We reverse, concluding the court misapplied the law on damages and erred in failing to award damages. We remand for the district court to award damages for Todd Stramer's wrongful occupation consistent with this opinion.
V
[¶46] We affirm in part, concluding the district court did not clearly err in finding that Todd Stramer was not actively farming and thus did not validly exercise his option to purchase the farm; and the court did not abuse its discretion in removing Todd Stramer as trustee and personal representative. We reverse in part, concluding the court clearly erred in finding that Douglas Stramer's option to purchase included the 25 acres identified in the plat, misapplied the law on damages, and erred in failing to award damages for Todd Stramer's wrongful occupation of the farm from 2023 to 2025. We remand for the court to amend judgment to state that Douglas Stramer shall have the option to purchase the 5.96 acres identified in Exhibit T, and to determine damages for the wrongful occupation.
[¶47] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J.
Jerod E. Tufte
Jon J. Jensen
Douglas A. Bahr
Mark A. Friese
Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.
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Docket No: No. 20260026, No. 20260034, No. 20260035
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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