SAILER v. SAILER (2026)

[¶1] Wayne Sailer, Jr. appeals the district court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for judgment awarding Christi Sailer an unequal distribution of the marital estate. Wayne Sailer argues the court erred in its findings by improperly applying the Ruff-Fischer factors resulting in an inequitable division of property. He further argues the court abused its discretion in admitting witness testimony.

[¶2] This Court's standard of review for property distribution is well established:

This Court will not reverse the district court's decision related to property distribution unless the findings are clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support a finding, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence, we are left with a firm conviction a mistake has been made. This Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, and the district court's findings of fact are presumptively correct. A district court's choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous, and this Court will not reverse simply because it may have viewed the evidence differently. On appeal, we do not reweigh conflicts in the evidence, and we give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

Ceynar v. Ceynar, 2025 ND 53, ¶ 3, 18 N.W.3d 613 (quoting Swanson v. Swanson, 2019 ND 25, ¶ 5, 921 N.W.2d 666 (cleaned up)).

[¶3] This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court's decision to permit a witness to testify. See Olson v. Olson, 2024 ND 224, ¶ 25, 14 N.W.3d 603 (reviewing a district court's decision to permit rebuttal testimony for an abuse of discretion after the witness heard prior testimony in violation of a sequestration order); see also State v. Skorick, 2002 ND 190, ¶ 9, 653 N.W.2d 698 (reviewing a district court's admission of rebuttal testimony under abuse of discretion standard); Ehrman v. Feist, 1997 ND 180, ¶ 21, 568 N.W.2d 747 (reviewing a district court's refusal to allow testimony by rebuttal witnesses under the abuse of discretion standard). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” State v. Doyle, 2024 ND 108, ¶ 12, 7 N.W.3d 245 (quoting State v. Yousif, 2022 ND 234, ¶ 5, 982 N.W.2d 870).

[¶4] The district court must consider the Ruff-Fischer factors in dividing the property:

[T]he respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material.

Ceynar, 2025 ND 53, ¶ 4, 18 N.W.3d 613 (quoting Swanson, 2019 ND 25, ¶ 6, 921 N.W.2d 666).

[¶5] The district court comprehensively evaluated and applied the Ruff-Fischer factors. The court found assets awarded to Wayne Sailer could be more easily liquidated than those awarded to Christi Sailer. The court found Wayne Sailer possessed greater current earning capacity. The court concluded its obligation to determine an equitable distribution required an unequal distribution. Ultimately, the court respectively awarded Wayne Sailer and Christi Sailer approximately 35% and 65% of the marital estate. While unequal, the court's determination is equitable under its analysis of the Ruff-Fischer factors. The record supports the court's findings and those findings are not clearly erroneous.

[¶6] At trial, Wayne Sailer objected to the testimony of a mental health counselor who was undisclosed in early discovery but disclosed on a witness list prepared more than three months prior to trial. Wayne Sailer chose not to raise the issue until trial, did not seek a continuance or alternative remedy, and has not demonstrated prejudice. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the counselor's testimony.

[¶7] We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).

Per Curiam.

[¶8] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese