DAGGETT v. RICHARDS (2026)

[¶1] Jeremy Daggett appeals from a judgment awarding Taylor Richards primary residential responsibility, establishing parenting time, and ordering Daggett to pay child support. He argues the district court erred in denying his expedited motion to withdraw admissions and to vacate the order granting Richards's motion in limine, in awarding Richards primary residential responsibility, in establishing parenting time, and in calculating his child support. We summarily affirm.

[¶2] Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3), “[a] matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” A matter admitted under Rule 36 “is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.” N.D.R.Civ.P. 36(b). Richards served requests for admission on December 11, 2024. Daggett untimely responded to Richards's discovery requests on February 21, 2025. Richards considered the responses inadequate and on March 9, 2025, moved to compel Daggett to respond to her interrogatories and request for production of documents, to deem the requests for admission admitted, and for an order in limine limiting Daggett's presentation of evidence to what he provided in his discovery responses. The district court granted the motion on April 29, 2025. Daggett did not move to withdraw the admissions or to vacate the court's order until August 6, 2025, seven days before trial. At the start of trial, the district court orally denied the motion as untimely under its scheduling order and N.D.R.Ct. 3.2 and found no exceptional circumstances warranting relief.

[¶3] We review a district court's ruling on a motion to withdraw deemed admissions for an abuse of discretion. Farm Credit Bank of Omaha v. McLaughlin, 474 N.W.2d 883, 887 (N.D. 1991). We likewise review a ruling on a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion. Bang v. Cont'l Res., Inc., 2025 ND 131, ¶ 25, 23 N.W.3d 895. “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner; its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination; or it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Clooten v. Clooten, 2026 ND 126, ¶ 9, 37 N.W.3d 205 (quoting Keller v. Keller, 2024 ND 27, ¶ 6, 2 N.W.3d 695). A scheduling order “controls the course of the action unless the court modifies it.” N.D.R.Civ.P. 16(d). Daggett did not seek modification of the schedule, and he offered no adequate explanation for waiting more than three months after entry of the April 29, 2025 order, and until a week before trial, to seek relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.

[¶4] Daggett also argues the district court erred in awarding Richards primary residential responsibility, in establishing parenting time, and in calculating child support. To the extent those arguments rest on his contention that the court improperly denied withdrawal of the admissions and restricted his evidence, they fail for the reasons stated above. To the extent he claims independent error, an award of primary residential responsibility and a decision on parenting time are findings of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Shively v. Shively, 2025 ND 69, ¶ 4, 19 N.W.3d 824. Child support determinations involve questions of law reviewed de novo, findings of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, and, in some limited areas, matters of discretion reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Williams, 2023 ND 240, ¶ 14, 999 N.W.2d 192. The district court's findings on each issue are supported by the evidence and meet the required standard of proof, and its conclusions of law are correct.

[¶5] We summarily affirm the judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).

Per Curiam.

[¶6] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese