RELLER v. STATE (2026)

[¶1] Mitchell Reller appeals from an order and judgment summarily denying and dismissing his application for postconviction relief. We affirm.

I

[¶2] In 2023, a jury convicted Reller of gross sexual imposition, and this Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Reller, 2024 ND 105, ¶¶ 1-2, 7 N.W.3d 252. Reller filed an application for postconviction relief on September 4, 2025. The State moved for summary disposition and dismissal, and Reller filed a response. The district court entered an order summarily denying and dismissing Reller's application on November 6, 2025. The court subsequently entered a final judgment on January 6, 2026. Reller timely appealed.

II

[¶3] Reller argues the district court erroneously dismissed his application under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09 for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He further argues the court erred in denying his application under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09.1 because material facts are in dispute.

[¶4] The State identified its motion as one for “summary disposition and dismissal” but did not articulate whether the motion was brought under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09 or § 29-32.1-09.1. (Emphasis added.) See Aune v. State, 2024 ND 99, ¶ 15, 6 N.W.3d 833 (noting statutory amendment formally codified distinction between summary dismissal and summary disposition). This Court has a duty to correctly apply the law regardless of the parties’ arguments. Int. of M.R.M.-B., 2026 ND 82, ¶ 16, 34 N.W.3d 128; see D.G.L. Trading Corp. v. Reis, 2007 ND 88, ¶ 7, 732 N.W.2d 393 (“[I]t is appropriate we consider and apply the correct statutes in this case, even if they were not presented to the district court in the first instance.”).

[¶5] The district court's order both dismissed and denied Reller's application for postconviction relief but did not articulate reliance on or analysis under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09, § 29-32.1-09.1, or any other applicable law. The order merely stated, “Pursuant to the ․ Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal ․ IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant and Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED in its entirety.” Because questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal from a postconviction proceeding, Wacht v. State, 2015 ND 154, ¶ 6, 864 N.W.2d 740, our review, based on these facts, is not limited by the lack of analysis in the district court's order.

A

[¶6] Reller argues the district court erroneously dismissed his application for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

[¶7] Section 29-32.1-09, N.D.C.C., governs summary dismissal of a postconviction relief application:

1. The court, on its own motion, may enter a judgment denying a meritless application on any and all issues raised in the application before any response by the state. The court also may summarily deny a second or successive application for similar relief on behalf of the same applicant and may summarily deny any application when the issues raised in the application have previously been decided by the appellate court in the same case.

2. The court, on its own motion, may dismiss any grounds of an application which allege ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. An applicant may not claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel in proceedings under this chapter.

[¶8] Motions for summary dismissal are analogous to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Kraft v. State, 2025 ND 155, ¶ 7, 25 N.W.3d 777. A motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests a claim's legal sufficiency. Severance v. Howe, 2023 ND 197, ¶ 8, 997 N.W.2d 99. The standard of review for a dismissal under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is well-established:

In an appeal from a motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true. A court's scrutiny of pleadings should be deferential to the plaintiff, unless it is clear there are no provable facts entitling the plaintiff to relief. Rule 12(b)(6) motions are viewed with disfavor and should be granted only if it is disclosed with certainty the impossibility of proving a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court's decision will be reviewed de novo on appeal. The court's decision dismissing the complaint will be affirmed if we cannot discern a potential for proof to support it.

Krile v. Lawyer, 2022 ND 28, ¶ 16, 970 N.W.2d 150 (cleaned up). A court should dismiss for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts supports the claim. Mohammed v. State, 2026 ND 59, ¶ 5, 32 N.W.3d 303. We review a court's decision on a motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de novo on appeal. Atkins v. State, 2021 ND 83, ¶ 9, 959 N.W.2d 588. An applicant has the burden of establishing the grounds for postconviction relief. State v. Shipton, 2019 ND 188, ¶ 4, 931 N.W.2d 220; see N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01 (listing grounds for postconviction relief).

[¶9] As grounds for postconviction relief, Reller's application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts his trial counsel failed to object to use of his criminal history, failed to investigate prosecutorial misconduct, allowed witness testimony irrelevant to proving the crime convicted, and denied him access to knowledge required for his defense. Further alleged grounds for relief include an illegally imposed sentence and the existence of new evidence. Reller's application alleges specified errors and offers factual support. These allegations do not demonstrate an impossibility for Reller to prove his claims.

[¶10] Reller's application, construed in the light most favorable to him, states a claim upon which relief can be granted under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We therefore conclude the district court erred to the extent it summarily dismissed the application for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

B

[¶11] Reller further argues he raised material issues of fact sufficient to resist summary disposition.

[¶12] A motion for summary disposition of a postconviction relief application is analogous to, and governed by, the procedure for a motion for summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. Kraft, 2025 ND 155, ¶ 8. Section 29-32.1-09.1, N.D.C.C., governs summary disposition of an application and authorizes a district court to grant a motion for summary disposition “if the application, pleadings, any previous proceeding, discovery, or other matters of record show that no genuine issues exist as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

[¶13] This Court has well established the standard of review for summary judgment:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether the information available to the district court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record.

Fiebiger v. Anderson, 2024 ND 156, ¶ 6, 10 N.W.3d 547 (quoting Borsheim Builders Supply, Inc. v. Manger Ins., Inc., 2018 ND 218, ¶ 7, 917 N.W.2d 504). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if reasonable minds could draw different inferences and reach different conclusions from the undisputed facts.” Pederson v. State, 2026 ND 1, ¶ 21, 30 N.W.3d 319.

[¶14] While argument, citations, discussion of authorities, or other supporting materials need not be filed with a postconviction relief application, Burden v. State, 2019 ND 178, ¶ 11, 930 N.W.2d 619, “[o]nce the State moves for summary disposition pointing out the absence of supporting evidence, the defendant is put on notice of the issue and a minimal burden shifts to the defendant to provide some competent evidence to support his claim.” Mwinyi v. State, 2024 ND 126, ¶ 11, 9 N.W.3d 665. The State's motion asserted the ineffective assistance allegation regarding criminal history objection was the only possible factually supported claim in Reller's application. The State further contended Reller failed to prove either element required for his ineffective assistance claim. The State specifically argued that Reller could not show prejudice because Reller himself made a full confession on the witness stand making any other verdict nearly impossible. The State therefore put Reller on notice and the burden shifted to him to provide evidentiary support for his claim.

[¶15] An applicant arguing ineffective assistance of counsel must show: first, counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and, second, counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the applicant. Broadwell v. State, 2014 ND 6, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d 750; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Prejudice is not assumed, even where counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Broadwell, ¶ 7. “Courts need not address both elements of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, and if a court can dispose of the case by addressing only one element, it is encouraged to do so.” Id.

[¶16] In response to the State's motion, Reller generally addressed his claim of ineffective assistance and discussed his burden to demonstrate ineffective assistance. Reller had the burden to provide some evidence on both elements of ineffective assistance, Morales v. State, 2019 ND 137, ¶ 6, 927 N.W.2d 401, by “present[ing] competent admissible evidence by affidavit or other comparable means that raises an issue of material fact and must, if appropriate, draw the court's attention to relevant evidence in the record raising an issue of material fact.” Bravera Bank v. Craft, 2023 ND 214, ¶ 18, 997 N.W.2d 829. In response to the State's motion, Reller presented no further evidence but argued his verified application provided evidence to resist summary disposition. Reller did not explain which evidence in his application he relied on, and upon review, his application contains no evidence regarding prejudice. In reviewing Reller's response, it appears he intended to submit additional evidence at an evidentiary hearing; however, Reller had the burden of raising supporting evidence in his response. See Atkins v. State, 2017 ND 290, ¶ 8, 904 N.W.2d 738 (“A motion for summary disposition puts the burden on the defendant to provide competent evidence to support his claim, and the defendant is only entitled to an evidentiary hearing if that burden is met.”). Even assuming Reller's counsel was ineffective, Reller did not meet his burden as he failed to present any evidence showing a reasonable probability he would have been acquitted had his counsel objected, i.e., prejudice resulting from his counsel's performance. See Lindeman v. State, 2024 ND 228, ¶ 6, 14 N.W.3d 883 (“To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (cleaned up) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052)).

[¶17] We need not address both ineffective assistance elements if one element is dispositive. Broadwell, 2014 ND 6, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d 750. Because Reller did not present competent evidence showing he was prejudiced, he failed to raise an issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary disposition. We conclude the district court did not err in summarily disposing of Reller's application for postconviction relief.

III

[¶18] We conclude the district court erred to the extent it may have summarily dismissed Reller's application for postconviction relief for failure to state a claim. However, any possible error is harmless because the court did not err in dismissing Reller's application under the summary disposition standard when he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the prejudice element under Strickland. We affirm the order and final judgment.

[¶20] I join the majority opinion. I write separately to address the inadequacies of the district court's order. Litigants and this Court should not have to guess as to the reasoning for a court's order.

[¶21] Based on its de novo review, the majority explains why Reller's application for postconviction relief and response brief did not survive the State's motion for summary disposition. The district court provided no such explanation.

[¶22] The district court's one-sentence order reads, in its entirety, “Pursuant to the Plaintiff and Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal, and all parties having been given an opportunity to be heard, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant and Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED in its entirety.” The court's order does not distinguish between summary dismissal and summary disposition. See N.D.C.C. §§ 29-32.1-09, 29-32.1-09.1. It does not identify the standards applied by a court when addressing a motion for summary dismissal or summary disposition. The order does not provide any analysis under either standard and does not indicate whether it is granting summary dismissal or summary disposition. See Majority, ¶ 5 (stating the district court's order “did not articulate reliance on or analysis under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09, § 29-32.1-09.1, or any other applicable law” and noting “the lack of analysis in the district court's order”). The order simply states Reller's petition is denied and dismissed.

[¶23] “We expect the district court to perform adequate analysis for us to determine the basis for its decision.” Carvalho v. Carvalho, 2025 ND 129, ¶ 7, 23 N.W.3d 890. It is difficult for this Court to perform its appellate function when a district court does not explain the rationale for its decision. See In re Est. of Nelson, 2015 ND 122, ¶ 8, 863 N.W.2d 521 (“This Court cannot perform its appellate function if we are unable to understand the rationale underlying the district court's decision.”); Hankey v. Hankey, 2015 ND 70, ¶ 13, 861 N.W.2d 479 (“Our review of this case is significantly hampered by the district court's failure to make specific, detailed findings on the relevant issues and its failure to expressly delineate the basis for its decision.”); see also Carvalho, ¶ 22 (Bahr, J., concurring) (stating this Court should “be able to understand the reasons for a district court's decision when conducting judicial review, even when this Court's review is de novo”). This Court is left to speculate whether the district court properly applied the law when it does not provide an adequate explanation of the legal basis for its decision. Nelson, ¶ 8. Moreover, “[a] party must be able to understand the reasons for a district court's decision to make an informed decision whether to appeal.” Carvalho, ¶ 22 (Bahr, J., concurring). Here, the district court failed to “delineate the basis for its decision.” Hankey, ¶ 13.

[¶24] I know our district courts are busy. I believe they efficiently handle a high volume of cases. I applaud them for what they do. However, neither a high caseload nor the goal to efficiently or promptly resolve cases justifies an opinion or order that does not inform the parties and this Court why the court reached its conclusion and entered its order.

[¶25] Douglas A. Bahr

Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.

[¶19] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese