PORTEUS v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (2026)

[¶1] Katie Lynn Porteus appeals from a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend her driving privileges for 91 days. On appeal, Porteus argues law enforcement lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and unreasonably interpreted N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2). We affirm the district court judgment affirming the Department's decision to suspend Porteus's driving privileges for 91 days.

I

[¶2] A Dickinson police officer stopped a vehicle driven by Porteus for “failing to signal a hundred feet before the intersection.” The parties agree, and the dash camera video shows, Porteus stopped at an intersection controlled by a stop sign, activated her vehicle's turn signal, and then turned. After stopping Porteus for the signal violation, the officer detected the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. After field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test, the officer arrested Porteus for driving under the influence.

[¶3] Porteus requested an administrative hearing. At the hearing, Porteus offered the dash camera video from the patrol vehicle. The hearing officer found:

Porteus argues that [the officer] lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. Porteus signaled her turn after coming to a complete stop at a stop sign. [The officer's] reasoning for the traffic stop falls under N.D.C.C. 39-10-38(2), as Porteus[ ] did not continuously signal at least 100 feet prior to the left turn. Review of the recording from the incident confirms the testimony of [the officer] and shows that Porteus[ ] was on a roadway and, despite having the opportunity to, did not activate the vehicle's turn signal at any point prior to reaching the stop sign. The greater weight of the evidence shows that [the officer] came to the objectively reasonable conclusion that Porteus’ turn required a continuous signal not less than 100 feet prior to the turn.

The hearing officer issued a decision suspending Porteus's license for 91 days. The hearing officer denied Porteus's petition for reconsideration. Porteus appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed. Porteus timely appeals to this Court.

II

[¶4] The Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, governs our review of the Department of Transportation's decision to suspend a person's driving privileges. Hoistad v. Henke, 2025 ND 45, ¶ 6, 17 N.W.3d 811. “In reviewing the Department's decision, we give deference to the Department's findings of fact and review its legal conclusions de novo.” Id. We must affirm the Department's decision unless:

1. The order is not in accordance with the law.

2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.

3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.

4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.

5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.

7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.

8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency's rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.

N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46.

III

[¶5] Porteus argues the Department lacked authority to suspend her driving privileges because the stop of her vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. She argues the officer unreasonably interpreted N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2) and did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. She argues the Department's suspension is not in accordance with the law, its conclusions of law are not supported by the findings of fact, and the order does not sufficiently state the Department's rationale.

[¶6] “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Oliver, 2006 ND 241, ¶ 6, 724 N.W.2d 114 (cleaned up) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). “An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. (quoting Whren, at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769).

[¶7] An officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion the motorist has violated or is violating the law to make an investigative stop. Hussiene v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2021 ND 126, ¶ 8, 962 N.W.2d 400. This Court has explained:

Whether reasonable suspicion exists is based on the totality of the circumstances and does not require an officer to see a motorist violating a traffic law or rule. The reasonable suspicion standard is an objective standard, which requires the court to determine whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have been justified by some objective manifestation to suspect that the law was or was about to be violated. Observed traffic violations provide officers with the requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops.

Id. (citation omitted). “The actual commission of a crime is not required to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Id. Even when an officer is mistaken, a traffic stop may be objectively reasonable. City of Lincoln v. Schuler, 2021 ND 123, ¶ 10, 962 N.W.2d 413.

[¶8] The parties agree the reasoning for the traffic stop is governed by N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(1) and (2), which provide:

1. No person may turn a vehicle, move right or left upon a roadway, or merge into or from traffic unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.

2. A signal of intention to turn, move right or left, or merge into or from traffic must be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet [30.48 meters] traveled by the vehicle before turning, moving right or left, or changing lanes.

[¶9] “Interpretation of a statute is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal.” Schuler, 2021 ND 123, ¶ 7, 962 N.W.2d 413 (citation omitted). “Our primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, and we first look to the plain language of the statute and give each word of the statute its ordinary meaning.” Id. (citation omitted).

[¶10] Porteus argues the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2) does not support a traffic stop for signaling an intention to turn after a complete stop. She argues under N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2), the operative words are “traveled” and “before turning.” She argues that a stopped vehicle is not “traveling” and that she complied with the statute because she signaled “before turning” after a complete stop. We disagree.

[¶11] The statute provides: “A signal of intention to turn, move right or left, or merge into or from traffic must be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet [30.48 meters] traveled by the vehicle before turning, moving right or left, or changing lanes.” N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2) (emphasis added). The statute's operative verb “must be given” is qualified by the prepositional phrase “during not less than the last one hundred feet.” This prepositional phrase specifies the minimum required distance during which the signal “must be given continuously.” The object noun phrase of the preposition “during” is “not less than the last one hundred feet.” Within that noun phrase, the participial phrase “traveled by the vehicle,” modifies “feet” by identifying which “feet” are relevant, and the prepositional phrase “before turning” describes those “feet” in relation to the turn. The phrases “traveled by the vehicle” and “before turning” define the 100 feet of travel immediately preceding the turn. Under the plain language of the statute, a vehicle is required to signal continuously beginning not less than 100 feet before the turn.

[¶12] Porteus argues a stopped vehicle is not traveling, and therefore she did not need to signal for the 100 feet traveled before turning. Porteus erroneously equates “traveling” with continued movement. While traveling, Porteus approached a stop sign and, as required by statute, made a complete stop. N.D.C.C. § 39-10-24(2). Porteus traveled and continued to travel before, during, and after she stopped at the stop sign. Stopping at a stop sign or other traffic control device does not negate the duty to continuously signal for not less than 100 feet before turning. N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2) (a signal of an intention to turn “must be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet [30.48 meters] traveled by the vehicle before turning”). Porteus traveled at least 100 feet before turning. Porteus did not signal 100 feet before turning, violating N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2).

[¶13] The officer's stop for an observed violation under the correct interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2) was reasonable and did not violate Porteus's Fourth Amendment rights. The Department's suspension is in accordance with the law, its conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact, and the order sufficiently states the Department's rationale.

IV

[¶14] We affirm the district court judgment affirming the Department's decision to suspend Porteus's driving privileges for 91 days.

Friese, Justice.

[¶15] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese