SKEEN v. STATE (2026)

[¶1] Sarah Lynn Skeen appeals from a district court judgment entered after an evidentiary hearing denying her application for postconviction relief. On appeal, Skeen argues the district court erred by denying her application because the court's findings regarding counsel's advice are not supported by the record. She also argues her counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate witness availability and cooperation, and that she would not have pleaded guilty absent counsel's deficient performance.

[¶2] When an applicant for postconviction relief seeks to withdraw her guilty plea, the district court considers whether relief is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Isxaaq v. State, 2021 ND 148, ¶ 7, 963 N.W.2d 260. “To establish manifest injustice, a defendant must prove serious derelictions on the part of the defendant's attorney that kept a plea from being knowingly and intelligently made.” Id. (cleaned up). This Court reviews whether circumstances establish a manifest injustice under an abuse of discretion standard. Id.

[¶3] An applicant seeking to withdraw her guilty plea alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must surmount the two-prong test set out by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Isxaaq, 2021 ND 148, ¶ 8, 963 N.W.2d 260. “To satisfy the first prong under Strickland, an applicant must show his or her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. ¶ 9. “To satisfy the second prong, an applicant must establish there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. “A district court's findings of fact in a postconviction proceeding will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. ¶ 6 (cleaned up).

[¶4] After review of the record, we conclude the district court's findings are supported by the record, and are not clearly erroneous. We also conclude Skeen failed to show her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Skeen was not deprived of her right to effective assistance of counsel. Without establishing serious derelictions by her counsel that kept her plea from being knowingly and intelligently made, Skeen cannot show a manifest injustice would result if she is not allowed to withdraw her plea. We summarily affirm the district court judgment denying Skeen's application for postconviction relief under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).

Per Curiam.

[¶5] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese