NORWOOD v. STATE (2026)

[¶1] Johnny Norwood appeals from the district court's order granting summary disposition of his application for postconviction relief on the ground that it was untimely.

[¶2] On August 17, 2017, Norwood entered Alford pleas of guilty to murder and attempted murder. He filed this application for postconviction relief on August 4, 2025. In his application, he raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Norwood alleged he asked his trial counsel to conduct forensic testing of his jacket before his guilty pleas, but the testing never occurred. The State filed a motion for summary disposition, which the district court granted. In its order, the court concluded Norwood's application was untimely, no exception to the two-year limitation period applied, and Norwood's pleas were knowing and voluntary. See N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) (providing an application for postconviction relief “must be filed within two years of the date the conviction becomes final,” except as provided in subsection 3).

[¶3] In a postconviction case, “[t]he court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition if the application, pleadings, any previous proceeding, discovery, or other matters of record show that no genuine issues exist as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09.1(1). “The party opposing the motion for summary disposition is entitled to all reasonable inferences at the preliminary stages of a post-conviction proceeding, and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if a reasonable inference raises a genuine issue of material fact.” Bridges v. State, 2022 ND 147, ¶ 6, 977 N.W.2d 718 (quoting Davies v. State, 2018 ND 211, ¶ 9, 917 N.W.2d 8). “This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary disposition under the de novo standard.” Friesz v. State, 2026 ND 124, ¶ 3, 37 N.W.3d 229 (quoting Conica v. State, 2026 ND 74, ¶ 2, 33 N.W.3d 787).

[¶4] Norwood argues his application is timely under the newly discovered evidence exception to the two-year limitation period. This exception applies when “[t]he petition alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence, including DNA evidence, which if proved and reviewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was convicted[.]” N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1). Norwood alleges his trial counsel failed to conduct forensic testing of his jacket. He claims forensic testing results would constitute new evidence and prove his innocence.

[¶5] We rejected a similar argument in O'Neal v. State, 2023 ND 109, 992 N.W.2d 14. There, the petitioner argued “new evidence may have been discovered” had there been forensic testing. Id. ¶ 5. We concluded the petitioner had not shown newly discovered evidence because he “only claimed new evidence may exist, or may have been discovered.” Id. Similarly, Norwood argues forensic testing results would constitute new evidence, but he does not claim this evidence currently exists.

[¶6] The district court did not err in granting summary disposition based on N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2). We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(6).

Per Curiam.

[¶7] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese