ALI v. OSMAN (2026)

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

[¶1] Mojahid Faroug Saeed Osman appeals from a judgment granting a divorce to him and Sara Abdalrhman Mohamed Ali. Osman argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a divorce judgment because the parties were already legally divorced in Sudan. He further argues the court erred in its property division, in valuing three assets, and in awarding Ali the marital home; erred in awarding spousal support; and abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees. Ali requests this Court award her costs and attorney's fees for this appeal under N.D.R.App.P. 38.

[¶2] The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide whether to grant comity in this divorce action. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exercise comity to recognize and enforce a Sudanese divorce certificate. We summarily affirm the judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4). We also award Ali sanctions from Osman in the amount of $1,000 and remand to the district court for consideration of whether an award under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4) of attorney's fees and costs with respect to this appeal will result in undue financial hardship to Osman and, if appropriate, the amount of any award.

I

[¶3] Ali and Osman married in 2001 in Sudan. Both parties are dual citizens of the United States and Sudan. The parties are the parents of five children—three of whom were minors at the time of trial. Shortly after they were married, the parties moved from Sudan to North Carolina, where they both received advanced university degrees. In 2010, the parties moved to Saudi Arabia for Osman's teaching career at a university. In 2015, the parties and their children moved to the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) for Osman's teaching career.

[¶4] In late 2022, Osman accepted another teaching position at a university and moved to Fargo with the parties’ oldest son. In February 2023, Ali and the other four children moved to the United States. The parties resumed cohabitation in May 2023. In June 2024, Ali petitioned the district court for and received a domestic violence protection order, prohibiting Osman from entering or coming within 300 yards of the parties’ marital home in Fargo.

[¶5] In July 2024, Ali commenced this action seeking a divorce from Osman. In October 2024, Osman moved to dismiss the divorce action, disputing that he and Ali were still married at the time of the action. Osman asserted they were no longer married because he had obtained a divorce certificate in Sudan on December 11, 2022. He argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce or address property division or spousal support. In January 2025, the court denied Osman's motion to dismiss, holding it would not exercise comity to recognize and enforce the Sudanese divorce certificate.

[¶6] In September 2025, the district court held a two-day trial during which Ali and Osman provided testimony and exhibits. At trial, Osman informed the court he was not seeking residential responsibility, joint decision-making authority, or parenting time.

[¶7] In January 2026, the district court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment. In its order, the court adopted its prior orders and noted the prior domestic violence protection order, finding that Osman committed domestic violence against Ali and the children and that Osman exercised coercive control regarding the parties’ finances and personal property. Based on its findings of Osman's domestic violence history and coercive control over Ali and the children, the court found it in the children's best interests to award Ali primary residential responsibility and sole decision-making authority. The court also awarded Ali child support. Osman was not given parenting time.

[¶8] The district court's order valued and distributed the marital property under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and awarded Ali spousal support. The court's order further awarded Ali attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4) and included an alternative attorney fee analysis under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23. The court entered a divorce judgment.

II

[¶9] Osman argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a divorce judgment because the parties were already legally divorced in Sudan in 2022.

A

[¶10] “Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's power to hear and decide the general subject involved in the action.” Gustafson v. Poitra, 2018 ND 202, ¶ 9, 916 N.W.2d 804; see also Schillerstrom v. Schillerstrom, 75 N.D. 667, 32 N.W.2d 106, 122 (1948) (“It is the power to deal with the general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to this question, and to determine whether or not they are sufficient to invoke the exercise of that power.”). “Whether a district court had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to the de novo standard of review.” Gomm v. Winterfeldt, 2022 ND 172, ¶ 7, 980 N.W.2d 204 (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 2011 ND 167, ¶ 12, 806 N.W.2d 133). This state's constitution and laws grant district courts subject matter jurisdiction to entertain divorce actions. Habberstad v. Habberstad, 444 N.W.2d 703, 704 (N.D. 1989); Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D. 1988); Schillerstrom, at 122-24; see also N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8 (“The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes, except as otherwise provided by law[.]”); N.D.C.C. § 14-05-01(2) (“Marriage is dissolved only: ․ 2. By a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction decreeing a divorce of the parties.”); N.D.C.C. § 14-05-02 (“The effect of a judgment decreeing a divorce is to restore the parties to the state of unmarried persons, but neither party to a divorce may marry except in accordance with the decree of the court granting the divorce.”); N.D.C.C. § 14-05-03 (listing the causes for which a divorce may be granted); N.D.C.C. § 14-05-17 (“A separation or divorce may not be granted unless the plaintiff in good faith has been a resident of the state for six months next preceding commencement of the action.”).

[¶11] The parties dispute whether they were still married when Ali commenced this divorce action. Osman contends the parties were validly divorced on December 11, 2022, by way of the Sudanese divorce certificate, and the district court was required to recognize that divorce under the doctrine of comity. Although Osman argues the court was without subject matter jurisdiction because the court was required to grant comity, “a district court's determination of whether a foreign divorce decree should be recognized under principles of judicial comity is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.” Bleich v. Bleich, 312 Neb. 962, 981 N.W.2d 801, 808 (2022) (citing Perry v. Coles Cnty., Illinois, 906 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing comity as doctrine of abstention, not subject matter jurisdiction); Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 783 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating “courts are obligated to consider whether a judgment of a foreign court should be afforded comity only when the ․ court already has jurisdiction”); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating “[i]nternational comity does not describe a limitation upon the subject matter jurisdiction of the ․ courts”); Iqtaifan v. Hagerty, 617 S.W.3d 400, 408 (Ky. 2021) (holding state court's decision regarding whether to recognize Jordanian divorce decree under principles of comity “had no bearing on whether [the court] was acting within [its] jurisdiction”); Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 536 (Tex. App. 2018) (stating “[t]he doctrine of international comity, however, involves a case over which a Texas court has subject-matter jurisdiction, but, in its discretion, chooses not to exercise it”)).

[¶12] In this case, whether the Sudanese divorce certificate is entitled to recognition under principles of comity is “not an issue bearing on the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.” Bleich, 981 N.W.2d at 809. In deciding whether or not to grant comity to the divorce certificate, the district court “does not lack judicial power over the general class or category to which the proceedings belong and the general subject involved in the action before the court.” Id. at 808 (quoting Charleen J. v. Blake O., 289 Neb. 454, 855 N.W.2d 587, 595 (2014)). Therefore, contrary to Osman's argument, whether or not the Sudanese divorce certificate was effective “had no bearing” on whether the district court was acting within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Iqtaifan, 617 S.W.3d at 408.

[¶13] The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide whether to grant comity in this divorce action. We therefore review the court's decision to refuse to grant comity to the Sudanese divorce certificate.

B

[¶14] Comity is “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to both international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Med. Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241, 243 (N.D. 1980) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895)); see also Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164, 167 (N.D. 1990); Black's Law Dictionary 337 (12th ed. 2024) (“A principle or practice among political entities (as countries, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), whereby legislative, executive, and judicial acts are mutually recognized.”). Before comity may be relied on, however, it must be established that “the court which issued the order or judgment had jurisdiction over the matter and the parties involved and that due process was afforded to the parties in the proceedings.” Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 145 (N.D. 1980).

[¶15] “Comity is not a right, but is a willingness to grant privilege out of deference and good will.” State ex rel. Stenehjem v. Simple.net, Inc., 2009 ND 80, ¶ 14, 765 N.W.2d 506. Because comity is not a right and is within a district court's discretion, we review a court's decision whether to recognize and enforce an international divorce decree under the doctrine of comity for an abuse of discretion. See id. (citing Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430, 433 (N.D. 1977)). A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner; misinterprets or misapplies the law; or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. Id.

[¶16] Osman argues that the district court was required to recognize the December 11, 2022 Sudanese divorce certificate under the doctrine of comity; the court applied the wrong legal standard in refusing comity; Ali had actual notice of the divorce and therefore cannot raise a due process claim; Ali is equitably estopped from denying the validity of the Sudanese divorce; an April 2023 religious ceremony in North Dakota did not create a valid marriage under North Dakota law; and the court lacked authority to divide property or award spousal support because no valid marriage existed when this action was filed.

[¶17] In its January 2025 order denying Osman's motion to dismiss, the district court made findings of fact regarding the Sudanese divorce certificate. The court found that, unbeknownst to Ali, Osman pronounced talaq ¹ three times prior to December 11, 2022; and on or about December 11, 2022, Osman obtained the certificate of divorce from Ali in Sudan based on his pronouncement of talaq. The court found that when he obtained the divorce certificate, neither Osman nor Ali lived in Sudan, but rather they lived in the UAE at the time, which had been their residence since 2015. The court found Ali was not present when Osman obtained the divorce certificate. Ali first learned of the divorce proceeding when Osman emailed a copy of the divorce certificate on December 19, 2022. The court found Ali had been discussing a divorce from Osman with an attorney in the UAE in 2021 and 2022 and, at some point, Ali commenced a divorce action against Osman in the UAE. The court further found that Osman responded to the action stating the parties were already divorced in light of the divorce certificate, but that the parties eventually dismissed the UAE action.

[¶18] The district court denied Osman's motion to dismiss, declining to exercise comity to recognize and enforce the divorce certificate. In so doing, the court specifically found public policy concerns and a lack of due process: Osman obtained the divorce certificate in Sudan when neither party resided in the country; Osman unilaterally obtained the certificate, declaring talaq outside of Ali's presence; Ali was not given notice Osman was pronouncing talaq or seeking the certificate in Sudan; Ali did not receive a copy of the certificate until Osman emailed it to her days later; and Ali was not provided the basic rudiments of due process for the divorce proceedings.

[¶19] After the trial in this matter, the district court further held that its prior ruling declining to grant comity to the divorce certificate was the law of the case; that no testimony presented new facts to change the court's analysis or findings; and that the testimony at trial confirmed the relevant facts—Ali was not given prior notice of divorce proceedings in Sudan, she did not participate in any proceedings related to the divorce certificate, and no other divorce proceeding was completed in the UAE. The court found, “Even though [Ali] was aware that her religion allowed [Osman], as her husband, to unilaterally initiate a divorce, she did not have any due process related to the Divorce Certificate, including any opportunity to be heard.” The court further found that “even if the parties acknowledged the divorce after [Osman] obtained the Divorce Certificate and abided by their cultural and religious norms, proper due process safeguards did not exist with the issuance of the Divorce Certificate.”

[¶20] Other courts have declined to grant comity in similar situations. See Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 947 A.2d 489, 501 (2008) (holding divorce husband obtained under Islamic religious law and secular Pakistani law by performing talaq would not be afforded comity in Maryland); In re Ramadan, 153 N.H. 226, 891 A.2d 1186, 1190-91 (2006) (holding principles of comity did not require trial court to defer to Lebanese divorce decree and public policy considerations supported the trial court's decision to retain subject matter jurisdiction); Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (holding wife was denied due process in the Indian divorce arising from husband's pronouncement of the triple talaq, and the trial court erred by recognizing the Indian divorce and dismissing wife's divorce complaint); DAB v. MAS, 77 Misc.3d 679, 180 N.Y.S.3d 815, 820-24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022) (holding trial court would not extend comity to uphold the validity of an Egyptian divorce judgment based on serious concerns about whether the process undertaken by husband in the Egyptian court comported with due process and equal protection requirements, there was no proof wife was served with process, and wife was not a resident of Egypt but rather a permanent United States resident). Further, one court has held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to extend comity to a Sudanese divorce certificate. In Mustafa v. Elfadli, the husband had failed to raise the Sudanese divorce in his answer and counterclaim, and the court also discussed due process and public policy concerns:

Additionally, the Sudanese proceeding denied Wife due process. Wife was never served with notice of the proceeding or participated therein. Husband participated in absentia. Additionally, the Sudan Divorce Certificate was not authenticated. Husband failed to provide legal testimony as to what the document purported to be under Sudanese law. Further, we find the purported Sudanese divorce decree offends the public policy of this state regarding the division of marital assets as well as both child and spousal support obligation.

No. 12 CAF 08 0058, 2013 WL 1787383, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013).

[¶21] Section 14-05-08.1, N.D.C.C., provides in part that “[a] decree of divorce or of annulment of marriage obtained in a court of another jurisdiction is of no force or effect in this state, if the parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time such decree was rendered.” Contrary to Osman's assertion, this section does not require a district court to grant comity to a foreign country's divorce decree because it was obtained while the parties were not domiciled in this state.

[¶22] On this record, the district court made findings of fact and articulated its specific due process and public policy reasons for not granting comity to the foreign divorce certificate. The district court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner; did not misinterpret or misapply the law; and its decision is the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. We therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to recognize and enforce the Sudanese divorce certificate as a matter of comity.

III

[¶23] Osman argues, even if jurisdiction existed, the district court clearly erred in its property division by failing to properly apply the Ruff-Fischer factors. He further argues the court clearly erred in valuing three assets and the court abused its discretion by awarding the Fargo marital home to Ali based on clearly erroneous findings.

[¶24] The district court “shall make an equitable distribution of the property and debts of the parties” under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). A court's distribution of marital property is a finding of fact, reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Van Beek v. Van Beek, 2025 ND 96, ¶ 5, 21 N.W.3d 79. “Our law does not mandate a set formula or method to determine this division”; rather, “the division is based on the particular circumstances of each case.” Id. ¶ 6. “The distribution does not need to be equal to be equitable, but a substantial disparity must be explained.” Id. ¶ 8. “While the origin of property must be considered, there is no requirement to set property aside for a spouse who brings property into a marriage.” Shively v. Shively, 2025 ND 69, ¶ 22, 19 N.W.3d 824.

[¶25] Osman argues, among other contentions, that the district court clearly erred in applying the Ruff-Fischer guidelines; that he brought the entire estate into the marriage and was the sole earner and sole titled owner of all the financial assets “by operation of foreign law”; that “post-divorce” assets, i.e., after the purported December 2022 Sudanese divorce, should be excluded from the marital estate; that Exhibit D to the judgment contains mathematical errors misstating his net share and the total estate; and that three valuation errors produced an inequitable property division.

[¶26] Here, the district court made extensive and specific findings under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and explained the disparity in equitably distributing the parties’ property and debts. While a minor calculation error appears in Exhibit D to the divorce judgment, we have held immaterial misstatements or insignificant errors will not render the district court's findings clearly erroneous or constitute sufficient grounds for reversal of a judgment. See Pomarleau v. Pomarleau, 2022 ND 16, ¶ 24, 969 N.W.2d 430 (“Appellate courts review the record and findings as a whole and if the controlling findings are supported by the evidence, they will be upheld on appeal notwithstanding immaterial misstatements in the lower court's decision.” (quoting Puklich v. Puklich, 2019 ND 154, ¶ 45, 930 N.W.2d 593)); Halvorson v. Halvorson, 482 N.W.2d 869, 872 (N.D. 1992) (explaining relatively insignificant error, standing alone, does not constitute sufficient grounds for reversal of a judgment); but see Mertz v. Mertz, 2015 ND 13, ¶ 26, 858 N.W.2d 292 (holding $1,306 discrepancy, standing alone, was de minimis error, but requiring district court to fix this discrepancy on remand because the case was being remanded on other grounds). A district court's property valuation is also a finding of fact, which will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Van Beek, 2025 ND 96, ¶ 15, 21 N.W.3d 79. Although Osman argues the district court's valuations are clearly erroneous regarding the Dubai contract for deed, his TIAA retirement account, and Ali's jewelry, the court's valuations are within the range of evidence presented at trial.

[¶27] The district court's valuation and distribution of the parties’ marital property is not clearly erroneous. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2). See Van Beek, 2025 ND 96, ¶ 15, 21 N.W.3d 79 (“Valuations of marital property within the range of the evidence presented are not clearly erroneous.”).

IV

[¶28] Osman argues the district court abused its discretion in awarding spousal support by failing to make adequate findings and by misapplying the Ruff-Fischer factors.

[¶29] A district court may award spousal support under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1. “The court must consider the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, the needs of the spouse seeking support, and the ability of the other spouse to pay when determining whether to award spousal support.” Walden v. Walden, 2025 ND 32, ¶ 5, 17 N.W.3d 521. Spousal support decisions are findings of fact, reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. “A spousal support award based on need will be upheld when it falls within the range of the evidence presented.” Id. “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, and the district court's factual findings are presumptively correct.” Williams v. Williams, 2015 ND 129, ¶ 8, 863 N.W.2d 508. “[S]pousal support and property distribution are interrelated and intertwined and must be considered together.” Berdahl v. Berdahl, 2022 ND 136, ¶ 27, 977 N.W.2d 294.

[¶30] Here, in awarding spousal support, the district court considered the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, the parties’ disparate earning abilities, Ali's needs for support, and Osman's ability to pay. The court made specific findings explaining its decision, considered the interplay of Ali's equalization payment to Osman with the spousal support award, and found it appropriate and equitable to award Ali $10,000 in lump sum spousal support under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1(4)(c). On this record, the court's award of spousal support is not clearly erroneous. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

V

[¶31] Osman argues the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees for a second time, imposing undue financial hardship on him.

[¶32] Here, the district court awarded Ali attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4) and also included an alternative analysis under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23. Section 14-09-29(4), N.D.C.C., provides:

In any proceeding dealing with parental rights and responsibilities in which a parent is found to have perpetrated domestic violence, and there exists one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding, all court costs, attorney's fees, evaluation fees, and expert witness fees must be paid by the perpetrator of the domestic violence unless those costs would place an undue financial hardship on that parent.

[¶33] In Van Beek, this Court held that once evidence is offered supporting an award under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4), an award becomes mandatory absent the undue financial hardship exception. 2025 ND 96, ¶ 50, 21 N.W.3d 79. We further held this statute provides for recovery of costs and attorney's fees on appeal. Id. ¶ 54. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23, a district court has broad discretion to award attorney's fees and, in exercising its discretion, must balance one party's needs against the other party's ability to pay. Sayler v. Sayler, 2023 ND 156, ¶ 44, 994 N.W.2d 351. “A court also has inherent authority to award attorney's fees as a sanction for a litigant's misconduct.” Lizakowski v. Lizakowski, 2019 ND 177, ¶ 18, 930 N.W.2d 609; see also Kelly, 2011 ND 167, ¶ 35, 806 N.W.2d 133.

[¶34] The district court made findings supporting an award of attorney's fees under both N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4) and N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23. The court made specific findings of domestic violence, including one incident of Osman choking Ali as involving serious bodily injury, and a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable proximate time shortly before the case was commenced. The court also found, however, paying the full amount of Ali's attorney's fees would impose an undue financial hardship on Osman, so it awarded less than half of her fees, i.e., $30,000. The court alternatively found under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23 that while Osman did not have the ability to pay Ali's full attorney's fees, he had the ability to pay $30,000 based on his significantly greater income than Ali's income and based on his property award that includes liquid assets. We conclude the district court did not err in awarding Ali attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4). We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).

VI

[¶35] Ali moved this Court for an award of costs and attorney's fees on appeal under N.D.R.App.P. 38.

[¶36] Under N.D.R.App.P. 38, this Court “may award just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees” if we determine an appeal is frivolous. See Carpenter v. Southbay Homeowners Ass'n, 2025 ND 114, ¶ 25, 23 N.W.3d 118 (“[W]e consider whether there is such a complete absence of facts and law that a reasonable person might not have thought this Court would render a favorable judgment on appeal.” (citation omitted)). “Where the appellant's arguments are both factually and legally so devoid of merit that the appellant should have been aware of the impossibility of success on appeal, an assessment of costs and attorney fees is proper.” White Star Royalty Co. v. McGahey Oil LLC, 2026 ND 132, ¶ 10 (cleaned up) (quoting Carpenter, ¶ 25). “If a party seeks more than a token amount of attorney fees, an affidavit documenting the work performed should accompany the request.” Id. (quoting Solberg v. Hennessy, 2024 ND 91, ¶ 4, 6 N.W.3d 820).

A

[¶37] In her motion, Ali requests an order requiring Osman to reimburse her $20,000 for her reasonable attorney's fees and for such other relief as this Court deems appropriate. She argues Osman's appeal is made in bad faith, groundless, and without merit. She contends Osman's legal citations are irrelevant, inapplicable, or contradictory to his own argument. Ali also points out that Osman cites cases that do not exist and quotes phrases that cannot be found in the authority provided. Ali's counsel submitted a general declaration in support of her motion for costs and fees.

[¶38] Osman opposed the motion, arguing his issues are not frivolous; his appeal raises genuine legal questions; no “authenticated” marriage record was offered at trial; Ali's bad faith argument is inaccurate and omits evidence; his opening brief's citation errors do not render the appeal frivolous; his jurisdictional argument was legally supported and a good faith attempt to raise a novel issue; Ali's counsel's declaration is deficient and contains inflated fees; the motion for fees is tactical, not remedial; and a sanctions award would impose undue financial hardship on him.

[¶39] We conclude Osman's appeal is not completely frivolous; therefore, we do not sanction under N.D.R.App.P 38 as requested. Nevertheless, while Osman corrected two nonexistent citations, he failed to acknowledge numerous other citations wholly unrelated to the propositions for which they were cited. Under N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(2) and (7), a party's brief must provide citations to authorities, and under Rule 28(l), the brief must be accurate and free from irrelevant matters. Under N.D.R.App.P. 13, this court “may take appropriate action against any person failing to perform an act required by rule or court order.” We conclude a sanction is appropriate based on the multiple fictitious or nonexistent citation errors in his opening brief. See City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, 2026 ND 34, ¶¶ 16, 19, 31 N.W.3d 672 (awarding $500 as a sanction for misconduct based on fake or nonexistent legal citations); Stokka v. Stokka, 2026 ND 94, ¶¶ 4-5, 35 N.W.3d 207 (citing Helgeson and imposing costs and attorney's fees of $1,000, noting the “few legal authorities cited” were “either irrelevant, fictitious, or nonexistent”). We therefore award Ali sanctions in the amount of $1,000.

B

[¶40] As we concluded, the district court properly awarded Ali her attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4), which provides for the recovery of attorney's fees in proceedings where a parent has perpetrated domestic violence. In Van Beek, 2025 ND 96, ¶ 52, 21 N.W.3d 79, this Court further held this statute also “extends to the recovery for the costs and attorney's fees incurred in a subsequent appeal.” As in Van Beek, we conclude an award of attorney's fees on appeal in this matter is appropriate under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4).

[¶41] In response to Ali's motion on appeal, however, Osman argues that awarding further attorney's fees of $20,000 as a sanction would impose an undue financial hardship on him. He asserts the district court's findings establish he is already running a monthly deficit, he has no liquid assets, and the Dubai property refund—the valuation of which he disputes—has not been received. Because this Court does not conduct factfinding, we remand this question to the district court for a determination of his claimed hardship regarding an award under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4) of attorney's fees and costs with respect to this appeal and, if appropriate, the amount of any award.

VII

[¶42] We have considered Osman's remaining arguments and conclude they are unnecessary to our decision or without merit. We summarily affirm the divorce judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4). We award Ali sanctions from Osman in the amount of $1,000 and remand to the district court for consideration of whether an award under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(4) of attorney's fees and costs with respect to this appeal will result in undue financial hardship to Osman and, if appropriate, the amount of any award.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court found: “Under Islamic law, a husband has the right to initiate a divorce (‘talaq’) against his wife. All that is required to achieve talaq is for a husband to pronounce his intent to divorce his wife on three separate occasions, either verbally or in writing. The husband does not need to communicate his three pronouncements to his wife. She need not be present for them or even aware of them. A wife cannot object to a talaq.”

Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.

[¶43] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese