KUMMER v. and (2026)

[¶1] N.W. appeals from a juvenile court order denying her motions to reconsider a default order terminating her parental rights to B.W. and R.W. and the order terminating her parental rights. She argues the juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and did not comply with N.D.R.Juv.P. 10(b) before entering default. We affirm the default judgment and order denying motions to reconsider.

I

[¶2] N.W. gave birth to B.W. in January 2026. At a shelter care hearing three days later, the juvenile court placed B.W. with RSR Human Service Zone after finding methamphetamine and amphetamines in the newborn's system. The zone already had custody of R.W.; R.W. entered the zone's care in August 2024.

[¶3] On February 19, 2026, the State petitioned to terminate N.W.’s parental rights to both children. On February 20, 2026, the juvenile court entered an order in B.W.’s file setting a three-hour trial for March 27, 2026, and mailed the order to N.W. In R.W.’s file, the court issued a summons directing N.W. to appear on March 5, 2026, and advising her of her right to counsel. On February 25, 2026, an employee of the zone personally served N.W. with the petition for termination, an application for indigent defense, and a notice of trial in B.W.’s case; and the petition for termination, the summons, an application for indigent defense, and a notice of trial in R.W.’s case. The affidavit of service in B.W.’s file does not certify service of a summons.

[¶4] N.W. attended the March 5, 2026 initial hearing remotely, which covered both cases. The juvenile court provided to N.W. a brief summary of the petitions’ allegations and advised her of the effect of termination, the clear and convincing burden of proof, and her right to a court-appointed counsel. N.W. said she had an application for counsel ready to submit. The State asked to continue the trial to complete service on the children's possible fathers. The court, in N.W.’s presence, converted the March 27, 2026 hearing to a status conference.

[¶5] N.W. did not appear at the March 27, 2026 hearing, personally or through counsel. The juvenile court found her in default, received the case manager's affidavit, and made findings on the record. On April 10, 2026, the court entered an interlocutory juvenile findings of fact and order terminating N.W.’s parental rights to both children. The court entered default judgment on April 16, 2026.

[¶6] N.W. moved the juvenile court to reconsider the default judgment on April 27, 2026. In her supporting affidavit, N.W. acknowledged she was at the March 5, 2026 hearing where “[i]t was agreed there would be [a] status hearing[.]” She provided no explanation for not attending the March 27, 2026 hearing. N.W. stated she received a document stating the trial would be on April 16, 2026, and she planned to attend. However, she did not attend the April 16, 2026 trial and offered no explanation for her failure to do so. The court denied the motions for reconsideration.

II

[¶7] Citing a 1999 case, N.W. states this Court reviews a juvenile court's termination decision “in a manner similar to a trial de novo.” This is no longer the standard. “This Court reviews a juvenile court's findings of fact in a termination proceeding under the clearly erroneous standard of review.” Int. of W.S., 2026 ND 86, ¶ 5, 34 N.W.3d 185. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. “When a juvenile court exercises its discretion to terminate parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1), we review the court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. ¶ 13. “A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasonable determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. (quoting Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 13, 23 N.W.3d 718).

III

[¶8] Rule 28(b)(7)(B)(ii), N.D.R.App.P., requires the appellant's brief contain “citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved for review; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved[.]” N.W.’s brief does not cite to the record to show she preserved her arguments. Her brief also provides no argument regarding why this Court can review her issues if they were not raised in the juvenile court. N.W.’s brief does not meet the minimum requirements of Rule 28(b)(7). “Appellate rules must be complied with and treated respectfully.” Holm v. Holm, 2025 ND 100, ¶ 6, 21 N.W.3d 96 (quoting State v. Roller, 2024 ND 180, ¶ 19, 11 N.W.3d 864).

IV

[¶9] N.W. argues the juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction over her because she was never served with a summons under N.D.R.Juv.P. 5.

[¶10] “A court must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to issue a valid order or judgment.” In re T.H., 2012 ND 38, ¶ 16, 812 N.W.2d 373. “Personal jurisdiction is the court's power over a party.” Id. “Generally, personal jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of process in compliance with N.D.R.Civ.P. 4.” Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. Smith, 2013 ND 117, ¶ 18, 833 N.W.2d 464. However, a party may waive personal jurisdiction. Id.; see also In re T.H., ¶ 16 (“The court acquires personal jurisdiction through service of process or by voluntary general appearance in the action, either personally or through an attorney or other authorized person.”). The juvenile rules apply these principles of personal jurisdiction.

[¶11] Rule 6(a), N.D.R.Juv.P., provides for service of the summons under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4. However, N.D.R.Juv.P. 5(d) provides a party “may waive service of summons by written stipulation or by voluntary appearance at the hearing.” N.W. voluntarily appeared at the March 5, 2026 hearing on the termination petitions. She did not preserve the issue of personal jurisdiction when she appeared. See In re T.H., 2012 ND 38, ¶ 17, 812 N.W.2d 373 (father waived any claim that the court lacked jurisdiction when he appeared at the hearing on the deprivation petition and did not object to the court's jurisdiction or argue he had not been properly served); Invs. Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2010 ND 138, ¶ 64, 785 N.W.2d 863 (“In the absence of a previously made and properly preserved objection to the jurisdiction of the trial court, a general appearance amounts to a waiver of the right to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the appearing party.” (quoting Grey Bear v. N.D. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 2002 ND 139, ¶ 30, 651 N.W.2d 611)). Moreover, N.W. did not raise the issue of personal jurisdictional in her motions for reconsideration. See Alliance Pipeline L.P., 2013 ND 117, ¶ 20, 833 N.W.2d 464 (holding personal jurisdiction arguments not raised in a motion for reconsideration were not properly before this Court).

[¶12] N.W. waived service of the summonses by voluntarily appearing at the March 5, 2026 hearing and not raising the issue of personal jurisdiction in her motions for reconsideration.

V

[¶13] N.W. argues the juvenile court lacked legal authority to enter default against her under N.D.R.Juv.P. 10(b)(1) because she was not properly served with a summons. She asserts the court may only enter default “after” the summons is properly served. Thus, according to N.W., proper service of the summons is a prerequisite to the court having authority to enter default. N.W. misreads Rule 10(b)(1).

[¶14] It does not appear N.W. preserved this issue below. In her motions for reconsideration, N.W. requests reconsideration “due to lack of notice to her.” In her supporting brief, she acknowledges she was at the March 5, 2026 hearing where it was announced a status hearing would take place on March 27, 2026. She also noted an order stated the March 27, 2026 hearing was a status conference. She stated she did not believe the March 27, 2026 hearing was a trial. Because the March 27, 2026 status conference was “turned into a default hearing” without notice, she requested the juvenile court reschedule the trial. The brief cited Rule 10(b) for the proposition the court is allowed to reschedule a hearing. See N.D.R.Juv.P. 10(b)(1) (stating if a parent “fails to appear at a hearing, the court may receive evidence in support of the petition or reschedule the hearing”). N.W. did not argue she was not served the summons in either case or that service of a summons was a prerequisite to the court entering default. Although likely unpreserved, and despite N.W.’s lack of compliance with N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(B)(ii), we address N.W.’s argument.

[¶15] Although labeled motions for reconsideration, we review N.W.’s motions under N.D.R.Juv.P. 16. See Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 21, 23 N.W.3d 718 (stating N.D.R.Juv.P. 16 is the correct standard to decide a motion to vacate a default judgment terminating parental rights). “We review a court's exercise of its discretion under N.D.R.Juv.P. 16(b) for an abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶ 25.

[¶16] Rule 10(b)(1), N.D.R.Juv.P., provides, “If after being properly served with a summons or notice a parent ․ fails to appear at a hearing, the court may receive evidence in support of the petition or reschedule the hearing.” Under the rule's plain language, the juvenile court may receive evidence if a parent fails to appear after proper service of the “summons or notice.” The word “or” is disjunctive, indicating an alternative between different things or actions. Sorenson v. Felton, 2011 ND 33, ¶ 13, 793 N.W.2d 799; State v. Martin, 2011 ND 6, ¶ 7, 793 N.W.2d 188. “The word ‘or’ expresses an alternative in its ordinary use and generally corresponds to the word ‘either.’ ” Martin, ¶ 7. Phrases separated by “or” have separate and independent significance. Id.; see also D.A.H. v. D.A.D., 2025 ND 208, ¶ 5, 29 N.W.3d 590 (explaining the word “or” is disjunctive indicating an alternative between different things or actions and phrases separated by “or” have separate and independent significance). Thus, a parent given proper notice of a hearing need not also have been served with a formal N.D.R.Juv.P. 5(a) summons before the court may proceed under Rule 10(b)(1).

[¶17] Based on the record, we are unable to conclude whether N.W. was served with a summons in compliance with Rule 5 in either case. However, N.W. did receive notice of the hearing as required by N.D.R.Juv.P. 10(b)(1).

VI

[¶18] In its order denying motions to reconsider, the juvenile court explained N.W. had both verbal and written notice of the March 27, 2026 hearing time and date. The record shows, and N.W.’s motions and affidavit acknowledge, the court gave notice of the March 27, 2026 hearing during the March 5, 2026 hearing. In its order, the court also explained N.W. “was verbally reminded of the hearing at her Child and Family Team Meeting earlier that week.” Despite the written and verbal notices and the verbal reminder, the court explained N.W. did not appear at the hearing. It also noted N.W. did not attend the April 16, 2026 hearing, despite stating in her affidavit she intended to attend it. The court explained N.W. has a consistent pattern of failing to participate in the proceedings, and offered no reasonable explanation as to why she did not attend the March 27, 2026 or April 16, 2026 hearing. It stated N.W. offered “no substantive explanation for her absence or why Rule 10 is inapplicable.” Finally, it explained N.D.R.Juv.P. 10(b)(1) “does not indicate that default can only be entered at a ‘trial,’ rather, that appearance by a parent is required at all hearings.” See N.D.R.Juv.P. 10(b)(1) (providing the court may receive evidence in support of the petition if a parent “fails to appear at a hearing”); Int. of K.B., 2026 ND 149, ¶ 7, ––– N.W.3d –––– (affirming default after parent failed to attend status conference the district court announced on the record). Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 16, 23 N.W.3d 718 (affirming default after parent failed to attend status conference despite having been properly notified of the hearing).

[¶19] A juvenile court may enter default and terminate parental rights if the parent receives oral notice of a hearing and fails to attend. Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶¶ 6-7, 16, 23 N.W.3d 718. Based on the record and the juvenile court's rationale in its order denying motions to reconsider, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying N.W.’s motions for reconsideration.

VII

[¶20] The juvenile court did not lack personal jurisdiction over N.W. The court did not misapply N.D.R.Juv.P. 10(b)(1) or abuse its discretion in denying N.W.’s motions for reconsideration. We affirm the default judgment and order denying motions to reconsider.

Bahr, Justice.

[¶21] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J. Jerod E. Tufte Jon J. Jensen Douglas A. Bahr Mark A. Friese